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WHOLE No. 304

ON HERACLITUS.¹

I offer here remarks on (a) the authenticity of the whole or part of some of his fragments (Section I), and (b) the historical relation of his thought to that of those who influenced him most directly, Anaximander and Anaximenes (Section II). The immediate stimulus for these reflections I owe to the study of G. S. Kirk's recent book, *Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments*, which I reviewed briefly in the July issue of this Journal. A work as serious and thorough as this compels one to reconsider many things one has previously taken for granted, to ask new questions, look afresh at the texts, and push through to a finish some hitherto half-finished trains of thought. For this I must express my sincere thanks to Kirk and also the hope that he will see in my many criticisms of his views a mark of esteem, not

¹ After completing the first draft of this paper I had the benefit of comments on it by Professor Friedrich Solmsen and of a detailed discussion of the fragments of Heraclitus made by Professor Harold Cherniss in his seminar at Princeton (Spring Term, 1955). I learned much from both, and made many revisions and corrections accordingly. But it must not be inferred that either or both of them would share all the views I express here; I alone am responsible for any opinion not credited by name to another. With two minor exceptions, I have not even undertaken to *mention* the interesting suggestions put forward by Professor Cherniss in his seminar; original ideas are better presented to the public by their originator, and I hope he may publish them himself. I also wish to thank the Institute for Advanced Study for enabling me to pursue studies on this and other topics under ideal conditions during the past year.

the reverse. Only a fundamental work is worthy of extensive criticism. And if I have said little on matters in which I agree with him, it is because I could not hope to improve on his own treatment of them.

I

I start with the river-fragments. In Diels-Kranz they read:

B 91a: ποταμῷ . . . οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι δις τῷ αὐτῷ.

B 49a: ποταμοῖς τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐμβαίνομέν τε καὶ οὐκ ἐμβαίνομεν, εἰμέν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν.

B 12: ποταμοῖσι τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν ἐμβαίνουσιν ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα ἐπιρρεῖ.²

The first is the most famous of the sayings attributed to Heraclitus since the time of Plato. The latter's citation (*Crat.*, 402A) reads: οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης for οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι in Aristotle (*Met.*, 1010 a 14) and Plutarch.³ I believe that Plato's more direct form, in the second person optative in place of the infini-

² The sequel, καὶ ψυχαὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὕγρων ἀναθυμῶνται, is printed in the fragment by Diels-Kranz, but with a sceptical question-mark. The main reasons for rejecting it are noticed by Kirk (pp. 368, 371). But we would be in a better position to solve the residual puzzle, *sc.* why Cleanthes (cf. Kirk, p. 367) should have connected the river-image with the soul, if we adopt (following a suggestion made by Cherniss in his seminar) an emendation proposed by J. D. Meewaldt (*Mnemosyne*, IV, 4 [1951], pp. 53-4), *veapal* for *voepal* in the sentence preceding the citation, which would then run, "For Heraclitus, wishing to show that souls by being exhaled become ever new (*veapal*), likened them to rivers, saying, etc." Thus Cleanthes would have linked the soul with *anathymiasis* (perhaps, as Kirk suggests at p. 371, by means of B 36 *sub fin.*) and then soul-in-*anathymiasis* with the river-image by means of the ceaseless change characteristic of exhalation. A still more complete explanation for Cleanthes' treatment of the fragment would be available if, as I shall argue below, B 49a should be retained. (May I say here, once for all, that I shall not burden the text by references to the ancient sources of quoted fragments, except where these are essential for my argument; the sources are easily found in Diels-Kranz or, better still, in Kirk who also gives more of their context. In referring to Kirk's opinions I shall not give page-references except when his excellent index of the fragments, pp. vii-ix, is insufficient to identify the passage.)

³ *De E*, 392b, from which B 91 is taken by Diels-Kranz, and also in Plutarch's less complete citation at *De Sera Num.*, 559c. But in a third citation in Plutarch, to which I shall refer and quote in the text below, Plato's οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης is retained.

tive, is more likely to be the original.⁴ The second fragment expresses in its first sentence much the same thought as that conveyed by B 91a in a different, though equally arresting, form. Both fragments are now in peril of their lives. Reinhardt has rejected the first; Gigon, and now Kirk, reject also the second, leaving us with B 12 as the single original.⁵ But I have no intention of bidding these old friends goodbye without strong reasons. And Kirk has really none for condemning the first, except the following: While Plutarch cites B 91a twice in almost the same form (see Kirk, p. 372), he has a third citation (at *Qu. Nat.*, 912a) which reads: ποταμοῖς γὰρ δις τοῖς αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης, ὥς φησιν Ἡράκλειτος, ἕτερα γὰρ ἐπιρρεῖ ὕδατα. Kirk assumes that the latter must be derived from an original identical with B 12, and that Plutarch's first two citations (as well as Plato's and Aristotle's) can only be variants of B 12. But let us compare the first clause in Plutarch's third citation (a) with B 91a and (b) with the first part of B 12. In the case of (a) the difference is trivial: "rivers" in the plural in place of "river."⁶ In the case of (b) the difference is anything but trivial: Plutarch's says, "one cannot enter *twice*," while B 12, "to those who enter." The presence of δις in the earliest version of the Heraclitean saying is attested not only by the Platonic citation to which I referred above, but, more strongly, by the context of Aristotle's version of the fragment (*Met.*, 1010 a 13): "Cratylus scolded Heraclitus for having said one could not step into the same river twice; for *he* thought one could not even once." In his book Kirk does not question the authenticity of Cratylus' remark.⁷ But, if authentic, it could not have been a

⁴ Cf. οὐκ ἂν ἐξέυροιο at B 45, which is sufficient to dispose of Reinhardt's opinion ("Heraklits Lehre vom Feuer," *Hermes*, LXXVII [1942], p. 18, n. 2) that the second person optative "niemals Heraklitisch sein kann," echoed by Kirk (p. 372). To this article by Reinhardt I shall hereafter refer merely by the author's name.

⁵ Reinhardt, *loc. cit.*, and *Parmenides* (Bonn, 1916), pp. 165 and 207, n. 1; O. Gigon, *Untersuchungen zu Heraklit* (Leipzig, 1935), pp. 106 ff. Cf. also E. Weerts, *Heraklit und Herakliteer* (Berlin, 1926), pp. 8 ff. I shall focus on Kirk's discussion which conserves most of the objections that have been raised against B 91a and 49a.

⁶ There is also, of course, οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης for οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι, but this would only strengthen the conclusion I reach below if the former is the original, as I have already suggested.

⁷ He did so in an earlier paper (*A. J. P.*, LXXII [1951], pp. 225 ff.,

retort to B 12, which does not contain the vital *δῖς*. How could it then be directed at anything but a saying which did say "twice," as Gigon and Reinhardt have already observed? Are we to suppose that Cratylus first invented the powerful image conveyed by "twice" (as an inference from B 12?) and then made his own creation the epitome of the Heraclitean doctrine to which he objected? Of shall we think he got it from some other second-hand source? In the absence of definite evidence to the contrary, we can only assume that an image worthy of Heraclitus' genius was his own creation, not that of an imitator or paraphraser. But if *δῖς* was in the original, it could obviously not have been in the first part of B 12; while the second part of B 12, unobjectionable in itself, could very well have been taken from an original which read, *δῖς ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης, ἕτερα γὰρ καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα ἐπιρρεῖ*. This is substantially Plutarch's third citation⁸ and, in the light of the foregoing considerations, our best reconstruction of the Heraclitean original from which both B 91a and B 12 were derived.

What of Kirk's case against B 49a? His objection to the first sentence is that it "is not a possible summary of anything Heraclitus said, for it asserts that *at any moment* the rivers are the same and not the same: this, as Aristotle tells us, is the belief

at pp. 244-8). He started here by pointing out the similarity between Aristotle's citation and Plato's (*Crat.*, 402A 9-10), as though this were any reason for thinking that Aristotle is only quoting Plato and Plato is misquoting Heraclitus. Then, catching up with the *non sequitur*, he negated the possibility that both Plato and Aristotle are quoting a genuine fragment by referring to Reinhardt's opinion that B 12 is the original quotation from Heraclitus and then "confirming" Reinhardt's view by referring to Plutarch. In all this there is nothing to discredit the authenticity of Cratylus' remark as reported by Aristotle, unless we assume the very point at issue, *sc.* the genuineness of B 12 and spuriousness of B 91a, nor is there anything in Reinhardt (*loc. cit.*) except the scornful aside, "Was bei Aristoteles steht, ist nicht Zitat, sondern Anekdote."

⁸ But I have kept the text in Plato's citation for the first part of the fragment, on the rule that the earlier citation should be favored in the absence of definite reasons to the contrary. For Plato's *ἐς . . . ποταμὸν* in place of the dative in Plutarch's third citation cf. *ἐς πηλὸν ἐμβάς* at B 5; Plutarch himself has the accusative with *ἐς* in one of his three citations (*De Sera Num.*, 559c). Both forms were in use (L. S., *s. v.* *ἐμβαλναι*); Heraclitus' use of the accusative with *ἐς* in this fragment and of the dative in B 49a presents no difficulty.

not of Heraclitus but of Cratylus, αὐτὸς γὰρ ᾤετο οὐδ' ἄπαξ" (p. 373).⁹ Now if we are to press such fine points we might as well be exact about it. If Cratylus' remark is to be recast into a retort against B 49a, it would have to assert not, as this does, both alternatives, "we do, and do not, enter," but just one of them, "we do not enter." So the difference between the two views would remain intact, Heraclitus asserting identity-in-difference in B 49a, Cratylus difference (without identity) in his remodelled rejoinder. So the difference from Heraclitus would remain intact. The only question then is whether Heraclitus would be unlikely to express identity-in-difference in a yes-and-no form. To this the answer is certainly, No. Kirk rightly cites the parallel of οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει at B 32. He might also have noticed here the ὅλα καὶ οὐχ ὅλα in B 10. These prove that Heraclitus did use the paradoxical yes-and-no form of expression, for which there is no known precedent, though it turns up after him both in his imitators¹⁰ and in his great critic, Parmenides¹¹—a form which is the perfect vehicle for his paradox that things

⁹ An objection first made by Gigon, *op. cit.*, p. 107, and approved by Calogero, *Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana*, XVII (1936), p. 215, n. 1.

¹⁰ (Hippocr.), *De Victu*, 1, 4, πάντα πρὸς ἕκαστον τῷτό, καὶ οὐδὲν πάντων τῷτό, 1, 5, πάντα ταῦτα καὶ οὐ ταῦτα, 1, 24, οἱ αὐτοὶ ἐσέρπουσι καὶ ἐξέρπουσι καὶ οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ . . . τὸν αὐτὸν μὴ εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν. *De Nutr.*, 17, μία φύσις ἐστὶ πάντα καὶ οὐ μία, 24, μία φύσις εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, 25, μέγεθος αὐτῶν μέγα καὶ οὐ μέγα, 27, γλυκὴ καὶ οὐ γλυκὴ, 32, δύναμις μία καὶ οὐ μία, 42, οὐκ ἔστι καὶ ἔστι. For most of the passages from *De Nutr.* I am indebted to Reinhardt, *Hermes*, LXXVII (1942), p. 239. For the same idiom in Euripides, cf. *El.*, 1230, φίλα τε καὶ φίλα, *Bacch.*, 395, τὸ σοφὸν οὐ σοφία, *Or.*, 819, τὸ καλὸν οὐ καλόν, *Hel.*, 138, τεθνᾶσι καὶ τεθνᾶσι, *Alc.*, 521, ἔστιν τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν; and Eurip. parodied by Aristoph., *Ach.*, 396, οὐκ ἔνδον, ἔνδον ἐστίν.

¹¹ B 6, 8-9. Those who deny any allusion to Heraclitus in Parmenides (and they are now in the great majority) have yet to explain why in these lines Parmenides should (a) impute to *anyone* the belief in the identity of being and not-being (rather than merely the belief in not-being, which is bad enough from his point of view and would have given his critical dialectic all the scope it needs) and (b) after saying οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταῦτόν νενόμισται here, which would be quite sufficient to make his point, should add maliciously, καὶ ταῦτόν, producing the expression, ταῦτόν καὶ ταῦτόν, which so strikingly parallels ὅλα καὶ οὐχ ὅλα in Heraclitus; nor (c) why he should be so emphatic in asserting that each of the two forms in his cosmology is ἐαυτῷ.

which not only appear to be, but are, different are nevertheless "one" and "the same." Nothing would be more natural for a man who thinks and talks this way than to say, of the same rivers whose waters are never the same at any point, "we step into the same rivers—and we don't step into the same rivers." What of the next sentence, *εἰμέν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν*? Surely one does not need to see "him through the eyes of Hegel" (Kirk, p. 373) to suppose that he *could* have said just that. The idea of our being and not being would be a true application of Heraclitus' notion of the identity of opposites and neither more nor less Hegelian than the identity of the living and the dead at B 88. Heraclitus was as capable of saying *εἰμέν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν*, as Euripides *ἔστιν τε κούκ' ἔστιν*, *Alc.*, 521. But is he likely to have said so in *this* fragment? This is the real problem, for admittedly the transition from "into the same river we do and do not enter" to "we are and are not" is abrupt. It is possible that some part of the original dropped out, for our source for this fragment, Heraclitus Homericus, omits important words in two of his other citations of Heraclitus.¹² If so, the simplest explanation would be that the original read *εἰμέν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν <οἱ αὐτοί>*¹³. But this is by no means the only reasonable hypothesis.

πάντοσε τωτόν, τῷ δ'ἐτέρῳ μὴ τωτόν, B 8, 57-8 (on the latter cf. *T. A. P. A.*, LXXVII [1946], p. 69, n. 21; and now Kirk, p. 2). As other allusions to Heraclitus we can count (d) *παλίντροπος* at B 6, 10 if, as I shall argue, the same word must be retained at Her., B 51; also (e) the parallel of *σκίδνησι . . . συνίσταται* at Her., B 91 with *σκιδνάμενον . . . συνιστάμενον* at Parm., B 4 (which is ironically strengthened by Reinhardt's rehabilitation—now followed by Walzer and Kirk—of the genuineness of *συνίσταται* in the Heraclitean fragment, against its rejection by Diels-Kranz and others; to the defense of *συνίσταται* I should add Heraclitus' use of *δύσταται* at B 125).

¹² In the case of B 90, all he gives us is *πυρὸς . . . ἀμοιβῇ τὰ πάντα*, *Quest. Homer.*, 43, omitting *καὶ πῦρ ἀπάντων*; of *ἀπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα* in the last clause of B 30 only *ἀπτόμενον τε καὶ σβεννύμενον* survives in *ibid.*, 26. No omissions in the case of B 62, though his text (*ibid.*, 24) is obviously not as good as that of Hippolytus.

¹³ Zeller-Nestle, *Philosophie der Griechen*, I (2) (Leipzig, 1929), p. 798, n., suppose that *οἱ αὐτοί* (or *ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ποταμοῖς*) though not in the original was meant to be supplied from the preceding *οἱ αὐτοί*. Though I do not think these suggestions "absurd" (so Kirk, p. 373), neither can I put any stock in them in the absence of any appropriate parallels.

There is nothing to preclude the possibility that the εἶμεν was existential, and that Heraclitus passed in this fragment (with or without intervening words) from the "yes-and-no" of our relation to external objects (the rivers, as symbols of change) to the "yes-and-no" of our own (changing) being.¹⁴

My conclusion as to the relative claims to authenticity of the three river-fragments is thus the opposite of Kirk's. In one thing I do agree with him: we cannot keep all three; for though Heraclitus may well have used the river-image more than once, he is unlikely to have done so without significant variation in thought and expression. But the one I would sacrifice is B 12, for it is the flattest of the three, and can be better explained as a smoothing down of B 91a (or rather of the variant I have suggested above) and B 49a, than can the latter as subsequent remodellings of a weaker Heraclitean original.¹⁵ Another solution of the problem would be to take Seneca's version as the

¹⁴ Other objections to B 49a are also put forward by Kirk, following Gigon: "The use of the first person plural to represent an action which is not necessary or universal (in contrast, for example, with fr. 21) is improbable in archaic prose style; and it is extremely unlikely that the ἐμβαίνοντες (who provide the fixed point of observation in fr. 12) should be put on a level with the waters which change" (p. 373). Why is the latter "unlikely"? Doesn't Heraclitus think that men change as much? Why then should he not "put them on a level" with the changing rivers? And the truth expressed by the verbs surely is universal (what else could it be?); so there is no problem about the plural, though I am not convinced that there would be, even if it were not universal. Curiously enough Kirk does not bring up the most serious difficulty in the way of the genuineness of the latter part of B 49a: εἶμέν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν are just the words that would have been most likely to be quoted by Cleanthes (n. 2, above) or by Seneca (n. 16, below) who see the river as a likeness of human change. The only explanation I can offer is to assume that the first part got separated from the second in some important source and thus came alone to the notice of Cleanthes and Seneca; cf. the fate of B 90, whose first part, πρὸς τε ἀνταμοιβήν τὰ πάντα, is cited all by itself (with variations) over and over again (ten citations listed by Walzer, *Eracrito* [Florence, 1939], pp. 125-6), while only Plutarch preserves the whole fragment.

¹⁵ I have misgivings about dropping even B 12. It has its own peculiar stylistic beauty, best noticed by H. Fraenkel, who speaks of its "wie rastlose Wellen herabflutende Kola," *Gött. Nachr.*, 1925, p. 107, n. 2. Yet neither does it have the rugged strength of Heraclitus. To rely on the contrast between ποταμοῖσι τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν and ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα

original of the first part of B 49a: *in idem flumen bis descendimus et non descendimus* (*Ep.*, 58, 23).¹⁶ But I think this goes to the other extreme from B 12. Seneca is bound to have both of the gems that fell out of B 12, and both in the same sentence. But either of them—"do not enter twice" or "we enter and do not enter"—tells the whole story perfectly all by itself. To put them together makes a crowded pattern, redundant, and less lucid. Its taste (or, rather, lack of it) is much more likely to be that of Seneca than Heraclitus.¹⁷

I shall next review the case of B 89, τοῖς ἐγρηγορόσιν ἓνα καὶ κοινὸν κόσμον εἶναι, τῶν δὲ κοιμωμένων ἕκαστον εἰς ἴδιον ἀποστρέφεσθαι. Diels, followed by Kranz, had already condemned the second clause, for no good reason: the use of κοιμωμένων is no objection, for, as Kirk points out (p. 64), κοιμᾶσθαι, a common word from Homer down, is perfectly possible instead of καθεῖδεν, εὔδεν in B 1, B 21, B 26, B 75, B 88. Kirk thinks the whole fragment "a later paraphrase, partly of the last clause of fr. 2 [ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν] and partly of the last sentence of fr. 1 [τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ποιοῦσιν, ὁκωσπερ ὁκόσα εὔδοντες ἐπιλανθάνονται]" (p. 63). But surely there is no mere paraphrase here. B 1 speaks of failing to notice or take account of what happens in our waking experience, while B 89 of turning away from "the one and common world" to a "private" one; this in turn is a different idea from that of the λόγος ξυνὸς vs. ἰδία φρόνησις of B 2, though the sense of all three is, of course, very closely related. If we are to throw out this fragment it cannot be on the ground that it merely repeats what is said in the other two, but that the distinctive thing it does say could not have been said by Heraclitus. And why not? Because, says Kirk, the word κόσμος could only mean 'order,' not 'world,' at this time (p. 63). He argues this at length in his commentary on B 30, κόσμον τόνδε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων, οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων

to get across the idea of change would be good enough for other writers, but milder than what one expects from Heraclitus—and gets in B 91a and B 49a.

¹⁶ Defended as a translation of a Heraclitean original by Calogero, *loc. cit.* at n. 9, above.

¹⁷ Reinhardt, *loc. cit.*, objected to Seneca's version on the ground that δις would not go with the plural. But I fail to see that δις οὐκ ἐμβαλνομεν would make poor sense or impossible Greek.

ἐποίησεν, etc., to condemn τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων as a gloss.¹⁸ He collects the uses of κόσμος in the pre-Socratics, and says, quite rightly, that ὁ κόσμος ὁ πρόσθεν ἑὸν in Mel., B 7, and κατὰ κόσμον in Parm., B 4, can only mean 'order' and 'in order' respectively. But he is wrong in saying that in Anaxag. B 8, οὐ κενώριται ἀλλήλων τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ κόσμῳ, κόσμος is "the one group, or category—in this case, probably the continuum formed by each pair of opposites" (p. 313). Anaxagoras does not say here that the hot and the cold "form" a κόσμος, but that they are "in" one; his κόσμος is indeed a continuum, but a single one, wherein "everything has a portion of *everything*," not the many continua of his multiple pairs of opposites, which would not be "one world." Kirk is also wrong in saying that in Diog., B 2, εἰ γὰρ τὰ ἐν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ ἑόντα νῦν, γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀήρ καὶ πῦρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα φαίνεται ἐν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ ἑόντα, the expression ἐν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ means "'in this arrangement' (as opposed to a primaeval mixture)" (p. 313), because the notion of a primaeval mixture has nothing to do with what Diogenes is talking about here and cannot be, as an implied contrast, the clue to the sense; he is just talking about the world of ordinary experience and the various things in it. He is finally wrong in saying that Xen., Mem., I, 1, 11, ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος and Plato, Gorg., 597E, οἱ σοφοί . . . τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο . . . κόσμον καλοῦσι "suggest very strongly that κόσμος = world is a comparatively *new* and technical usage" (p. 314): I italicize "new" because that, of course, is the only thing to which I object; the point of both texts is that it is the philosophers who call the world κόσμος, not that they have started doing this fairly recently.¹⁹ Moreover this

¹⁸ Following Reinhardt, pp. 12-13, whose arguments are (a) that the words are only in Clement, but not in Plutarch or Simplicius (quoting Alexander); (b) "the same for all things" does not make good sense here and the sense it does make ("Totalität") is anyhow implied by the assertion of the eternity of the world in the sequel. But (a) lacks cogency, since only Clement cites the rest of the fragment in its entirety, while the other two give only pieces of it; (b) becomes irrelevant if one translates, "the same of all men" (see n. 21, below), which makes excellent sense: the world which "no one of gods or men has made" or could make is "this one," the real world, which is "the same of all"; "private" dream-worlds (cf. B 89) can be and are being made all the time.

¹⁹ On the other hand, I should agree with Kirk (p. 312) against

very fragment of Heraclitus (B 30) is evidence that κόσμος, though it implies, does not just mean, 'order,' for what is in question here is not merely that nobody made the *order* of the world, but that nobody made this orderly *world*; this world is fire, and nobody made the fire, for it is "ever-living."²⁰ Kirk, in spite of his theory, concedes as much when he is led to say in the course of his discussion of the fragment that "the relationship of κόσμον τόνδε to πῦρ αείζων becomes, after all, one of simple predication: the natural world and the order in it . . . is an ever-living fire" (p. 317). "Natural world and the order in it"—this is the sense of κόσμος in Heraclitus, B 30 and B 89, Anaxagoras, B 8, and Diogenes, B 2. Then the argument that it can only mean 'order' for Heraclitus is pointless, as it is certainly wrong anyhow.

There is then no reason why Heraclitus could not have spoken of "this world, *the same of all*" in B 30,²¹ and in B 89 of the

Reinhardt, Kranz, and Gigon, that Theophrastus' phrase τοὺς οὐρανοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς κόσμους is of itself no evidence for the use of the word by Anaximander; and that the authenticity of ὅλον τὸν κόσμον in Anaximenes, B 2 (to be discussed below) is far from certain. But I am not as confident as Kirk that κόσμος was not used even in sixth century speculation for 'world.' In his extended defense of early usage (*Philologus*, XCIII [1938], pp. 430 ff.) Kranz makes no mention of this consideration: the Milesians would certainly need a substantive by which to refer both in the singular and the plural to the world(s) which issue from the *arche*. Adjectival and participial makeshifts like τὸ ὅλον, τὸ πᾶν, τὰ ἅπαντα, τὰ ἔόντα would not formally distinguish world(s) from *arche* or, if they did, would only convey the idea of indefinite totalities instead of structured world-systems. *Ouranos*, sometimes used by Aristotle, Theophrastus, and the doxographers for just this purpose, is never used in this way in extant fragments (Parm., B 10, 5; Emp., B 22, 2) but always, as we should expect, in its original sense of 'heavens.' Such a need is bound to be met sooner or later, and more likely sooner than later; it could be met very early by the use of κόσμος since the notion of the world as an orderly arrangement was, of course, present from the beginning. For this reason (not Kirk's, p. 313) I am inclined to discount Aet., II, 1, 1, "Pythagoras was the first to name τὴν τῶν ὅλων περιοχὴν 'world' because of its order."

²⁰ Cf. Burnet's comment: "κόσμος must mean 'world' here, not merely 'order'; for only the world could be identified with fire," *Early Greek Philosophy* (4th ed., London, 1945), p. 134, n. 3.

²¹ The usual translation of ἀπάντων here is "for all" (so Diels-Kranz, Burnet, Kirk), as though Heraclitus had written πᾶσι. The difference in sense between the genitive and the dative is probably not great, but

"one and common world" for the wide awake from which sleepers turn away, each to his own "private (world)." The notion of the real world being "the same of all," "one and common" for all, is a powerful one. It fills out beautifully Heraclitus' idea that the *Logos*, though common, is missed by the many (B 2) and passes unnoticed, though ever-present and universal (B 1). It says explicitly what is implied in B 17, which says that the many don't understand the things they "meet with" (reading *όκόσοις ἐγκυρεῦσιν*): the world is what we all "meet with" all the time, it is the very same for all of us, but those who cannot understand its order live as though not only their understanding (B 2), but their world (B 89), were private, like men asleep. Homer had already spoken of the *δῆμος ονείρων*, *Od.*, XXIV, 12, and for him, as for everyone, dream, like shadow, was the symbol of unreality, the land where only phantoms dwell. Heraclitus underlines the unreality of the dream-world by calling it "private."²² At the same time he shows up the illusory character of ordinary belief by banishing it into a world as "private" as that of the dream. In developing this line of thought Heraclitus would run up against the paradox that the beliefs which *he* condemns as "private" were in fact the general rule and thus perfectly "common" in that sense, while his were, in the same sense, all too "private" to himself. To block this side-track he would wish to say somewhere along the line that the "common" is not the common-run, nor the individual the "private"; what is "common for all" is not what all, or almost all, happen to think, but what all should think, and would, if they had sense. So B 113, *ξυνόν ἐστι πᾶσι τὸ φρονέειν*, has a distinctive place in his train of thought, and I see no reason for dropping it because of Kirk's suspicions.²³

we might as well observe it in the translation, with "of all" here and at B 114, *τῷ συνῶ πάντων*, and "for all" at B 113, *ξυνόν . . . πᾶσι*, and "for the wide awake" at B 89, *τοῖς ἐγρηγορόσιν*.

²² Cf. E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley, 1951), p. 118: "Not only does that rule out the 'objective' dream, but it seems by implication to deny validity to dream-experience in general, since Heraclitus' rule is 'to follow what we have in common'."

²³ They come to this: for Heraclitus "common" was "almost a technical term" whose "primary" sense was "operative in all things"; but in B 113 it has the "subsidiary" sense of what (or how) all should think; and "one may well doubt whether Heraclitus would have ex-

I now turn to two cases which involve a change in the received text. First the famous B 51, which reads in Diels-Kranz, οὐ ξυνιάσιν ὅκως διαφερόμενον ἐωυτῷ ὁμολογέει· παλίντροπος ἀρμονίη ὅκωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης. Kirk, with Zeller, Brieger, Gigon, Verdenius, and Walzer, would change ὁμολογέει to συμφέρεται, after Plato, *Symp.*, 187A, τὸ ἐν γάρ φησι διαφερόμενον αὐτὸ αὐτῷ συμφέρεσθαι ὥσπερ ἀρμονίαν τόξου τε καὶ λύρας, and by analogy with συμφερόμενον διαφερόμενον in B 10. With this change I would agree.²⁴ But I cannot join Kirk (and an impressive list of other scholars)²⁵ in dropping παλίντροπος in favor of παλίντονος. My reasons for conserving παλίντροπος are partly those of Diels and Kranz (*Vors.*⁶, *ad loc.*, pp. 162 and 493): (a) Plutarch has παλίντροπον in one citation (1026b), παλίντονος in a second (369b), while in a third (473f) one of the MSS gives -τονος and all the others -τροπος, and Porphyry, *De Antr. Nymph.*, 29, has παλίντονος. But none of these are complete citations of the fragment; only Hippolytus gives the whole fragment, and he reads παλίντροπος; moreover he cites it along with a raft of other complete fragments, which makes it pretty certain that he had a book, or excerpt, of Heraclitus before him, which is most unlikely in the case of Plutarch's and Porphyry's citations. (b) Given the repeated (five times) παλίντονον as an epithet for τόξον (or τόξα) in Homer, it is certainly the *lectio facillior* for any later citation of Heraclitus' fragment. (c) Theophrastus' διὰ τῆς ἐναντιοτροπῆς ἡρμόσθαι (*ap.* Diog. Laert., IX, 7) is a clear

plicitly used ξυνός in this subsidiary sense where some other expression would have done equally well" (pp. 55-6). But what is the good of doubting this, when ξυνός is so used in B 2 and B 114, in both of them with the sense of a norm which all should follow—a sense which surely has the closest connection with that which, I agree with Kirk, is the primary one.

²⁴ Mainly for the reasons given by Kirk on p. 205. Hippolytus' text for Heraclitean fragments is generally excellent, and one departs from it at one's peril. But in this case, there is a plausible explanation for a mistake (by Hippolytus or a copyist) in the occurrence of ὁμολογεῖν (also ὁμολογοῦσιν) just before the fragment (Kirk, p. 204), and in the MS reading ὁμολογέειν, whose final nu strongly suggests repetition of the preceding ὁμολογεῖν.

²⁵ Kirk (p. 211) refers to Brieger, Burnet, and Walzer. I add Snell (*Hermes*, LXXVI [1941], p. 86, n. 1), Verdenius (*Parmenides* [Groningen, 1942], p. 78), H. Fraenkel (*Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums* [New York, 1951], p. 482).

variant for *παλίντροπος* ἄρμονία. Kirk's objection (p. 211) that this depends "upon his (Theophrastus') physical interpretation" of B 60, ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία καὶ ὀντή, is irrelevant: even if this interpretation of B 60 were mistaken (and I do not think that it is),²⁶ it would not explain why Theophrastus should invent a word not modelled on Heraclitus to convey his mistake. I offer finally this further reason against *παλίντροπος*: *τόνος*, in the sense of 'tension' that would be needed here, does not occur in any Heraclitean fragment, nor in any pre-Socratic fragment in a physical context; nor does *τείνειν* with this sense, but always²⁷ with the sense of 'extending.' There is much talk of "tension" in Kirk's and others' interpretations of Heraclitus,²⁸ but none of it is grounded textually on anything but the disputed *παλίντροπος* in B 51. As everyone knows, tension was a key-concept for the Stoics, and if they could have pinned it on their patron they would have surely done so; this is itself another reason why *παλίντροπος* would be likely to displace *παλίντροπος* in the post-classical era. *τροπή*, on the other hand, is an important word and concept for Heraclitus, as we know from B 31, where indeed the sense of *παλίντροπος* is strongly conveyed: fire "turns" to sea, but half the sea turns back again to fire (*πρησ-*

²⁶ Kirk, following Reinhardt, takes it "as a relativistic statement devoid of physical application" (p. 109). But the arguments against the physical interpretation are weak. Its misapplication to the *ekpyrosis* by Diog. Laert., IX, 8 proves nothing. Nor does its use by Tertullian, Philo, and the neo-Platonists to express other ideas foreign to Heraclitus (for the references see Kirk, p. 106), a recurrent fate of Heraclitus' sayings. As Kirk duly remarks (p. 107), in "the commonest ancient interpretation . . . the 'way up and down' represents the cosmological changes of matter between fire, water, and earth, as in fr. 31." There is absolutely nothing to forbid this connection with B 31, whose sense B 60 fits perfectly, and much to recommend it, for thereby the primary reference of this assertion of the unity-identity of opposites becomes a cosmological phenomenon of the highest importance instead of a banality, like the sameness of the road that goes up-hill and down-hill, adopted in all seriousness by Kirk and others.

²⁷ Empedocles, Diogenes, perhaps Parmenides; see *Vors.*⁶, Wort-Index, s. v.

²⁸ Ironically, even proponents of *παλίντροπος* fall into the same way of talking. Diels translated "gegenstrebig," having perhaps forgotten he had translated *τόνος ἀμφ' ἀρετῆς*, Xenoph., B 1, 20, as "das Streben um die Tugend." Kranz also slips into "Gegenstrebigkeit" while elucidating *παλίντροπος*, *Hermes*, LXIX (1934), p. 118, n. 1.

τήρ).²⁹ On these grounds it appears to me that the evidence is overwhelmingly on the side of *παλίντροπος*.³⁰ The only question then is whether it makes good sense. (i) Does *παλίντροπος ἀρμονίη* make a fitting description of the Heraclitean cosmos? (ii) Does it apply to the bow and the lyre in the simile?

I should have thought there could be no possible doubt in anyone's mind as to (i). But I gather from Kirk that there is more than doubt in his.³¹ So I had better go into the matter briefly: The primary sense of *πάλιν* is 'back'; hence, by easy extension, 'reverse' or 'opposite' (so Kirk, p. 215). So *παλίντροπος* would be literally 'back-turning,' 'changing in the opposite direction,' or more broadly, just 'contrary' (L. S., s. v. II. 1, 2). As for *ἀρμονίη*, its sense is what we would expect of the abstract for *ἀρμόζω*, which is 'to fit, adapt, accommodate'; its denotation is broad enough to cover a ship's joint, a medical suture, a covenant, a betrothal, a government, a musical scale or concord (L. S., s. v.). Burnet's "attunement" is too narrow as a translation of *ἀρμονίη* in this fragment; it will not fit the bow. Conversely, Kirk's "connection" is too loose; "adjustment" would be better. Now Heraclitus' world is all adjustment, and of a kind which is not only compatible with contrariety, but can only exist through the latter; and since it is all in change, the contrariety it exhibits is that of changes proceeding in opposite directions (e.g. B 10, B 126). So there would be plenty of scope here for *παλίντροπος* in its most general

²⁹ It might have been even in the text of the closely following B 31b, which Kranz would now begin with *ζάλιν δὲ γῆ*, *Vors.*³, I, p. 493.

³⁰ I have not mentioned *παλίντροπος* at Parm., B 6, 9 which Diels considered decisive all by itself (*Herakleitos* [Berlin, 1901], p. 13), for it would not be right to argue that Parmenides' use of it here is an allusion to Heraclitus unless its use by Heraclitus can be established on independent grounds.

³¹ Pp. 212-14. The conclusion he reaches is that "*παλίντροπος* cannot well describe a *ἀρμονίη*, and is indeed probably not used during the fifth century in any sense which could conceivably be attached to the fragment" (p. 214). I suspect confusion here, for there is a sense in which what Kirk says is true but irrelevant. Certainly, to the general public, indeed to almost anyone but Heraclitus, *παλίντροπος* would seem the last thing any *ἀρμονία* could possibly be. But would not the general public find *διαφερόμενον . . . συμφέρεται* an equally incongruous coupling? Is this a good reason why *Heraclitus* should not have used the latter, or the former?

sense of 'contrary.' But we need not stop with this. Let us note that in the Heraclitean scheme any one thing following a given line of change will be found to turn in the opposite way sooner or later; and that this "back-turning" is necessary to preserve the inter-adjustment of this changing thing with other changing things. Think, for example, of some water on the "upward" path. Whatever parts of it continued on this path would have to double back when they became fire; only by doing so could they remain within the system of "exchanges" (B 90) that maintains the order of the world; and the only "exchange" in which fire can be involved is with water, hence "downwards." Thus the *ἀρμονία* of the Heraclitean world is *παλίντροπος* in the most specific and definite sense.

What of (ii)? There are two possibilities here, depending on the reference of *ἀρμονία*: If this is to the *framework* of the bow and the lyre (a perfectly good sense of *ἀρμονία*, L. S., s. v., I. 4), then *παλίντροπος* must refer to their shape, i. e. to the fact that the two arms turn away from each other at the center. The only trouble with this is that it would make for a static image, not in keeping with the *ἀρμονία* of the Heraclitean universe which is as dynamic as anything could be and is elsewhere appropriately illustrated by burning spices (B 67), gold coin in circulation (B 90), stirred barley-drink (B 125). To get a comparably dynamic image out of bow and lyre we must assume that *ἀρμονία* refers to their *modus operandi*. This is indeed *παλίντροπος*, for bow and lyre do their work, send forth arrow or sound, at just that moment when the process of stretching the string is reversed. The continuous application of effort in the same direction would not produce this effect. No arrow would fly, no sound would be heard, without "back-turning."³²

³² An identical interpretation of the simile was offered by A. Brieger (*Hermes*, XXXIX [1904], pp. 198-9), following closely upon Susemihl: "Die Bogensehne wird nach der Brust zurückgezogen . . . und dann losgelassen, und das Resultat dieser beiden entgegengesetzten Bewegungen ist der Flug des Pfeils. Wie beim Schiessen, handelt es sich auch beim Leierspiel um zwei entgegengesetzte Bewegungen: die Saite wird durch den Schlag des Plektrons zurückgedrängt und schnell wieder in ihre ursprüngliche Lage vor, und das Resultat ist der Ton. Den beiden Werkzeugen, deren Fügung durch Zurückschnellen den betreffenden Effect bewirkt, wird mit Recht eine 'zurückschnellende Fügung,' *παλίντροπος ἀρμονία* beigelegt." I have cited this at such length because of its

Finally I must consider what Kirk does with B 41, which reads in Diels-Kranz, ἐν τὸ σοφόν, ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην, ὅτῃ ἐκυβέρνησε πάντα διὰ πάντων. Kirk would punctuate strongly after γνώμην, taking ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην with Heidel (and Gigon) as a periphrasis for γιγνώσκειν; and he would read ὅκη κυβερνᾶται after γνώμην. Now κυβερνᾶται is unobjectionable; something must be done with κυβερνήσαι or ἐγκυβερνήσαι of the MSS, which does not make sense, and Bywater's κυβερνᾶται will do as well as any of the proposed emendations.³³ Ὄκη for ὅτῃ would fit much better

admirable lucidity and complete success in sustaining the consistency of the simile in bow and lyre alike—neither of which can be said of the much better known version of this interpretation, the one offered by Wilamowitz, in *Griechisches Lesebuch*, II, 2 (Berlin, 1902), p. 129, and again (with some changes) in *Platon* (4th ed., Berlin, 1948), p. 287, n. 2. The only odd thing in the citation from Brieger is in the surprise that awaits one at the end; one would never have thought he was doing anything but glossing and even translating παλίντροπος! "Bewegung" is intolerably loose for τόνος, and "zurückschnellende" would be just right for παλίντροπος. L. Campbell (who read παλίντροπος) paraphrased (*The Theaetetus of Plato* [2nd ed., Oxford, 1883], p. 244), "As the arrow leaves the string, the hands are pulling opposite ways to each other, and to the different parts of the bow (cp. Plato, *Rep.* 439), and the sweet note of the lyre is due to similar tension and retention"; in the latter sentence the reference of "retention" is unintelligible; in the former (often echoed by others), the account is strictly false: the hands are no longer "pulling opposite ways," etc. "as the arrow leaves the string." Kirk's own gloss on παλίντροπος (which he translates, "working in both directions"), "the string is being pulled outwards towards its ends and the arms of the frame are being pulled inwards towards each other" (p. 215), is possible, but open to two objections: (i) since, as he duly notes, pp. 213-14, παλίντροπος, as applied to the bow in the epic and currently, was used of the unstrung, as much as of the strung, weapon, its primary reference must have been to its *shape*; (ii) if τόμος in παλίντροπος were used with the sense of 'tension,' the πάλιν would be redundant, since, as Kirk himself remarks, "any kind of tension must work in both directions" (p. 215), and Heraclitus is not the sort of writer who says the same thing twice over in a single word. If one must have παλίντροπος, one would do better to follow Macchiore (known to me only through Kirk, p. 216), who "takes it as meaning 'alternately stretching,' and refers it to the alternate tension and relaxation of the string" (Kirk, *loc. cit.*). Kirk's objection—that the present tense of συμφέρεται in the preceding sentence precludes alternating tensions in this one—seems to me irrelevant.

³³ And if taken with ὅτῃ (following Deichgraeber, *Philologus*, XCIII [1938], p. 14 and n. 5, who compares ὅτῃ at B 15) would surely make

Heidel's interpretation of ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην.³⁴ But why should Heraclitus, who is hardly the man to use two words where one will do, say ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην if ἐπίστασθαι or γινώσκειν is what he means? Heidel's reason for this was that a γνώμη governing all things is a Stoic concept; with this, says Kirk (p. 388), "I entirely agree," and adds that "the name of the possessor of the γνώμη would have to be added, as in, for example, Pindar, *Pyth.* 5.122 ff., Διὸς τοι νόος μέγας κυβερνᾷ δαίμον' ἀνδρῶν φίλων." But is the subject of Logos supplied in τοῦ λόγου δ' ἐόντος ξυνοῦ at B 2 or in τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντες at B 50? Naturally, if asked, "Whose γνώμη or λόγος are you talking about?," he would reply, "that of the ever-living fire." But the implied distinction would not have been a matter of reflective attention for him. If anything is foreign to Heraclitus, it is the conceptual disjunction of the substantival and the adjectival. As Kirk knows very well, this sort of discrimination takes a long time to find its feet in Greek philosophy; Being is both existential and predicative in Parmenides, and the hot, cold, etc. in the pre-Socratics are not just qualities but, as Cornford used to call them, quality-things. It would be wholly characteristic of this period to merge thought and thinking things,³⁵ and change freely from "the thunderbolt (which) steers all things," B 64, to "the thought by which all things are steered." To whom could this give offence, except someone who would take the latter to imply a disembodied, incorporeal mind, as no one would at this time.³⁶

our best text for the fragment. ὁτέη κυβερνᾶται is closer to the MS readings (ὁτέη κυβερνῆσαι P¹ B, ὅτ' ἐγκυβερνῆσαι F) than ἧ (Bywater) or ὅπη / ὅκη (Gigon) or ὅκη (Kirk) κυβερνᾶται. Diels' ἐκυβέρνησε is open to Kirk's well-taken objection: "his gnomic aorist is inappropriate, since the action is strictly continuous" (pp. 387-8).

³⁴ It would iron out the queer inconsistency in Heidel who, after denouncing as "Stoic" the notion of a thought that governs the world, went right ahead to translate, "she (Understanding) it is that pervades all things and governs all things," *Proc. Amer. Acad. of Arts and Sc.*, XLVIII (1913), pp. 700-2.

³⁵ And even both of these with their object, *cognoscens* with *cognoscendum*: cf. *C. P.*, XLII (1947), p. 177 and n. 180.

³⁶ Thus Xenophanes says only that his "one god" is οὐτι δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὁμοῖος οὐδὲ νόημα, B 23; he does not think of saying that he has νόημα, but no δέμας which would have served infinitely better his polemic against anthropomorphism.

II

A prime requisite of the historical interpretation of any philosopher, ancient or modern, is to determine the nexus with those of his contemporaries or predecessors who did the most both to supply him with a working-stock of basic concepts and also to provoke new questions in his own mind, calling for new answers and therewith new concepts. Who are the most likely candidates for the role in the case of Heraclitus?

A proper answer to this question would call for a much more extensive investigation than I could carry out in this paper. All I can do here is to propound a *hypothesis*, and follow it out, in the hope that the results so obtained will commend it to others. It is that the main historical influences on Heraclitus' thought were the great Milesians, Anaximander and Anaximenes, and that our best chance to understand the problems which confronted him and the meaning of his own answers to them is to discover as best we can the links which connect his thought with theirs. Though, I repeat, this is only a hypothesis, it is only fair to add that it is not an implausible one. For think of the suggested alternatives: Parmenides, Xenophanes, Pythagoras. Each of the first two has found powerful exponents, but with results disproportionate to the resources expended on either hypothesis. Reinhardt's brilliant sponsorship of the view that Heraclitus' "roots" are in Parmenides was condemned to failure at the start by the indefensible chronology on which it was based.³⁷ Gigon's attempt to link him with Xenophanes³⁸ sheds some light on Heraclitus' religious views but almost none on his cosmological and metaphysical conceptions. As for Pythagoras,

³⁷ For the most recent criticism of his chronology, see Kirk, pp. 1-3. That in spite of this mistake Reinhardt's work has done so much to stimulate Heraclitean studies in the last forty years is a tribute to the vigor of his thinking, the incisiveness of his writing, and the breadth of his knowledge. The same qualities make his later papers (to the first of which I shall continue to refer), "Heraklits Lehre vom Feuer," and "Heraclitea," *Hermes*, LXXVII (1942), pp. 1 ff. and 225 ff., outstanding contributions.

³⁸ *Op. cit.* For a critique of his theory of Heraclitus' dependence on Xenophanes see W. Broecker, *Gnomon*, XIII (1937), pp. 530 ff. Though only a doctoral dissertation Gigon's is a challenging book, and Kirk has done well to devote so much time to the detailed discussion of its views.

he is easily the candidate least likely to succeed, since what we know of his doctrine is so meager in itself, almost infinitesimal in comparison to what we know of Heraclitus; how can our ignorance of the former improve our knowledge of the latter?³⁹ So by a process of elimination one is led back to the Milesians, where one should have started anyway. That Heraclitus knew their books has high antecedent probability, and is confirmed, quite apart from all the things I shall discuss below, by some meteorological details in which he followed them.⁴⁰ That he

³⁹ If this sounds unduly pessimistic, consider the possible borrowings: (I) *metron* (so Kirk, p. 403). But did this figure in the Pythagorean scheme? We don't know. Our evidence, such as it is, speaks of *peras* (in opposition to *apeiron*), not *metron*. But suppose *metron* was used as an alternate to *peras*; it would then refer, like the latter, to (a) ratios of odd-even numbers such as those of the concordant musical intervals (cf. *Gnomon*, XXV [1953], pp. 33-4) and/or (b) whole integers, applied to things like justice, the soul, etc. (Arist., *Met.*, 985b 29-31 and Ross *ad loc.*). Where does Heraclitus employ ratios as at (a) or numbers as at (b) in any comparable way? (II) *logos*. What is there analogous to either (a) or (b) in Heraclitus when he speaks of *logos* e.g. at B 1 or B 31b? A more interesting suggestion has come from Fraenkel, *A. J. P.*, LIX (1938), pp. 309 ff. and Minar, *C. P.*, XXXIV (1939), pp. 338 ff., who take the sense of *logos* borrowed from Pythagoras to be "proportional mean," i.e. the $X:Y :: Y:Z$ ratio. But though a convincing case has been made by Fraenkel for Heraclitus' use of this "thought-pattern," there is no evidence that he derived it from Pythagoras, whose use of it is purely conjectural, and, if historical, would not have endeared it to one who thought him a charlatan (B 81). Moreover, though *any* proportion would be a *logos*, there is no evidence that when Heraclitus spoke of *the logos* or "the same *logos*" he was thinking of a proportional mean at all (cf. my elucidation of B 31b in the text below, where the required relation is equality, not geometric proportion) nor, conversely, that when he did use the three-term proportion (e.g. at B 83, ape: man :: man: god) he was thinking of this relation as a manifestation of what he called *logos*.

⁴⁰ His explanation of thunder-lightning is that of Anaximander as modified by Anaximenes (Aet., III, 3, 1, 2, and 6): Anaximander explained this as a cloud-burst; Anaximenes, likening the phenomenon to the "sea, which flashes when divided by the oars," added the notion of external impact (which could be only that of wind on cloud) as the cause of the rending of the cloud; Heraclitus' explanation of thunder has both wind-impact on cloud (*ἐμπτώσεις πνευμάτων εἰς τὰ νέφη*) and compression (*συστροφάς*) of cloud by wind; and there is no reason to think that he offered a different explanation for lightning, as the confusing statement in Aetius might suggest. His "bowls" theory of

had plenty of respect for them we may assume from the fact that they never figure in his vitriolic broadsides against prominent contemporaries and predecessors (B 40, B 42, B 56, B 57, B 81). To be known and not abused by a man of Heraclitus' temperament is tantamount to the receipt of a certificate of merit.

Of B 80, εἰδέναι δὲ χρὴ τὸν πόλεμον ὄντα ξυνόν, καὶ δίκην ἔριν, καὶ γινόμενα πάντα κατ' ἔριν καὶ χρεών, Kirk rightly remarks that it is "almost certainly a criticism of Anaximander" (p. 401). Both δίκη and κατὰ χρεών occur also in Anaximander's famous fragment; and the thrice repeated reference to "war/strife" could hardly fail to allude to Anaximander's notion of the mutual aggression of the elements.⁴¹ But what is the criticism? Kirk's answer—that while Anaximander held that "change between opposites involves a kind of injustice: on the contrary, *he* (Heraclitus) held that strife between opposites was 'the right way,' normal and just" (p. 240)—takes us part of the way toward the answer; but not the whole way. To begin with we must notice the enormous difference of the role which "strife" plays in Heraclitus: "All things happen in accordance with strife" (B 80); "war is the father of *all* and king of *all*" (B 53). What is only occasional and intermittent, though recurrent, in Anaximander, becomes universal and invariant in Heraclitus. Why

the heavenly bodies follows Anaximander in attempting to provide for containers of their fiery substance, altering the shape of the holders to suit the disk-shaped bodies postulated by Anaximenes. Heraclitus must also have known the physical theories of Xenophanes, but made only one important borrowing from them: the doctrine that "the sun is new every day" (B 6), though this apparently meant for him that each day's sun is extinguished at night (Kirk, p. 267), while for Xenophanes it meant its "travelling on *ad infinitum*" (Aet., II, 24, 9). An interesting linguistic link between Heraclitus and Anaximenes is pointed out by Reinhardt (p. 16), διαχεῖσθαι (Anaxim., A 7, A 8; Heracl., B 31b).

⁴¹ For my interpretation of Anaximander I must refer to "Equality and Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies," *C.P.*, XLIII (1947), pp. 168 ff. (pp. 168-73 on Anaximander). Cf. also F. Dirlmeier, "Der Satz des Anaximandros," *Rhein. Mus.*, LXXXVII (1938), pp. 376 ff., K. Deichgraeber, "Anaximander von Milet," *Hermes*, LXXV (1940), pp. 10 ff., and H. Cherniss, "The Characteristics and Effects of Pre-Socratic Philosophy," *Journal of the Hist. of Ideas*, XII (1951), pp. 319 ff. (pp. 323-8 on Anaximander).

this difference? We cannot answer this question without granting the obvious implication of the river-fragments which Kirk formally denies (p. 367 *et passim*), the universality of change.⁴² That strife is universal follows from the assumption that whatever exists is in change with the added assumption that all change is strife, neither of them made by Anaximander. What happens now to the latter's conviction that the world is a realm of "justice"? Anaximander could hold, and did, that there is both "injustice" and "justice" in the world; strife being injustice, and justice consisting in the eventual reparation of the encroachments gained by strife. To Heraclitus this presented an intolerable compromise. Concluding as he did that strife is universal, he would have to infer that, if strife itself were unjust, there could be nothing but injustice. For him there could be no half-way house: either all is injustice, or all is justice, in the physical world. He chose the second alternative, which he could only do by affirming, as he does in B 80, that "strife is justice." The last clause of this fragment—that "all things happen in accordance with strife and rightful necessity"—is the completion of the thought which is affirmed in *each* of the preceding clauses.⁴³

⁴² For my criticism see my review of Kirk's book in the July issue of this journal (LXXVI, pp. 310-13).

⁴³ Kirk fails to see that πόλεμον . . . ξυνόν in the first makes the same point as δίκην ἔριν in the second. He says that "in Homer and Archilochus Ares is described as impartial, but here war is said to be universal; this surely must be the sense in view of fr. 2 and 114 and of the description of war as father and king of all in fr. 53" (p. 241). But this misses (a) the perfect connection between the Homeric reference to war as ξυνός because "it kills the killer," *Il.*, XVIII, 309, and Heraclitus' reason for saying that strife is just (see the following paragraph in the text); (b) the fact that at B 2 and B 114 ξυνός does indeed have the sense of a *norm* (note 23, above); and (c) that the same sense is even present at B 53 which, of course, accents the universality of war in the strongest terms but also refers to its function as creator (πατήρ) and governor (βασιλεύς), a function which Heraclitus surely regards as just since he says that war establishes the distinction, unquestionably right for him, between gods and men, free and slave. Even the full significance of δίκην ἔριν is not brought out by Kirk, for he makes no mention of usages of ἔρις, νεῖκος which would lend substance to their conception as instruments of justice (cf. latter half of note 134, *C. P.*, XLII [1947], p. 170; and Fraenkel's fine elucidation of B 80 in the work cited at n. 25, above, pp. 481-2).

Thus so far Heraclitus' thought is more intimately connected with Anaximander's than Kirk or any of the modern interpreters have recognized. Two of the fundamental ideas in Anaximander—that there is strife among the elements, and that a just order is *nevertheless* preserved—are re-asserted in a form which universalizes both of them and thereby resolves the opposition between them: what is a “*nevertheless*” in Anaximander, becomes a “*because*” in Heraclitus. The result is that no part of nature *can* “over-step its measures,” which is surely the point of B 94,⁴⁴ and not, as Kirk takes it, that “long-term excess is punished (and reduced)” (p. 402), which is precisely what Anaximander had taught, not Heraclitus. There can be no excess at all, long-term, or short-term either, if “*all* things happen in accordance with strife and rightful necessity.” But when we turn to the next question, “Why is justice preserved in strife?” we find that Heraclitus stands in a very different relation to Anaximander. For the maintenance of justice the latter had relied immediately upon the equality of the elements. Now, as Kirk notes repeatedly, the notion of nature as an equilibrium of opposing forces does find a place in Heraclitus, though with the difference that the processes of encroachment and reparation are not successive, as in Anaximander, but concurrent: at every moment the main world-masses of fire, water, and earth are each giving up exactly as much as they take, each compensating constantly by the “death” they suffer (B 36) for the one they inflict.⁴⁵ So much, I believe with Kirk, follows from B 31a: “the turnings of fire are first sea, and of sea the half is earth, half *prester*”: the second clause can only mean that equal amounts of water are always turning back into fire and forward into earth, whence it would follow (a) that the total mass of water remains constant, consequently (b) that the total masses of fire and earth are also constant, since either of these can only change into or from water, and hence, for the same reason, (c) that fire and earth must also display the equipollence of change asserted of water in B 31a—an inference

⁴⁴ As Reinhardt (*Hermes*, LXXVII [1942], p. 244, n. 2) has remarked, *ei δὲ μὴ* in this fragment “drückt eine Unmöglichkeit aus, einen Fall, der nie eintreten wird, wie in fr. 121: ‘Und wenn, dann . . .’, worauf eine Negation folgt.”

⁴⁵ Cf. above, note 43 (a).

explicitly confirmed in the case of fire by the balancing expressions, "kindling according to measures, and extinguished according to measures," in B 30.

But note how short all this falls of preserving (let alone, extending) Anaximander's concept of equality as the guarantee of justice. For one thing, nothing is said to the effect that fire, water, and air are equal to one another. The assumption of the equality of the physical components of the world, re-asserted by Parmenides and Empedocles, is quietly dropped by Heraclitus; for Anaximander's equilibrium of elements he substitutes an equilibrium of processes of change. And even the latter is only a special case of *πάλιντροπος ἁρμονία*. It applies only to those systems which do maintain themselves in a stable equilibrium. The world as a whole is such a system, and so is a river or, for that matter, the humblest candle-flame, so long as its mass remains constant. But many, indeed most, things within the world are not of this kind; there are rivers that dry up and flames that are put out. To uphold the justice of *all* strife Heraclitus must fall back on another notion, more fundamental in his scheme than that of equipollent change: the constancy of a *logos* or *metron* preserved in all changes whatever. This is conveyed, in part, in B 31b, whose sense is not correctly rendered by Kirk. "(Earth)⁴⁶ is dispersed as sea and is measured in the

⁴⁶ I agree with Kranz, Kirk, and others that <γη> is justified by the probability that it was in the text followed by Theophrastus (*πάλιν τε αὖ τὴν γῆν χεῖσθαι*, Diog. Laert., IX, 9). This expansion is rejected by Walzer, Snell, Reinhardt (for the latter's defense see p. 16, n. 1; and cf. note 48, below). I fail to see what is gained by dropping <γη> if *θάλασσα διαχέεται* is to be understood to mean, as by Reinhardt (*loc. cit.*) "the sea passes from a solid to a liquid state"; its "solid state" is earth, so we are right back to the meaning of <γη> but now without warrant from the text. If one is to forego the initial <γη>, one should accept the only meaning which Clement's text will then permit, i. e. that the sea is dispersed as *fire*. This makes excellent sense, especially if taken in conjunction with the suggestion in the following note. For my part, I prefer to stick by <γη> on the probability that this was in the text known to Theophrastus. But nothing of any great consequence depends on this. The general conclusion I reach from my interpretation of B 31b and B 90 (towards the close of the paragraph in the text above) would be exactly the same if B 31b referred to the change from sea to fire instead of from earth to sea.

same *logos* as existed before [it became earth]”⁴⁷ does not say or of itself imply that “sea is being constantly replenished by the liquefaction of earth proportionally with its diminution by condensation into earth” (p. 331). Heraclitus believes this, but it is not what he says *here*. What he does say is that any part of earth which becomes water has the same *logos* which it had before it had become earth, i. e., when a part of water, *w1*, becomes a part of earth, *e1*, and then *e1* changes back into a part of water, *w2*, then *w2* is “measured in the same *logos*” as *w1*, or *w2* = *w1*, for short.⁴⁸ B 90, “all things are an exchange for fire, and fire for all things, as wares (are exchanged) for gold and gold (is exchanged) for all things,” identifies fire as the thing that remains constant in all transformations and implies that *its* measure is the same or common measure in all things. Thus, in the preceding instance, the same measure would obtain not only between *w1* and *w2*, but also between each of these and *e1*, and similarly between all previous transformations of which *w1* is the last and all subsequent transformations of which *w2* is the first, and in all cases for the same reason: each member of the

⁴⁷ I am inclined to accept a suggestion made by Cherniss (in his seminar) and treat ἡ γενέσθαι γῆ as a gloss: its presence makes for unnecessary stylistic clumsiness, and its absence would make no difference to the sense; retaining (here contrary to Cherniss) the initial γῆ, the new text would still allow, indeed favor, the same reference of “before,” *sc.* to the earth’s antecedent liquid state. (But cf. also the following note.) Incidentally, I would argue that, if ἡ γενέσθαι γῆ is a gloss, it must have been put in by someone who did have an initial γῆ in his text; for, if he did not, it would have been natural to take θάλασσα as the subject, and, in that case, his gloss would probably have been ἡ γενέσθαι θάλασσα.

⁴⁸ Another possibility on the text suggested in the preceding note is that “before” refers to the earthy state before it turns into water, in which case it would be *e1* which is said to have the same *logos* as *w2*. A variant of this is permitted by the Diels text, *sc.* that the logical subject of μετρέεται is earth before it turns into sea, in which case the equation would be *e1* = *w1*. For obvious reasons, neither of these is as likely as the one suggested above, though the latter would avoid completely Reinhardt’s objection (*loc. cit.*) that on the expansion <γῆ> “διαχέεται καὶ μετρέεται verschieden Subjekt erhalten,” since the subject of μετρέεται (as well as διαχέεται) would be γῆ. On the former interpretation here and that of my text above, γῆ would still be the grammatical subject of μετρέεται, but not the logical one; this I do not find absurd, or even difficult, in this context.

whole series represents the same amount of fire which is the common thing—τὸ ξυνόν—in all the different things that compose the series. Thus the ultimate guarantee of cosmic justice is fire: the invariance of *its* measures is what accounts for the observance of the *metron* in all things, and fire is therefore that which “governs” or “steers all things” (B 41, B 64, and n. 35, above).

Towards the end of his discussion of B 90 Kirk remarks: “There remains one slight difficulty. . . . Fire is said to be an exchange for ‘all things’; but fire itself must be one constituent of ‘all things’ . . .” (p. 348). There is indeed a difficulty; but is it “slight” and is it “simply due to an unavoidable looseness of speech” (*loc. cit.*)? If the trouble were merely verbal, Heraclitus could easily have avoided it by saying that πάντα <τὰ ἅλλα> are an exchange for fire and fire <τῶν ἁλλων> ἀπάντων. The real difficulty is of quite another order. It is why Heraclitus should give to fire so unique and preëminent a place, when it is after all just one of three components of the cosmos whose mutual transformations are symmetrical. Why should not water or earth have as good a claim to the place of the “common,” since either one of them becomes in due course each of the others? Indeed why should any one of them be singled out as the “common”? And why should the whole world be “ever-living fire”? Are not water and earth also “ever-living,” each of them, like fire, everlastingly “living” and “dying”?⁴⁹

⁴⁹ I cannot understand how the earth could be for Heraclitus “das Starre, Gegensatzlose, Tote” (W. Broecker, *op. cit.*, p. 532). How could anything be *gegensatzlos* in Heraclitus’ world, and fail to exemplify both terms of the polarities, change-stability, life-death? Kirk refers approvingly (p. 342) to the remark of H. Gomperz that life, for Heraclitus, consists in passing from a more solid to a more fluid state, while death is the reverse. This too is surely wrong as a generalization; true enough in the case of fire, it would be e.g. false in the case of earth, for which it would be death to pass into the more fluid state of water. The more common view is that while Heraclitus would exempt nothing from change, he would (a) think of fire as changing more rapidly than anything else and (b) choose fire as his *arche* for this reason. We need not doubt that Heraclitus believed (a), i.e. that the rate of “exchange” between fire and water is higher than of that between water and earth, though he never says this. Nor do I think that (b) is wrong, though I do think it an incomplete answer to the question raised in the text above. Certainly fire makes a better *symbol* of permanence through

When Kirk faces up to this problem he thinks he can solve it as follows: "The fire in question (in B 30) is not simply that which burns in the hearth, because this has no claim to be more important or more primary than sea or earth. The cosmological fire must be thought of primarily as *αἰθήρ*, that purer kind which in popular thought fills the upper region of the heavens and is considered to be divine and immortal" (p. 316). Whether popular thought at this time made this distinction between our fires and the fire of the celestial regions we do not know. What we do know is that it is not to be found in Heraclitus⁵⁰ nor in any pre-Socratic fragment, and that no Ionian philosopher thought of "cosmological" fire, air, etc. as different in kind from that we see and handle every day. The first surviving text in which this peculiar notion is asserted is in Plato. It is he, not Heraclitus, who says that the fire in the heavens is "pure," as well as "fairest," "most honourable," etc., while ours is *οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς εἰλικρινές*, *Phil.*, 29B-30B.⁵¹ But even if Heraclitus had made this distinction, how would it help to answer our question? "Cosmological" fire would still be on a par with water and earth in the series of natural transformations, and the question why *it* should be elevated above the rest would remain unanswered. It cannot be answered, I submit, without taking account of a powerful historical influence which passes unnoticed in Kirk's book: that of Anaximenes.⁵² It is here that Heraclitus found the cosmological pattern we are looking for and superimposed it upon the one he derived and developed from Anaximander. This pattern, in sharp opposition to Anaximander's, explains all the things that compose the world as a dif-

change and life in death than does anything else. If he were *only* a poet, the superbly evocative power of this symbol would be an ample answer to my question.

⁵⁰ Nor the parallel one between an *Urfeuer* and its *Erscheinungsformen* in sun, *prester*, etc., assumed by Reinhardt, p. 16—an odd vestige of Zeller's theory, who needed an *Urfeuer* as a prop for the *ekpyrosis*.

⁵¹ Where this distinction in respect of the superior "purity," etc. of *τὸ ἐν τῷ παντί* over *τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν* (or *τὸ ἐνθάδε*) is extended to all the *στοιχεῖα*, including earth (29D). Cf. *C. P.*, XLII (1947), p. 176, n. 173.

⁵² All I can find in Kirk by way of reference to any major relationship between Anaximenes and Heraclitus is the casual remark, pp. 343-4, "It may be that Heraclitus' omission of air is a direct criticism of Anaximenes' acceptance of it."

ferentiation of just one of them. Anaximenes' preference for this type of explanation must have been due partly (a) to a genuinely empirical impulse, eschewing an *arche*, like Anaximander's, which must lie forever beyond experience, to put in its place one which is indisputably *in this world*, as well as out of it, and whose relation to experience can be properly explained (Hipp., Ref., I, 7, 2), and partly (b) to the conviction that the *arche* must be of the same stuff as that of the human soul,⁵³ doubtless because he held with Anaximander that the *arche* which creates the world also governs it,⁵⁴ and is therefore intelligent. Though both motives are discernible in Heraclitus, the second far outweighs the first and provides, in my view, the main explanation of the dominant role of fire in his cosmos.

What may have led Kirk to ignore this link is his insistence that "the parallel between man and cosmos is first explicitly drawn by medical speculation in the fifth century" (p. 312). But it is drawn in Anaximenes, B 2; though much of the wording of this fragment is doubtful, there is no good reason to doubt that it paraphrases an analogy drawn by Anaximenes himself.⁵⁵

⁵³ Which is air: A 22 and 23; also Aet., I, 3, 4, listed as B 2 in *Vors.*^o, on which see note 55, below.

⁵⁴ Arist., *Phys.*, 203b 11 ff.: καὶ περιέχειν ἅπαντα καὶ πάντα κυβερνᾶν, ὡς φασὶ ὅσοι μὴ ποιοῦσι παρὰ τὸ ἄπειρον ἄλλας αἰτίας οἷον νοῦν ἢ φιλίαν, which would certainly include Anaximenes. That air περιέχει the world is also in Anaximenes, B 2. Cf. W. Jaeger, *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (Oxford, 1947), pp. 29-30 and notes; and on the significance of the ascription of περιέχειν to the *arche* cf. also *C.P.*, XLII (1947), p. 173, n. 153.

⁵⁵ The upshot of the controversy about this fragment—for the best on either side see Reinhardt, *Kosmos und Sympathie* (Munich, 1926), pp. 209-13, and Kranz, *Hermes*, LXXIII (1938), p. 111 and *Gött. Nachr.*, 1938, p. 145—is surely that it should now be regarded as an "A" fragment. How can συγκρατεῖ be defended for Anaximenes when there is no known use of the word prior to the Christian era? Nor is there any pre-Socratic parallel for the notion that the soul holds the body together while, as Reinhardt points out, this was a common Stoic view. On the other hand, there can be absolutely no objection to the statement that the air περιέχει the world (cf. n. 54, above); τὸν ὅλον κόσμον is doubtful (Kranz cites its occurrence in Philol., B 1, but this is not conclusive), though possible (cf. n. 19, above). Moreover, the comparison of a human with a cosmic phenomenon is also reported for Anaximenes at A 7, 6; Kranz compares ὡς περὶ περὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν κεφαλὴν there with οἷον ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ ἡμετέρα here. Finally, the man-world analogy

And even if we were to throw it all out, we would still have the fact, independently attested, that Anaximenes made air both the *arche* of all things and the stuff of the human soul, and this suffices for our purpose, for this is precisely what Heraclitus does, merely substituting fire for air. A variety of convergent reasons would prompt this substitution in the case of the soul. As the principle of life, soul would be naturally thought of as fire, since the warmth which persists throughout life and fails only after death, was a fact of ordinary experience.⁵⁶ As the

is also implied by Anaximenes' close follower, Diogenes of Apollonia, when he argues that the same thing, air, is that by which man lives and thinks (B 4; B 5 *sub fin.*; A 19, 42 *sub fin.*) and that which governs and thinks in the world. As to what stood for the improbable *ἐγκρατεῖ ἡμῶς* in the original, the simplest guess is *ἡμῶν κρατεῖ*. Fraenkel (*op. cit.*, p. 348, n. 20) thinks it anachronistic to credit Anaximenes with the notion of the soul ruling man or his body. Certainly there is no known *elaboration* of this idea before Plato. But it would be taken for granted from the moment the *psyche* was identified with the thinking, willing self and hence accorded the power of controlling the body or its functions expressed by *κρατεῖν* and its derivatives (cf. *σκελέων τε καὶ χειρῶν ἀκρατεῖς*, Hipp., *Art.*, 48; *γλώσσης ἀκρατής*, Aesch., *P. V.*, 884; *αὐτοῦ κρατεῖν* for the self-control which is lost in drunkenness, Antiphon, *Or.*, V, 26). This concept of the *psyche* is amply documented in Heraclitus (cf. especially B 118 with B 117), and there is no reason why it cannot go back to Anaximenes.

⁵⁶ Anaximenes himself would have had to take account of this fact. Cf. Diog., B 5, *ἡ ψυχὴ . . . ἀπὸ θερμότερος τοῦ ἔξω ἐν ᾧ ἔσμεν*. This would make the transition (from 'hot air' to 'fire') all the easier for Heraclitus. It is possible, perhaps probable, that Anaximenes had also anticipated Heraclitus in explaining sleep and drunkenness as due to the moistening of the soul, for we know that Diogenes of Apollonia held this view (A 19, 44). In an interesting paper (*Hermes*, LXXVI [1941], pp. 359 ff.) Diller attributes these and other similarities between Heraclitus and Diogenes to the direct influence of the former upon the latter. This I very much doubt, since the true affinities of Diogenes—in style (cf. Anaximenes, A 1, *κέχρηται . . . λέξει . . . ἀπλῇ καὶ ἀπερίττω*, with Diog., B 1, *τὴν ἐρμηνείαν ἀπλῆν καὶ σεμνήν*), main cosmological doctrine (the same *arche*, air, infinite, giving rise to an infinity of worlds), and primarily "scientific" bent of mind with no discernible ethical or political interests—are with Anaximenes. It is most unlikely that Diogenes would take over the details noticed by Diller from a thinker with whose temper and fundamental doctrine he was so much out of line. Things common to Heraclitus and Diogenes are much more likely to be derived by Heraclitus from Anaximenes, and by Diogenes either directly from Anaximenes or from intermediaries other than Heraclitus.

principle of thought, soul would be connected both (a) with the heat of fire, since that lapse of intelligence which looms so large in Heraclitus' psychological reflections, sleep, was generally regarded as due to a reduction of organic heat,⁵⁷ and (b) with its light, because of the inevitable association of truth and knowledge with light, of error or ignorance with darkness.⁵⁸ Now since his cosmos is "ever-living" and is "governed" by a *gnōmē*, what would be more natural for him than to ascribe the principles of life and intelligence in the cosmos to the same stuff to which he assigned them in the case of man? That the analogy between this cosmic fire and man's fiery soul was so complete for him that it amounts to identity we know from B 36, where he says "souls" when he means "fire"; as Kirk rightly remarks (p. 341), "Heraclitus has here put soul in the place of cosmic fire." Renouncing the Milesian concept of an *arche* which "contains" the world, he would have to give a physical explanation of the world's "government" by the *arche* in terms of the physical relation of fire to everything else in the world; and this he did, as we have seen, by imputing to fire the common measure whose preservation throughout all change ensures the "justice" of all "strife." This reconstruction, I submit, explains why fire should have in his system its otherwise inexplicable preëminence over water and earth; and it does so by showing how an idea, derived initially from Anaximenes, was grafted upon a concept of justice-in-strife developed from ideas supplied by Anaximander.

Two other cosmological doctrines—his affirmation of the eternity of the world (B 30), and his denial of the infinity of fire and therewith of the sum-total of existence⁵⁹—tell against both

⁵⁷ Parm., 46b, *somnum* . . . Emp. et Parm. refrigerationem. Emp., A 85, E. τὸν μὲν ὕπνον καταψύξει . . . τῇ δὲ παντελεῖ θάνατον, Hippocr., *De Flat.*, 14, ὁ ὕπνος πέφυκεν ψύχειν.

⁵⁸ Attested, e. g. in *φαίνω*, originally 'shine,' derivatively, 'bring to light, disclose, reveal.' Parmenides speaks of his dark form as *νύκτ' ἀδαῆ* (unknowing), B 8, 59.

⁵⁹ Arist., *Phys.*, 205a 1-4; Theophr., *Phys. Op.*, frag. 1 (*Dox. Graeci*, p. 475); Diog. Laert., IX, 8. It is strange that this important doctrine should be so seldom noticed in the modern literature; Kirk is typical in ignoring it completely. It is briefly recognized in Zeller-Nestle, *op. cit.*, pp. 862-3, but with the suggestion that Heraclitus did not assert this doctrine explicitly; I see no reason for this opinion: he

Anaximander and Anaximenes. Their significance is best appreciated in terms of his rejection of the Milesian axiom that the world is derived from and "governed" by an everlasting and infinite substance which "contains" it. For Anaximander the creative source of the world is wholly outside of it; for Anaximenes it is both in and beyond the world; for Heraclitus it is wholly within the world, which is itself the theatre of the ceaseless and regular transformations of fire, therefore self-creating, self-governing, self-contained. He could thus transfer to the world that eternal life and youth which was always for the Greeks the unique privilege of divinity. To express this he employs in B 30 not only the solemn, traditional formula, "ever was and is and shall be,"⁶⁰ but also the new and proud affirmation, "ever-living," in place of the canonical negatives, "deathless, ageless" (Anaximander, B 2, B 3) for which he had no use anyhow, since for him the condition of life ever-lasting is not deathlessness but life endlessly renewed by death in a process where youth and age are "the same" (B 88). We do not know what form of expression he gave to his denial of the infinity of fire and the totality of being; all we learn from Aristotle and Theophrastus is that he did, without even a hint of his reasons. These we must reconstruct, and our only clue to them is in his new, anti-Milesian concept of the relation of the world-creating *arche* to its creatures. If the two are one, as in Heraclitus, then the *arche* neither need, nor can, be infinite. It need not, for no matter how limited may be its mass, its energy, ever-renewed by reabsorbing its own creatures, is inexhaustible, and thus sufficient to maintain it for all time to come. It can not, for it is interdependent with its creatures, and can be no more infinite than they; if it were, the balance of their mutual "exchanges" would be completely upset.⁶¹

would have every reason for doing so against Anaximander and Anaximenes, if he did not believe in the infinity of fire.

⁶⁰ Reinhardt, pp. 10-11; also in *Parmenides*, p. 176, n. 2.

⁶¹ One might still ask why the creatures too could not be infinite. The question could hardly have bothered Heraclitus. He must have assumed, as did every known thinker of classical Greece, that the visible world is finite in extension; the only thing ever held to be infinite was something either beyond the visible world, as for the Milesians and many others after them, or of a different order of being from it, as for Melissus, who was also the first to offer a formal argument against the possibility of more than one infinite being (B 6).

Finally, what of that doctrine which many in the ancient world considered his most original invention,⁶² the unity of the many and the sameness of opposites? If, as Kirk says from time to time (e. g. pp. 121, 344, 402), this only meant for Heraclitus that "opposites are essentially connected" or "not really disconnected," how could we think of it as Heraclitus' "great discovery" (Kirk, p. 344)? That the many and different things which compose the world are all essentially connected, so much so, that they are all one and the same thing, is the rudimentary truth about the world as conceived by Anaximenes.⁶³ When Heraclitus declared that "all things (come) from one and one from all" (B 10) or even that "all things are one" (B 50), he was saying something with which Anaximenes would have agreed as a matter of course. But the difference would still be enormous. The sense of the unity of all things would be both lucid and prosaic for Anaximenes: simply, that all things are differentiations of air.⁶⁴ Heraclitus' speculative imagination transforms this straightforward cosmological theorem into an assertion of the unity of all differences whatever, including moral ones, and pursues its consequences to that reckless and bewildering conclusion that "for god all things are fair and good and just" (B 102) which, if true, would be fatal for all morality, not excepting his own.⁶⁵ I cannot discuss here the fragments

⁶² As Philo tells us, *Quis rer. div. haer.*, 505.

⁶³ And is spelled out in the only exposition of this type of cosmology available to us in extant fragments, that of Diogenes (at B 2).

⁶⁴ For an excellent statement of this aspect of Heraclitus' relation to Anaximenes see Cherniss, *op. cit.*, pp. 331 ff.

⁶⁵ Kirk (pp. 180-1), following Wilamowitz and others, argues that the second part of the fragment, *ἄνθρωποι δὲ ἅ μὲν ἄδικοι ὑπειλήφασιν ἅ δὲ δίκαιοι*, can hardly be wholly authentic; *ὑπειλήφασιν*, though barely possible, is most unlikely for Heraclitus. Kirk underwrites Mazzantini's suggestion that the original read something like *ἀνθρώποις δὲ ἅ μὲν ἄδικοι ἅ δὲ δίκαιοι*. With all this I agree. But what follows for the sense of the whole fragment? Man's wisdom is to god's what an ape's is to man's (B 83); since men's moral distinctions do not exist for god (first sentence of B 102), must they not be ultimately illusory? I fail to see how this difficulty is solved by Kirk's elucidation: moral distinctions, he says, submerged only for (god's) "synthetic" view, are still "necessary" and "legitimate" for the "analytical" view (man's), pp. 180-1. But what Kirk calls the "synthetic" view is "wisdom" for Heraclitus (B 50)—not only for god, but for man too

which assert this and other aspects of the most paradoxical of all his doctrines and explore its connection with the doctrines of the justice of all strife and *palintropos harmonia*. Of Kirk's interpretation of these fragments I shall merely remark that it is sober and sensible throughout, and that its only fault is to discount that part of their sense which is inherently obscure and, so far as it is clear, profoundly disturbing not only to the moralist but also to the logician. It proved disturbing enough to the latter to provoke in Parmenides a reaction, violent in the extreme,⁶⁶ yet immensely fruitful, for it issued in a doctrine of Being which served as the foundation of the great cosmological constructions of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the atomists. In a singularly Heraclitean turn of events, Heraclitus, ignored in Ionia⁶⁷ by the best minds of the generation that followed him, lived in them only through the death of his own system in Parmenides.

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so far as he can reach it. Hence the wiser man becomes, the closer he comes to the view that "all things are fair and good and just," and if this does not make moral distinctions illusory, I do not know what would.

⁶⁶ Cf. Cherniss, *op. cit.*, pp. 336 ff.

⁶⁷ I say "Ionia" to allow for some Heraclitean influence on Empedocles (*C.P.*, XLII [1947], pp. 164-5), though it is subordinate to that of Parmenides. In Ionia itself not one of Heraclitus' distinctive doctrines is conserved by Anaxagoras or Leucippus; so far as we know, they do not even acknowledge their existence by a word of refutation. Democritus must have known intimately Heraclitus' book, for it influenced his style (E. Norden, *Antike Kunstprosa*, I [Berlin, 1915], pp. 22-3) and doubtless also some of his ethical reflections; but he too writes cosmology and ontology as though Heraclitus had never existed. The only possible anti-Heraclitean polemic is Melissus, B 8 (so Kirk, p. 140), a feeble echo of Parmenides' great assault.

LIVY'S PREFACE AND THE DISTORTION OF HISTORY.

The greater Roman historians showed complete unanimity in their view of the function of history. Ignoring the strictly scientific view of Thucydides,¹ they regarded it as their duty to enshrine virtue before the eyes of future generations, and to deter men from the paths of vice.² This sense of moral purpose in historiography can be traced back not only to the Roman annalists,³ but also to the Hellenistic historians before them, who countenanced even the distortion of the truth for moral ends.⁴

Livy's preface does not, then, denote an original approach, but is part of a general tradition, reflecting above all the influence of Stoic philosophical ideas upon later Hellenistic historiography.⁵ He asks his readers to pay especial attention to *quae*

¹ C. N. Cochrane, *Thucydides and the Science of History* (Oxford, 1929), esp. pp. 25-6, 31.

² E.g. Tacitus, *Ann.*, III, 65: *quod praecipuum munus annalium reor, ne virtutes sileantur, utque pravis dictis factisque ex posteritate et infamia metus sit*; Sallust, *Cat.*, 1-4; and *Jug.*, 4: *nam saepe ego audivi Q. Maximus, P. Scipionem, praeterea civitatis nostrae praeclaros viros solitos ita dicere, "quum maiorum imagines intuerentur, vehementissime sibi animum ad virtutem accendi"; scilicet non ceram illam, neque figuram, tantam vim in sese habere; sed memoria rerum gestarum eam flammam egregiis viris in pectore crescere, neque prius sedari, quam virtus eorum famam atque gloriam adaequaverit.*

³ E.g. the remark of Sempronius Asellio (Peter, *H. R. F.*, 2 = Aulus Gellius, V, 18, 9): *nam neque alacriores . . . ad rempublicam defendendam neque segniores ad rem perperam faciendam annales libri commovere quicquam possunt.* Sempronius here contrasts chronicles (*annales*) with real history (*res gestae*), which in his view has the patriotic and moral functions which *annales* lack.

⁴ F. W. Walbank, *C. Q.*, XXXIX (1945), p. 10, quotes Polybius' approval (VI, 56, 6) of the moral utility of Roman religion, and well compares Diodorus, I, 2, 2, where history is said to be a more potent moral influence than "myths about Hades." The Stoic influence is clearly discernible in both.

⁵ On the Preface, see esp. the important article of L. Ferrero in *Riv. Fil.*, XXVII (1949), pp. 1-47; H. Dessau, "Die Vorrede des Livius" (*Festschrift z. O. Hirschfelds 60. Geburtstage* [Berlin, 1903]); E. Dutoit, *R. E. L.* (1942), pp. 98-105; G. Curcio, *Riv. I. G. I.*, I (1917), pp. 77-85.

*vita, qui mores fuerint, per quos viros quibusque artibus domi militiaeque et partum et auctum imperium sit.*⁶ As Ferrero says, *mores* and *artes* are not merely close to each other, but are bound together, forming a synthesis between the sphere of morals and that of political activity which reveals Livy's relationship with Stoic beliefs. The *artes*, when *bonae*, are the principles of religious, political, and private activity—*pietas* and *fides*; *concordia*, *disciplina*, *clementia*, *prudencia*; *virtus*, *pudicitia*, *diginitas*, *frugalitas*, and the rest. In Livy the great Romans embody these *artes*, and the villains are symbols of their opposites: each class is set forth as a stimulus and a warning.⁷

The danger of such a preoccupation with the moral interpretation of history in such definite terms is that it may lead to a biased account, especially as Livy is convinced, at the commencement of his task, that *nulla umquam respublica nec maior nec sanctor nec bonis exemplis ditior fuit*,⁸ and that he will seek consolation and a refuge in a happier past.⁹ This patriotic bias, so openly manifested before his evaluation of the evidence has properly commenced, finds its outlet precisely in the emphasis on those principles of conduct, the *bonae artes*, which allegedly motivated the great men of Roman history. Hence moral and patriotic considerations are united for didactic purposes, with the aim not so much of inducing an immediate moral revival (Livy's pessimistic attitude towards this is quite explicit),¹⁰ but of demonstrating to posterity that national greatness cannot be achieved without the possession, especially by the leading men of the state, of the attributes which promote a healthy morality and sagacity in the execution of external or domestic policies.

⁶ *Praef.*, 9.

⁷ It has frequently been observed that in the first Decade the gentile name is often symbolic of certain qualities or defects which play their inevitable role in the crises of their times.

⁸ *Praef.*, 11.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹⁰ Esp. in *Praef.*, 9: . . . *haec tempora quibus nec vitia nostra nec remedia pati possumus*; and other comments in VII, 2, 13; 25, 9; 29, 2; VIII, 11, 1. There is no real evidence, as is sometimes implied, that Livy prostituted his talent to serve Augustus' moral revival. One should rather ascribe to him disgust about the immoral state of contemporary Rome, with some scepticism about the feasibility of Augustus' reforms.

I

This bias of Livy can most convincingly be demonstrated by a careful examination of his sources, where extant, in comparison with his own version of events.¹¹ A feature which comes repeatedly to our notice is Livy's insistence on *dignitas* and *gravitas*, not only in Romans but also in non-Romans of high rank. This insistence is taken to such lengths that nowhere in the *Ab Urbe Condita* is a distinguished Roman depicted as laughing aloud. This suppression of all jocular elements has tended to mislead us in general about the over-sobriety and high seriousness of the Roman character, and in particular about the prevailing atmosphere of individual conferences. An interesting example of this is Livy's treatment of the conference at Nicaea in 197 B. C.¹²

Philip had asked Flamininus for a parley, but refused to leave his ship, so that Flamininus and his Greek and Asian allies had to address him from the shore. Of these, Alexander the Aetolian spoke last. In reply, Philip began to criticise Alexander's speech, but was interrupted by Phaeneas, another Aetolian. Philip made a humorous rejoinder about Phaeneas' defective vision.

Pol., XVIII, 4, 3: ἔτι δὲ ταῦτα λέγοντος τοῦ βασιλέως, ὁ Φαινέας, ἡλαττωμένος τοῖς ὄμμασιν ἐπὶ πλεῖον, ὑπέκρουε τὸν Φίλιππον, φάσκων αὐτὸν ληρεῖν· δεῖν γὰρ ἢ μαχόμενον νικᾶν ἢ ποιεῖν τοῖς κρείττοσι τὸ προσταττόμενον. ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος, καίπερ ἐν κακοῖς ὤν, ὅμως οὐκ ἀπέσχετο τοῦ καθ' αὐτὸν ιδιώματος, ἀλλ' ἐπιστραφεὶς "Τοῦτο μὲν" ἔφησεν "ὦ Φαινέα, καὶ τυφλῷ δῆλον." ἦν γὰρ εὐθικτος καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος εὖ πεφυκὼς πρὸς τὸ διαχλευάζειν ἀνθρώπους.

Livy, XXXIII, 34, 2: orsum eum dicere, in Aetolos maxime, violenter Phaeneas interfatus non in verbis rem verti ait: aut bello vincendum aut melioribus parendum esse. 'apparet id quidem, inquit Philippus, etiam caeco,' iocatus in valetudinem oculorum Phaeneae. *et erat dicacior quam regem decet, et ne inter seria quidem risu satis temperans.*

¹¹ So far as Polybius is concerned, it is safer to cite examples from the fourth Decade, in which Livy has indisputably followed him. Hence examples *in extenso* from the third Decade, where Livy's direct debt to Polybius is in dispute, have been avoided.

¹² This conference is discussed by M. Holleaux, *R. E. G.* (1923), pp. 115 ff.; L. Homo in *Mélanges Cagnat* (1912), pp. 31 ff.; G. Aymard, *Les premiers rapports*, etc. (1938), pp. 114 ff., but their interest is, naturally enough, primarily in the Polybian account.

Livy's view clearly is that kings should not descend to witticisms, and that laughter at any time is bad enough, but especially at conferences of this kind.¹³ Hence no Roman must be portrayed as acting with similar abandon, as we see from Livy's later treatment. In Polybius, Philip continues his reply to the demand of the Aetolians that he should evacuate Greece. Most of Aetolia, he says, is not Greece: can he remain there? Flamininus laughs. But in Livy's account, Philip makes the point seriously, and the laughter is not mentioned.¹⁴ A similar censorship is exercised a little later, when Philip answers the Rhodians and Dionysodorus, the legate of Attalus, who had demanded the restoration of the temple of Aphrodite and the Nicephorium, which Philip had destroyed. Philip jokingly offered to send plants and gardeners, and Flamininus again laughs. But Livy depicts Philip as rebuking Attalus' legate for raising such a trifling matter, and the laughter is again omitted.¹⁵ Finally, at the end of the day's discussions, Flamininus, pleased by Philip's wit, made a joke himself.

Pol., XVIII, 7, 5: ὁ δὲ Τίτος οὐκ ἀηδῶς μὲν ἤκουε τοῦ Φιλίππου χλευάζοντος· μὴ βουλόμενος δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις [μὴ] δοκεῖν, ἀντεπέσκηψε τὸν Φίλιππον εἰπὼν οὕτως· “εἰκότως” ἔφη “Φίλιππε, μόνος εἰ νῦν· τοὺς γὰρ φίλους τοὺς τὰ κράτιστά σοι συμβουλευσοντας ἀπώλεσας ἅπαντας.” ὁ δὲ Μακεδὼν ὑπομειδιάσας σαρδάνιον ἀπεσιώπησε.

¹³ It is interesting to observe the two techniques of narration of this witticism. Polybius is careful to explain the circumstances of Phaeneas' defective sight (ἡλαττωμένος τοῖς ὄμμασιν ἐπὶ πλείον) before recounting the dialogue. Livy first cites the remark, and then explains it, thus ruining the joke. He is more interested in the incisiveness of the dialogue, and prunes Polybius' account of all remarks which precede Philip's retort. For this dialogue-technique, see K. Witte, *Rhein. Mus.*, LXV (1910), pp. 283-4, and P. G. Walsh, *Rhein. Mus.*, XCVII (1954), pp. 107-10.

¹⁴ Pol., XVIII, 6, 1 (τοῦ δὲ Τίτου γελάσαντος . . .) and Livy, XXXII, 34, 4, where Philip is angry, not jocular (*indignari inde coepit* . . .).

¹⁵ Pol. XVIII, 6, 4: “. . . φυτὰ δὲ καὶ κηπουροὺς πέμψω τοὺς φροντιοῦντας θεραπείας τοῦ τόπου καὶ τῆς αὐξήσεως τῶν ἐκκοπέντων δένδρων.” πάλιν δὲ τοῦ Τίτου γελάσαντος ἐπὶ τῷ χλευασμῷ. . . . Livy, XXXII, 34, 10: *quid restitui ea postulantibus respondeam, nisi quo uno modo silvae lucique caesi restitui possint, curam impensamque sationis me praestaturum, quoniam haec inter se reges postulare et respondere placet?* Holleaux (*op. cit.*, p. 134, n. 2) notes these suppressions of Flamininus' laughter.

This incident, both the remark and the ensuing smile, is omitted completely by Livy. It is clear that throughout his description of this conference, Livy has systematically suppressed all traces of the joking between Flaminius and Philip, and thereby has given a very different and distorted picture of the relationship between them and of the atmosphere of the whole conference. His motive is clear. Kings and responsible Romans should not lay aside their *gravitas*. So far as Philip is concerned, it detracts from the dignity of kingship.¹⁶ Still less will Livy tolerate any unseemly behaviour in his idealised characterisation of Flaminius, one of the symbols of the seriousness and incorruptibility of the Roman people. (Important, too, is the fact that Flaminius' apparent jocularly towards Philip entails an unfriendly attitude towards his own allies, at whose expense the jokes were made.)¹⁷

Another interesting example of Livy's suppression of laughter can be seen in IX, 46, where he follows, at least in part, the annalist Piso, whose account is preserved by Gellius.¹⁸ This passage concerns a certain Cn. Flavius, the son of a freedman, who was elected curule aedile. When visiting a sick colleague, he found a number of noble youths sitting there, none of whom would rise in deference to his curule office because of his lowly origin.

Piso: idem Cn. Flavius, Annii filius, dicitur ad collegam venisse visere aegrotum: eo in conclave postquam introivit, adolescentes ibi complures nobiles sedebant. hi contemnentes eum, assurgere ei nemo voluit. Cn. Flavius, Annii

¹⁶ This is a favourite theme with Livy. With his remarks in this conference (XXXIII, 34, 3: *et erat dicacior natura quam regem decet* . . . ; 34, 10: *quoniam haec inter se reges postulare et respondere placet* . . .) we can compare XXXI, 18: *ferocior visa est oratio quam quae habenda apud regem est* (not in Pol., XVI, 34, 6); XXXIII, 32, 14: *superbo et regio animo* (not in Pol., XVIII, 1, 7); also XXXIII, 21, XXXV, 15, 3, XXXIX, 35, 3, etc. An amusing example concerns Moagetes, chief of Cibyra in Gallograecia. When Cn. Manlius Vulso was campaigning there, Moagetes came to beg the consul not to devastate his territory. Polybius says he was *κατά τε τὴν ἐσθῆτα καὶ τὴν ἀλλήν προστασίαν λιτὸς καὶ ταπεινός* (XXI, 34, 10). Livy's version in XXXVIII, 14, 9, *vestitus comitatusque vix ad privati modice locupletis habitum* (scarcely up to middle-class standards!), allows the king to play the suppliant more becomingly.

¹⁷ *Infra*, p. 376.

¹⁸ *H. R. F.*, 27 = Gell., VII, 9.

filius, *id arrisit*, sellamque curulem iussit sibi afferri, eam in limine posuit, ne quis illorum exire possit, utique ii omnes inviti viderent sese in sella curuli sedentem.

Livy's account (IX, 46, 9) contains substantially the same details, but Flavius, as curule aedile, is not allowed to detract from his *dignitas* by laughing at the petty conduct of the nobles.

Other examples of Livy's preoccupation with *dignitas* and *gravitas* could be quoted,¹⁹ and there can be no doubt that his attempts to edify his readers about the solemn bearing of Roman heroes have resulted in a distortion of the facts.

II

The role of *pietas* towards the gods, and *fides* towards men, and their close interconnection, in Livy's philosophy of history, are clear to all who have read his account of the great disasters which befell Roman arms at the hands of the Gauls, the Samnites, and the Carthaginians. The defeat at the Allia is considered to be the result of a lack of *pietas* and *fides*. It is true

¹⁹ Livy comments ironically on the traditional account of the Gaul's conduct before his famous duel with T. Manlius (later Torquatus). The Gaul put out his tongue in derision, says Livy, *quoniam id quoque memoria dignum antiquis visum est* (VII, 10, 5). One source followed here, Claudius Quadrigarius (*H. R. F.*, 10b = Gell., IX, 13) says: *deinde Gallus inridere coepit atque linguam exertare*. There is no laughter in Livy, though the Gaul is *stolide laetum*.

In XXIV, 33, 9 there is no trace of a joke made by Marcellus during the siege of Syracuse. Polybius (VIII, 5, 2 ff.) recounts how a device of Archimedes succeeded in destroying the *σαμβύκαι*, the harp-shaped ladders used against towns besieged from the sea, and how other machines broke up direct attacks. Marcellus laughed at this failure, saying "Archimedes is drawing water from the sea with my ships, but my harpists (*σαμβύκας*) have been flogged and expelled from the feast in disgrace."

More serious is Livy's failure to discuss fully Rome's responsibility for the second Punic War. Polybius (III, 22 ff.) outlines the various treaties which Rome had made with Carthage before stating his opinion about the responsibility for the commencement of hostilities. Livy regards the issue as one of *dignitas*: it would be an affront to the Roman people to inquire into her degree of responsibility for the war. Hence he emphasises the dramatic scene at Carthage when the ultimatum was laid down and war declared, and then adds: *haec derecta percontatio ac denuntiatio belli magis ex dignitate populi Romani visa est quam de foederum iure verbis disceptare*. . . .

that military considerations are mentioned: the military tribunes are blamed for conducting an inadequate levy, for lack of preparation and of any *ratio pugnae*; but these are regarded as secondary to, and perhaps the result of, the grievous neglect of a divine warning,²⁰ and the contravention of the *ius gentium*, first by the Roman ambassadors, who despite their ambassadorial status fought on behalf of Clusium after unsuccessful negotiations with the Gauls, and then by the senate and commons, who not only failed to surrender the guilty ambassadors but appointed them as military tribunes.²¹ Similarly the disaster at Caudium is the result of the Romans' rejection in a haughty manner of the just restitution offered by the Samnites. This *superbia* and the failure to act justly is the fundamental cause of the humiliation that ensues.²² The defeat of Flaminius at Trasimene is attributed to his disrespectful attitude towards the gods.²³ This tragic concept of history, with *ὑβρις* (*superbia*) meeting its inevitable *ἄτη*, has its origins in Greek historiography,²⁴ and clearly influenced Polybius²⁵ as well as the Roman annalists.

This tragic treatment is for obvious reasons sharper in outline in the largely legendary content of the first Decade than in the later sections of the *Ab Urbe Condita*.²⁶ The necessity for the Stoic doctrine of harmony, translated from its cosmological context to the religious and social spheres, is demonstrated especially in these early books. The disasters are rare exceptions: Livy is at pains to stress the harmonious relationship of the ancients with the gods and with their fellow-men.²⁷ Yet the same moral lesson is taught in the later books in a more indirect

²⁰ V, 32, 6-7.

²¹ Esp. V, 35, 6; 36, 8-11.

²² As C. Pontius the Samnite says: *et ego ad deos vindices intolerandae superbiae confugiam, et precabor ut iras suas vertant in eos* (IX, 1, 8).

²³ XXII, 3, 4-5.

²⁴ B. L. Ullman, "History and Tragedy," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXIII (1942), pp. 25-53.

²⁵ F. W. Walbank, "Φίλιππος τραγωδούμενος," *J. H. S.*, LVIII (1938), pp. 65-8.

²⁶ Hence the view put forward by Dessau (*op. cit.*, p. 461) that the Preface, with its statement of moral aims, applies only to the earlier books.

²⁷ II, 40, 11; III, 5, 14-15; 20, 3; 57, 7; IV, 6, 12; etc.

manner. Success is only possible for those who observe their obligations of *pietas* and *fides*. This is the moralistic framework within which the career of Hannibal is described; and Hanno sees the first Punic War in its result as a victory for the side which observed *fides* in regard to the treaty.²⁸

It is in his anxiety to show the *fides* of Flaminius in the fourth Decade that Livy departs from the truth. Through this indirect manner he propounds the thesis that Rome's successes in Greece and Macedonia are founded upon harmonious relations with her allies and the complete trust accorded by the Greeks to Roman leaders. Hence Flaminius is depicted successively as the liberator of the Greeks,²⁹ as their father,³⁰ and as their wet-nurse.³¹ To achieve this constant picture of *fides*, Livy omits the allegations of intrigue made against Flaminius by Polybius.³² Flaminius' apparent antipathy towards his allies at the Nicaea conference has already been mentioned.³³ At the end of the conference, the allies agreed to send embassies to Rome; and Polybius says that Flaminius sent Amynander *γινώσκων αὐτὸν εὐάγωγον μὲν ὄντα καὶ ῥαδίως ἐξακολουθήσοντα τοῖς ἐκεῖ φίλοις, ἐφ' ὁπότ' ἂν ἄγωσιν αὐτόν, φαντασίαν δὲ ποιήσοντα καὶ προσδοκίαν διὰ τὸ τῆς βασιλείας ὄνομα*.³⁴ Livy omits mention of Amynander's pliability, and says merely that he was sent *ut speciem legationi adiceret*.³⁵

Worst of all is Livy's account of the assassination of the pro-Macedonian Boeotarch Brachyllas at Thebes in 197 B. C. by the philo-Roman party, led by Zeuxippus and Pisistratus. Polybius³⁶ tells us that the conspirators consulted Flaminius before proceeding with their plans (*ἐπρέσβευον πρὸς Τίτον*), and that he, whilst refusing to be a participant, said that he would not con-

²⁸ XXI, 10, 9: *vicerunt ergo di hominesque, et, id de quo verbis ambigebatur uter populus foedus rupisset, eventus belli velut aequus iudex unde ius stabat ei victoriam dedit.*

²⁹ XXXIII, 32-3.

³⁰ XXXIV, 50: *has velut parentis voces cum audirent, manare omnibus gaudio lacrimae. . . .*

³¹ XXXVI, 35, 4: *ego tamen sorte quadam nutriendae Graeciae datus. . . .*

³² For an unfavourable view of Polybius' characterisation of Flaminius, see Wood, *T. A. P. A.*, LXX (1939), pp. 93 ff.

³³ *Supra*, pp. 372-3.

³⁵ XXXII, 36.

³⁴ XVIII, 10, 7.

³⁶ XVIII, 43, 7 ff.

strain them, and urged them to talk it over with the Aetolian Alexamenus (αὐτὸς μὲν οὐκ ἔφη κοινωνεῖν τῆς πράξεως ταύτης, τοὺς δὲ βουλομένους πράττειν οὐ κωλύειν· καθόλου δὲ λαλεῖν αὐτοὺς ἐκέλευε περὶ τούτων Ἀλεξάμενῳ τῷ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν στρατηγῷ . . .). It was quite obvious that Alexamenus would be in favour of such an anti-Macedonian intrigue, and that Flamininus, under cover of a specious neutrality, was approving the assassination. Livy omits the incident completely, and the subsequent anti-Roman demonstrations in Thebes and in Boeotia generally are explained as the outcome of a suspicion, not of an objective fact: *effervit ea caedes Thebanos Boeotosque omnes ad execrabile odium Romanorum, credentes non sine consilio imperatoris Romani Zeuxippum, principem gentis, id facinus conscisse*.³⁷

This major example of Livy's suppression of unpalatable fact tempts us to suspect his integrity elsewhere. His account of the siege of Saguntum contains no *direct* comment on Rome's failure to show *fides* to her ally by the despatch of immediate aid.³⁸ Indeed, if we examine Polybius' account,³⁹ Livy seems to have minimised in one important respect the Roman responsibility. Polybius writes that the Saguntines sent *frequent* messages to Rome when the siege was imminent (III, 15, 1: οἱ δὲ Ζακανθαῖοι συνεχῶς ἐπεμπον . . .). Livy's version in XXI, 6, 2 (*legati a Saguntinis Romam missi*) tones down the sense of crisis so vividly reproduced by Polybius, and thereby seeks to lessen Rome's guilt.

III

Livy's emphasis on *pudicitia*, the quality in women which he places on a par with *virtus* in men,⁴⁰ is demonstrated in the

³⁷ XXXIII, 29, 1.

³⁸ But Rome is blamed through the words of one of the Volciani (XXI, 19, 9-10), and the senate is said to be ashamed that no help was sent (16, 2).

³⁹ Though Livy has probably followed Coelius Antipater in the main, there is good evidence that Polybius has been consulted in this section of the book. See esp. Livy, XXI, 1, Pol., III, 8 on the causes of the war; Livy, 5, Pol., 13, 5 ff. on Hannibal's operations before the siege; Livy, 18, Pol., 20, 6-21, 8 and 33, 1-4 on the embassy to Carthage; and the discussion of the treaties in Livy, 19, 1 ff., Pol., 29, 2 ff. See also A. Klotz, *Livius und seine Vorgänger* (Leipzig, 1940), pp. 111-12.

⁴⁰ The words of Verginia in X, 23, 7-8 clearly have Livy's stamp upon them: *vosque hortor ut, quod certamen virtutis viros in hac civitate tenet, hoc pudicitiae inter matronas sit* . . .

famous legends of the first Decade. The rape of Lucretia and her suicide,⁴¹ and the story of Appius Claudius and Verginia, whose father slew her to preserve her chastity,⁴² are concerned, by the condemnation of the *libido* of the Romans involved, to illustrate the fact that in any healthy state high ideals of chastity are essential.

This anxiety to point the moral sometimes leads to a distortion of the facts. In XXXVIII, 24, there is an interesting description of an event the narration of which is also extant in the source, Polybius.⁴³ Whilst L. Manlius was encamped at Ancyra, one of his centurions took advantage of the capture of a barbarian princess, Chiomara, to do her violence. He subsequently agreed to sell her back to her husband, but as she was being handed over to the custody of her tribesmen, she ordered one of them to kill the centurion, and carried his head back to her husband as a mark of her fidelity.

Livy's romantic sense (a feature obvious with each of his descriptions of *pudicitia*)⁴⁴ leads him to preface his account with the addition that Chiomara was very beautiful (*forma eximia*). The pen-picture of the lustful, greedy centurion is similar in both accounts, but the story of the violation is amplified by Livy.

Pol., XXI, 38, 2: ὁ δὲ λαβὼν αὐτὴν ταξίαρχος ἐχρήσατο τῇ τύχῃ στρατιωτικῶς καὶ κατήσχυεν. . . . ἡττήθη δ' ὁμῶς ὑπὸ τῆς φιλαργυρίας, καὶ χρυσίου συχνοῦ διομολογήθεις ὑπὲρ τῆς γυναικός, ἤγεν αὐτὴν ἀπολυτρώσων. . . .

Livy, XXXVIII, 24, 3: is primo animum temptavit; quem cum abhorrentem a voluntario videret stupro, corpori, quod servum fortuna erat, vim fecit. deinde ad leniendam indignitatem iniuriae, spem reditus ad suos mulieri fecit, et ne eam quidem, ut amans, gratuitam.

Livy stresses the *pudicitia* of Chiomara by inserting a preliminary stage not in Polybius, an elaboration on his source typically

⁴¹ I, 58.

⁴² III, 44 ff.

⁴³ XXI, 38. This is preserved through Plutarch (*Mul. Virt.*, 22) and is therefore probably condensed.

⁴⁴ I must disagree with J. M. K. Martin (*Greece and Rome*, XI [1942], pp. 124 ff.) who sees Livy's interest in the Sophonisba episode (XXX, 12, 11 ff.) as political rather than romantic. His approach is that of the moralist, but his tendency to romance is clear from the additions which he inserts into his account.

Livian: ⁴⁵ *is primo animum temptavit; quem cum abhorrentem a voluntario videret stupro. . .* He also emphasises the *libido* of the centurion with his remark (*et ne eam quidem, ut amans, gratuitam*) that no feelings of love were involved. After the murder, ⁴⁶ Chiomara returns to her husband with the head of the centurion, which she drops at his feet. Livy's account fittingly rounds off the story with a remark (not in Plutarch's version of Polybius): *aliaque ut traditur sanctitate et gravitate vitae, huius matronalis facinoris decus ad ultimum conservavit*. Livy has added imaginative touches to the account of Polybius so as to point the moral more clearly.

IV

The Roman doctrine of *clementia*, epitomised in the Vergilian line *parcere subiectis et debellare superbos*,⁴⁷ implies the according of merciful treatment not to all, but to those who willingly surrender. Camillus initiated the tradition, according to Livy, with his treatment of the Tuscans. Camillus was ordered to attack Tusculum because it had supported the Volsci; but the policy of non-resistance (*patientia*), which the Romans had not hitherto experienced, ensured that the city was not harmed. As Camillus remarks, *Soli adhuc, inquit, Tusculani, vera arma verasque vires quibus ab ira Romanorum vestra tutaremini invenistis*.⁴⁸ Subsequently the senate was merciful to the Tusculan embassy and granted peace, and later the *civitas*.

⁴⁵ We can compare VIII, 28, 3: . . . *florem aetatis eius fructum adventicium crediti ratus, primo perlicere adulescentem sermone incesto est conatus; dein, postquam aspernabantur flagitium aures, minis terrire . . .* and again, III, 44, 4: *hanc virginem adultam forma excellentem Appius amore amens pretio ac spe perlicere adortus, postquam omnia pudore saepta animadverterat, ad crudelem superbamque vim animum convertit*.

⁴⁶ The two accounts of the murder show interesting differences, but one cannot be certain of Plutarch's accuracy in reproducing the details of Polybius' version. In Polybius Chiomara gives the command to kill with a nod, as she is being embraced by the centurion. In Livy the centurion is weighing the gold, and the command is given in the girl's language, which the centurion does not understand. It is tempting to ascribe these changes to Livy, who depicts a poetic justice: it is the *avaritia* of the centurion which causes his death, and no element of affection enters the account.

⁴⁷ *Aen.*, VI, 853.

⁴⁸ VI, 26, 1.

It is an attempt to portray a similar attitude which leads Livy to a falsification of the facts in his narration of the battle of Cynoscephalae. Polybius tells us of Philip's decision to flee when his position was hopeless, and of the pursuit of the fugitives by Flaminius. He continues (XVIII, 26, 9):

(Τίτος) τὰς μὲν <ἀρχὰς> . . . ἐπέστη, τῶν πολεμίων ὀρθὰς ἀνασχόντων τὰς σαρίσας, ὅπερ ἔθος ἐστὶ ποιεῖν τοῖς Μακεδόσιν, ὅταν ἢ παραδιδῶσιν αὐτοὺς ἢ μεταβάλλωνται πρὸς τοὺς ὑπεναντίους· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πυθόμενος τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ συμβαίνοντος παρακατεῖχε τοὺς μεθ' αὐτοῦ φείσασθαι κρίνων τῶν ἀποδεδειλιακότων. ἀκμὴν δὲ τοῦ Τίτου ταῦτα διανοομένου τῶν προηγουμένων τινὲς ἐπιπεσόντες αὐτοῖς ἐξ ὑπερδεξίου προσέφερον τὰς χεῖρας, καὶ τοὺς μὲν πλείους διέφθειρον, ὀλίγοι δὲ τινες διέφυγον ρίψαντες τὰ ὄπλα.

Livy's account shows some differences (XXXIII, 10, 3):

Quinctius cum institisset cedentibus, repente quia erigentes hastas Macedonas conspexerat, quidnam pararent incertus, paulisper novitate rei constituit signa: deinde ut accepit hunc morem esse Macedonum tradentium sese, *parcere victis* in animo habebat. ceterum *ab ignaris militibus omissam ab hoste pugnam*, et quid imperator vellet, impetus est in eos factus et *primis caesis ceteri in fugam dissipati sunt*.

Livy's emphasis on Flaminius' intended *clementia*, and the ignorance of the Roman troops about the termination of the conflict, can be justified in that it can be inferred from Polybius' account. But Livy clearly seeks to mislead his readers about the numbers who were butchered: τοὺς μὲν πλείους διέφθειρον, ὀλίγοι δὲ τινες διέφυγον . . . gives us a picture of a more ruthless attack than Livy's *primis caesis ceteri in fugam dissipati sunt*, which continues to give us the impression that it was all an honest mistake.⁴⁹

Another suppression of Roman *saevitia* occurs in the description of the famous duel between Manlius Torquatus and the Gaul. The annalistic account of Claudius Quadrigarius,⁵⁰ which Livy has obviously followed in part, tells us that after Manlius had killed the Gaul, he cut off his head before removing the necklace (*ubi eum evertit, caput praecidit, torquem detraxit*,

⁴⁹ An additional example from the Hannibalic War may be cited. In Polybius (III, 102, 2) Minucius orders his forces to take no prisoners when attacking the Carthaginian foragers. Livy has chosen to ignore this (XXII, 24, 8).

⁵⁰ *H. R. F.*, 10b = Gell., IX, 13.

eamque sanguinolentam sibi in collum imponit). Livy's account makes the proceedings more in harmony with the spirit of the Augustan age, and emphasises the lack of *saevitia* on the part of Manlius: . . . *in spatium ingens ruentem porrexit hostem. iacentis inde corpus ab omni alia vexatione intactum uno torque spoliavit* . . . (VII, 10, 10-11).

Thus does Livy avoid the narration of Roman atrocities. The truth is that in this respect, as in others, he retains his preconceived notions despite the evidence. In the first book (I, 28, 11) he has criticised the barbarous punishment of Mettius with the qualifying comment that Rome's subsequent record was a creditable one: *primum ultimumque illud supplicium apud Romanos exempli parum memoris legum humanarum fuit: in aliis gloriari licet nulli gentium mitiores placuisse poenas*. This attitude of mind causes him deliberately to underestimate on occasion the *saevitia* of Roman arms.

V

The necessity for *disciplina*, or deference to the appropriate military or civil authority, is a favourite theme of the *Ab Urbe Condita*, being illustrated dramatically in the first Decade by the famous accounts of the execution of Brutus' son,⁵¹ and the disobedience of Q. Fabius Rullianus.⁵² Whilst accepting the need for due discretion, Livy emphasises the importance of enforcing obedience. Thus Camillus' *severitas imperii* in refusing booty to his troops is called a *virtus*,⁵³ and many other passages show Livy's insistence on *disciplina*.⁵⁴

Hence in the fourth Decade his picture of the Roman armies in Greece is invariably one of efficient fighting-units, whose strength is their discipline: there is no hint here of the rebellious attitude which dogged republican armies a century later. That Livy's picture is to some extent distorted can be realised

⁵¹ II, 5, 5 ff.

⁵² VIII, 30 ff.

⁵³ V, 26, 8.

⁵⁴ III, 29, 3, where Livy praises Minucius' gracious acceptance of the rebuke of Cincinnatus: *sed adeo tum imperio meliori animus mansuete obediens erat*. Also IV, 37, 5; 42, 7; VII, 10, 2 ff. (where Manlius offers to fight the Gaul *extra ordinem* only if his commander allows it—a stipulation not recorded by Claudius Quadrigarius [*H. R. F.*, 10b = Gell., IX, 13]), XXI, 7, 3; XXII, 13, 11; etc.

by reading Polybius' description of an incident after Cynoscephalae. After their victory, many Romans hastened to loot the enemy camp, but found that their allies the Aetolians had got there first. Their remarks to Flaminius do not indicate that degree of *severitas imperii* which we might otherwise have assumed.

XVIII, 27, 4: ἔνθα δὲ καταλαβόντες τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς προεμπεπτωκότας καὶ δόξαντες στέρεσθαι τῆς σφίσι καθηκούσης ὠφελείας, ἤρξαντο καταμέμψεσθαι τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς καὶ λέγειν πρὸς τὸν στρατηγὸν ὅτι τοὺς μὲν κινδύνους αὐτοῖς ἐπιτάττει, τῆς δ' ὠφελείας ἄλλοις παρακεχώρηκε.

Livy has omitted this insubordination, merely remarking:

XXXIII, 10, 6: Romani victores in castra hostium spe praedae irrumpunt: ea magna ex parte direpta ab Aetolis inveniunt.

Interesting, too, in connection with Livy's emphasis on *disciplina*, is a passage in XXIV, 44, 9-10. Here, as often elsewhere, Livy makes use of an anecdote for the purposes of characterisation. It is the story of how Fabius Maximus Cunctator went to Suessula to join his son, recently elected consul, in order to serve as his lieutenant. The account of the meeting of father and son is preserved from Claudius Quadrigarius by Gellius, and the correspondence between this version and that of Livy is so close that we can assume that Claudius was Livy's source here.

Claudius' version (*H.R.F.*, 57 = Gell., II, 2, 13) describes the unwillingness of the father to dismount:

ei consuli pater proconsul obviam in equo vehens venit, neque descendere voluit quod pater erat, et quod inter eos sciebant maxima concordia convenire, lictores non ausi sunt descendere iubere. Ubi iuxta venit, tum consul ait: "Quid postea?" Lictor ille qui apparebat cito intellexit, Maximum proconsulem descendere iussit. Fabius imperio paret et filium collaudavit, cum imperium quod populi esset retineret.

Though this account is in itself a sufficiently edifying one, Livy makes the role of the father, Cunctator, still more exemplary. There is no mention of the father's unwillingness to dismount: instead, Cunctator is depicted as deliberately testing his son (XXIV, 44, 9-10):

Pater filio legatus ad Suessulam in castra venit. cum obviam filius progrediretur lictoresque verecundia maiestatis eius taciti anteirent, praeter undecim fasces equo praevectus senex, ut consul animadvertere proximum lictorem iussit, et is ut descenderet ex equo exclamavit, tum demum desiliens, '*experiri*' inquit '*volui, fili, satini*' scires consulem te esse.'

Thus Cunctator is characterised as a man willing to subordinate his own exalted status and reputation to his son's superior office. The need to forget personal eminence in the interests of the state is emphasised by another slight change made by Livy: he refers to Cunctator not as *proconsul*, as Claudius does, but as *legatus*.

All these deliberate changes and omissions, however worthy in intention, should make us hesitate before attributing to Livy the virtues of impartiality and intellectual integrity.⁵⁵ In his anxiety to confound those of his contemporaries who scoffed at the standards of the ancients,⁵⁶ he has idealised the characters of Roman leaders and of the Roman people; and in so doing has neglected the obligations which Antonius asserts are accepted by all historians: *nam quis nescit primam historiae legem ne quid falsi dicere audeat, ne quid veri non audeat? ne quae suspicio gratiae sit in scribendo?*⁵⁷

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⁵⁵ M. L. W. Laistner, *The Greater Roman Historians* (Univ. of California, 1947) rightly defends Livy from his over-captious critics, but seems to carry his defence too far in this respect: see p. 95.

⁵⁶ XXVI, 22, 14.

⁵⁷ Cicero, *De Orat.*, II, 62.

THE DATE OF AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS' LAST BOOKS.

To judge by the recent publications which deal, directly or indirectly, with Ammianus Marcellinus, one would gather that the attempt to determine the date at which the last great Roman historian finished his work had better be given up as hopeless. There is general agreement that the *terminus post quem* for Books XXVI-XXVIII is 390, the year in which Neoterius (*postea consul*, XXVI, 5, 14) held office. The last instalment, however, Books XXIX-XXXI, contains not a single reference to an event or a situation, the validity of which as a chronological criterion has not been questioned.

After a thorough discussion of the limitations evidently imposed upon Ammianus' freedom to expose his religious opinions, Thompson¹ comes to the conclusion that the historian completed his work after the fall of the usurper Eugenius in September 394. No contemporary reader, he says, could fail to see in the praise bestowed upon the tolerant Valentinian (XXX, 9, 5) a veiled criticism of Theodosius. This is also the opinion of Straub.² But Hartke,³ like Ernst Stein⁴ before him, interprets the passage in the opposite way. He considers it unthinkable that Ammianus could have written it under Theodosius. He dates Books XXX and XXXI, with the possible exception of the last chapter, in the reign of Eugenius.

While Ammianus describes the career of the elder Theodosius at considerable length, he does not speak of the execution of the emperor's father in 376. According to Thompson⁵ and Straub⁶ this can be explained only under the assumption that Ammianus did not want to deal with a matter that, even after so many

¹ E. A. Thompson, *The Historical Work of Ammianus Marcellinus* (Cambridge, 1947), pp. 116-17.

² J. Straub, *Studien zur Historia Augusta* (Bern, 1949), p. 140.

³ W. Hartke, *Römische Kinderkaiser* (Berlin, 1951), p. 72.

⁴ *Geschichte des spätrömischen Reiches*, I (Wien, 1928), p. 232.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 92.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 140.

years, must have been painful to Theodosius. Hartke⁷ sees no reason why Ammianus should have added anything of his own to his source, which, in Hartke's opinion, was possibly a panegyricus.

In XXIX, 6, 15 Ammianus calls Theodosius *princeps noster perspectissimus*. As early as 1868, Cart⁸ contended that Ammianus would have referred to the emperor as *nunc princeps noster*, had he reached the end of his work while Theodosius was still alive. Seeck⁹ regarded this argument as decisive. So does Pighi, who dates Books XXIX-XXXI accordingly in the years 396-398.¹⁰ But Thompson is not impressed with the argument. He dismisses it as "thin, to say the least."¹¹ Straub, going one step further, maintains that the very superlative *perspectissimus* dates Book XXIX in Theodosius' reign.¹²

Surveying the discussion going on for nearly a century one comes to the conclusion that the text itself simply does not furnish any cogent argument for one date or another. There arises the question whether other criteria exist for arriving at a decision. The problem is, *prima facie*, a purely chronological one. Its correct solution, however, is likely to throw some light on the political and religious thinking during the years in which the last war between paganism and Christianity was fought out.

Ammianus gave recitations of parts of his work at Rome in the beginning of the nineties of the fourth century. From a letter of Libanius we know how well they were received.¹³ Then follows almost complete silence. Only Priscian mentioned, in passing, Ammianus' work.¹⁴ Cassiodorus, in his history of the Goths, named and quoted Vergil and Strabo, Lucan and Josephus, Dio Chrysostomus and Cassius Dio, Tacitus and Ptolemy,

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 72, n. 1.

⁸ Quoted by Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

⁹ *R.-E.*, I, col. 1847.

¹⁰ J. B. Pighi, *Ammiani Marcellini rerum gestarum capita selecta* (Neuchatel, 1948), p. ix.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 18.

¹² *Op. cit.*, pp. 140-2.

¹³ *Ep.* 983; for the date (late in 392) cf. O. Seeck, *Die Briefe des Libanius* (Leipzig, 1906), pp. 202, 463.

¹⁴ H. Keil, *Grammatici Latini*, II, 487, 1 f.

Priscus and the mysterious Ablabius.¹⁵ But he did not mention the source from which he drew so much of his knowledge about the early history of the Goths and Huns. This can hardly be a coincidence. I would suggest that it was Ammianus' deep respect for Julian "the Apostate" that made the Christian author shrink from indicating the source of his information.¹⁶ Another of Ammianus' readers who did not care, or dare, to say from whom he quoted was Jerome.

In his Commentary on Isaiah, more than in any other of his writings, Jerome made quite a show of his erudition. He adduced Cicero as if he had never been soundly beaten by the angels for his sinful love of the *eloquentia Tulliana*.¹⁷ The incurable littérateur indulged in quotations from Aristophanes, Herodotus, Xenophon, Josephus, Horace, Vergil, Ovid, and Lucan;¹⁸ it is more than doubtful whether he had read all these authors. That he had a considerable library, and not only a theological one, is certain. It must have also contained a copy of Ammianus.

Isaiah VII, 20 is an obscure verse: "In the same day shall the Lord shave with a razor that is hired, namely, by them beyond the river, by the king of Assyria, the head, and the hair of the feet; and it shall also consume the beard."

The best Jerome could do was to paraphrase the words of the prophet:

In ista novacula acutissima, et in his, qui habitant trans flumen Euphratem, in rege videlicet Assyrio, omnes capillos et pilos totius corporis a capite usque ad pedes decoremque barbae, quod virilitatis indicium est, radet Dominus de Judaea, ut nihil in illa forte, nihil pulchrum resideat, sed

¹⁵ Cf. Th. Mommsen in his edition of Jordanes (*Mon. Germaniae Hist., Auct. Antiqu.*, V, 1 [Berlin, 1882]), pp. xxx ff.

¹⁶ Symmachus is another historian who made use of Ammianus; see W. Ensslin, *Sitzb. Akad. München*, 1948, 3, pp. 100-1. Whether he acknowledged his debt to him, we do not know. His *Historia Romana* is lost. The author of a world chronicle attributed, rightly or wrongly, to John of Antioch read Ammianus rather carefully, cf. Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 19, n. 2, but he never refers to him.

¹⁷ Jerome, *Ep.*, XXII, 30.

¹⁸ Cf. A. Lubeck, *Hieronymus quos noverit scriptores et ex quibus hauserit* (Lipsiae, 1872), pp. 18, 22, 24, 42, 172, 192, 194.

effeminatis hominibus, immo ignominiosis mulieribus comparantur.¹⁹

Jerome was still thinking of the "effeminate men" when he commented on verses 21-2 as follows:

Sicubi ergo rarus cultor in montibus fuerit inventus, inde vitam miserabilem sustentabunt. Caetera autem patebunt pascuis, et absque ullo custode a brutis animantibus concubantur. Haec post captivitatem solere fieri, utinam nesciremus. At nunc magna pars Romani orbis quondam Iudaeae similis est: quod absque ira Dei factum non putamus, qui nequaquam contemptum sui per Assyrios ulciscitur, et Chaldaeos; sed per feras gentes, et quondam nobis incognitas, quarum et vultus et sermo terribilis est, et femineas incisasque facies praeferentes virorum, et bene barbarorum fugientia terga confodiunt.²⁰

This was written in the summer of 408.²¹ The *ferae gentes* were the Huns and their Scirian allies, who, in the spring, had crossed the Danube and broken into Thrace.²²

¹⁹ Migne, *P. L.*, XXIV, col. 112.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, col. 113.

²¹ In the preface to Book XI, Jerome alluded to the execution of Stilicho in August 408, cf. F. Cavallera, *Saint Jérôme, sa vie et son œuvre*, I (Louvain, 1922), p. 312. When he received the news can, of course, not be dated to the day. He knew that his enemies, in particular "the scorpion" Rufinus, had attacked his work on the prophet Daniel in which he equated the Roman empire with the last of the four kingdoms; he was rightly afraid they would accuse him to the authorities, and that meant, first of all, the all-powerful Stilicho, of subversive interpretation of the scriptures, cf. H. Demougeot, "Saint Jérôme, les oracles sibyllins et Stilicon," *R. É. A.*, LIV (1952), pp. 83-92. No doubt, Jerome's Roman correspondents informed him as quickly as they could of the death of the generalissimo. Jerome had excellent connections with his friends in the West, cf. H. Levy, "Claudian's *In Rufinum* and an Epistle of St. Jerome," *A. J. P.*, LXIX (1948), pp. 62-8. We may assume that Jerome learnt about Stilicho's death in September or, at the latest, in October.

The *breves praefatiunculae* to the commentary show with what incredible haste Jerome wrote it. He dictated the first book *celeri sermone* (col. 57). *Dictamus haec*, he says in the preface to Book II, *non scribimus: currente notariorum manu currit oratio* (col. 155). Book II in which he speaks about the war with the "savage peoples" must have been dictated in June or July.

²² Cf. O. Seeck, *Gesch. d. Untergangs d. antiken Welt*, V (Berlin,

As usual well informed about the situation in the Balkan provinces, the Huns chose the right time to attack. At the end of 407, Stilicho abandoned his plan to conquer Eastern Illyricum with the help of Alaric's Visigoths. Betrayed by the generalissimo, unable to feed his people any longer in the exhausted Epirus, feeling himself not strong enough to fight the East for new land, Alaric turned against the West. In May 408 the Visigoths were in Noricum.²³

With the danger of a West Roman—Gothic invasion over, the greater part of the troops which were to contain it had been thrown to the Persian frontier where hostilities were expected to break out any day.²⁴ The government in Constantinople was well aware that the Huns might use the weakening of the Balkan army to make inroads into the border provinces. In April 408, Herculus, Praetorian Prefect of Illyricum, was instructed to compel "all persons, regardless of any privilege, to provide for the construction of walls as well as for the purpose and transport of supplies in kind for the needs of Illyricum."²⁵ If the Huns should by-pass the strong places on the frontier and break into Dacia, or even Macedonia, they could for a while plunder the helpless villages, but eventually they would be caught between the unconquered towns in the interior and the troops holding

1913), pp. 408-9; J. B. Bury, *History of the Later Roman Empire*, I (London, 1923), pp. 212-13; E. A. Thompson, *Attila and the Huns* (Cambridge, 1948), p. 29.

²³ Cf. S. Mazzarino, *Stilicone* (Roma, 1942), pp. 280-6.

²⁴ Cf. Sozomenus, *Hist. Eccl.*, IX, 3-4. As the edict of March 23, 409, *Cod. Iust.*, IV, 63, 4, shows, the tension ended with the conclusion of a new commercial treaty.

²⁵ The edict *Cod. Theod.*, XI, 17, 4 is dated "III id. April. Constantinop. Basso et Philippo conss.," i.e. April 11, 408. It is practically identical with the edict issued on April 9, 412, *Cod. Theod.*, XV, 1, 49. Seeck first presumed that both edicts should be dated April 9, 407 (*Regesten der Kaiser und Päpste* [Stuttgart, 1919], pp. 28-9), the time when Alaric threatened to march into Eastern Illyricum; later (*Ungang*, VI, p. 68) he conceded that both edicts provided for the protection of the towns exposed to Hun attacks. Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 376, n. 4, with some hesitation, referred XI, 17, 4 to 412. Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 29 dates both edicts in 412; Mazzarino, *op. cit.*, p. 75, n. 2 in 407. However, there can be no reasonable doubt that the dates of the edicts, as given in the codex, are correct, cf. A. Guldenpenning, *Gesch. des oström. Reiches unter den Kaisern Arcadius und Theodosius*, II (Halle, 1885), p. 209, n. 74. The first refers to the critical moment in the spring of 408; the second, issued 412, is a repetition, a year later somewhat mitigated by *Cod. Theod.*, XII, 1, 177, which, like the others, should be observed in Illyricum (*vastatum Illyricum*).

out in the fortifications along the lines, and forced back into the Barbaricum. What the Romans could not anticipate was that the Huns would take Castra Martis²⁶ in Dacia Ripensis by treachery. Whether other of the fortified places to the West and East of it also fell into the hands of the Huns is not known. It is quite likely.

Sozomenus, the only historian to speak about the Hun invasion,²⁷ gives a distorted account of it, but even through his edifying narrative one senses how extremely serious the situation was. With his few troops, the magister militum per Thraciam could not counterattack. He could not drive the savage hordes back. He made peace propositions to Uldis,²⁸ the leader of the Huns. But Uldis replied by pointing to the sun, and declaring "it would be easy for him, if he desired to do so, to subjugate every region of the earth that is enlightened by that luminary." The war dragged on throughout the year. It was still going on in the early months of 409.²⁹ Only after the desertion of a number of his captains to the Romans was the Hun king forced to retreat. He escaped across the Danube with difficulty; the Scirian prisoners of war were settled in Asia.³⁰

That Jerome's *ferae gentes* were the Huns is evident not only from the fact that in 408 the East Romans fought no other enemy, but also from his description of the savages: they were formerly unknown, and they cut their faces because they wanted to look like women rather than men with beards.

Ammianus described the Huns as "monstrously ugly and misshapen." "Since the cheeks of the children are deeply furrowed with the steel from their very birth, in order that the growth of hair, when it appears at the proper time, may be checked by the wrinkled scars, they grow old without beards and without any

²⁶ The present Kula, cf. *R.-E.*, III, col. 1769, no. 32 (Patsch). Bury on the map, *op. cit.*, p. 265 put Castra Martis on the left bank of the Danube; actually it was south of the river, "at a great distance from it" (Procopius, *De aed.*, IV, 6, 33).

²⁷ *Hist. Eccl.*, IX, 5.

²⁸ Byzantine writers liked to transcribe foreign names ending in *-in* as if they were in the accusative, cf. Gy. Moravesik, *Byzantinoturcica*, II (Budapest, 1943), p. 47. The King's name was Uldin, cf. Orosius, *Hist. adv. paganos*, VII, 37, 12.

²⁹ As the edict of March 23, 409, *Cod. Theod.*, V, 6, 2, shows.

³⁰ *Cod. Theod.*, V, 6, 3, and Sozomenus, *loc. cit.*

beauty, like eunuchs."³¹ Ammianus' explanation of the scanty beards of the Huns is absurd.³² Like many other peoples the Huns "inflicted wounds on their live flesh as a sign of grief when their kinsmen were dying."³³ The Hunnic Kutrigur "cut their cheeks with daggers, wailing after their manner."³⁴ In speaking about the peoples "to whom wailing means self-wounding and tearing the cheeks with iron and gouging the red traces of scars on the threatening face," Sidonius Apollinaris³⁵ had the Huns in mind. When they learned of Attila's death, they "made their faces hideous with deep wounds, that the renowned warrior might be mourned, not by effeminate wailings and tears, but by the blood of men."³⁶

Ammianus not only misinterpreted the Hun custom; his description of the Huns as beardless is at variance with Priscus. He may have seen one or another Hun mercenary; in the main he had to rely on informants. Priscus, on the other hand, spent months in the Hun settlements between the Danube and the Theiss; he was personally acquainted with Attila, his sons, his uncles, and many Hun dignitaries. Attila, he wrote, had a thin beard, *rarus barba*; this, the short stature, broad chest, small eyes, flat nose, and swarthy complexion were evidences of his origin, *origenis suae signa*.³⁷ To a Roman of the fifth century, a period when the beard was valued as a sign of strength, *indicium virilitatis*, as Jerome says,³⁸ the beards of the Huns may have looked sparse.³⁹ But Attila did not look like a eunuch.

³¹ XXXI, 2, 2. I follow J. C. Rolfe's translation (Loeb ed., III, p. 381).

³² Jordanes, *Getica*, 127, outdid Ammianus: "They cut the cheeks of the male children with a sword on the very day they are born so that before the nourishment of milk they must learn to endure wounds."

³³ Liutprand, *Antapodosis*, II, 3, ed. J. Becker, p. 37, on the Magyars.

³⁴ Agathias, V, 20, ed. Bonn, p. 322; cf. Menandros Protector on the Western Turks, fragm. 43, *Excerpta de legationibus*, ed. de Boor, p. 207.

³⁵ *C.*, VII, 238-40.

³⁶ Jordanes, *Getica*, 255.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 182; the source is Priscus.

³⁸ *Barba significat fortes*, Augustine, *Enarrat. in psalm.*, 132, 7 (Migne, *P. L.*, XXXVII, col. 1733), quoted, after Gerke, by Hartke, *op. cit.*, p. 466.

³⁹ Since early times the Scyths were represented as men with scanty beards, cf. H. Schoppa, *Die Darstellungen d. Perser in d. griech. Kunst bis zum Beginn des Hellenismus* (Heidelberg, 1933), pp. 21 f.

The correspondences between Ammianus and Jerome cannot be ascribed to the identity of the subject-matter. A comparison of the texts leaves, I believe, little doubt that Jerome paraphrased Ammianus:

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Hunorum gens monumentis ueteribus leuiter nota . . . omnem modicum feritatis excedit. | 1. Ferae gentes quondam nobis incognitae. |
| 2. ferro sulcantur genae . . . senescunt inberbes absque ulla venustate. | 2. feminae incisaeque facies . . . ut nihil pulchrum resideat. |
| 3. spadonibus similes. | 3. effeminati homines. |

Our assumption that in the characterization of the Huns Jerome was dependent upon Ammianus is confirmed by the letter the monk wrote in the summer of 396⁴⁰ to Heliodorus. He was still under the impression of the Hun invasion of the Asiatic provinces the year before, still shocked that

the soldiers of Rome, conquerors and lords of the world, now are conquered by those, tremble and shrink in fear at the sight of those who cannot walk on foot and think themselves as good as dead if once they touch the ground.⁴¹

This is an odd description of the Huns. It is true that all nomads who spend a great deal of their lives on horseback have a peculiar gait when they dismount and walk,⁴² as sailors rolled in the age of the sailing-ship when they went ashore. But to say that they cannot walk at all is grotesque. Who told Jerome this story? He read it, and as a comparison with Ammianus, XXXI, 2, 6-7 shows, he read it there.

Their shoes are formed upon no last, and so prevent their walking with free step. For this reason they are not at all adapted to battles on foot, but they are almost glued to their horses, which are hardy, it is true, but ugly, and sometimes they sit them woman-fashion and thus perform

⁴⁰ Cf. Cavallera, *op. cit.*, II, p. 44.

⁴¹ *Romanus exercitus, uictor orbis et dominus, ab his uincitur, hos pauet, horum terretur aspectu, qui ingredi non ualent, qui, si terram tetigerint, se mortuos arbitrantur*, *Ep.*, LX, 17 (S. Jérôme, *Lettres*, III, ed. J. Labourt [Paris, 1953], p. 108). I follow F. A. Wright's translation, *Select Letters of St. Jerome* (Loeb Class. Libr.), p. 304.

⁴² Cf. e.g. Radloff on the Kirgiz, *Aus Sibirien*, I (Leipzig, 1893), p. 412.

their ordinary tasks. From their horses by day and night every one of that nation buys and sells, eats and drinks, and bowed over the narrow neck of the animal relaxes into a sleep so deep as to be accompanied by many dreams.⁴³

This passage impressed not only Jerome. It is well known that Zosimus' description of the Huns goes back to Eunapius.⁴⁴ So far as I can see, it has not been recognized that Eunapius, in his turn, followed Ammianus.⁴⁵ The Huns, wrote Zosimus-Eunapius, were "absolutely unable to fight hand to hand. Spending their lives on horseback and even sleeping on their horses, they could not stand firmly on the ground."⁴⁶ This is nothing but a paraphrase of Ammianus. It was not in the steppes of the Ukraine that the Huns slept on horseback. They did it only in the pages of Ammianus from where, without waking them up, Eunapius carried them over in his work.⁴⁷

It is amusing to see how Jerome, still following Ammianus, contrasted the savage Huns to the Roman army. Ammianus wrote with respect about the primitive but most efficient arrows of the Huns;⁴⁸ Jerome looked forward to the day when the Roman *pilum* would triumph over the Hun *sagitta*.⁴⁹ The Huns, said Ammianus, cover their heads *galeris incuruis*; ⁵⁰ Jerome set

⁴³ *Calcei formulis nullis aptati uetant incedere gressibus liberis: qua causa ad pedestres parum adcommodati sunt pugnas. Verum equis prope adfixi, duris quidem sed deformibus, et muliebriter isdem non numquam insidentes, funguntur muneribus consuetis. Ex ipsis quibus in hac natione pernox et perdiu emit et uendit, cibumque sumit et potum, et inclinatus ceruici angustae iumentum in altum soporem usque ad uarietatem effunditur somniorum.* Ed. Pighi, p. 69.

⁴⁴ Cf. Gy. Moravesik, *op. cit.*, I (Budapest, 1942), p. 364.

⁴⁵ Thompson, *op. cit.*, pp. 135 ff. suggested that Eunapius had direct, or more probably indirect, access to Ammianus' work but did not wish to imply the belief that Eunapius made use of Ammianus' narrative for any other portion of his history than Julian's Persian expedition. He stressed in particular, p. 119, that Eunapius, writing on the Huns, set down what his own inquires could discover.

⁴⁶ Zosimus, IV, 20, 4, ed. Mendelssohn, p. 175.

⁴⁷ Suidas, s. v. "ἀκροσφαλεῖς" may be a quotation from Eunapius.

⁴⁸ *Eoque omnium acerrimos facile dixeris bellatores, quod procul missilibus telis, acutis ossibus pro spiculorum acumine arte mira coagmentatis et distinctis, corpora figunt*, XXXI, 2, 9.

⁴⁹ *nec amputamus causas morbi ut morbus pariter auferatur, statimque cernimus sagittas pilis, tiaras galeis, caballos equis cedere?* loc. cit.

⁵⁰ XXXI, 2, 6.

the barbarian *tiara* against the Roman *galea*, at the same time correcting Ammianus' slightly vulgar term.⁵¹ Ammianus described the Hun horses as *duri sed deformes*; Jerome called them contemptuously *caballos*, so much inferior to the Roman *equi*.

Four years later, in 400,⁵² in a letter to Oceanus,⁵³ Jerome remembered vividly the panic with which all of Palestine was seized at the rumors that the Huns were approaching. He conjured before the eyes of his correspondent *Hunorum examina, quae pernicibus equis huc illucque volitantia caedis pariter ac terroris cuncta complerent*. This is merely a paraphrase of Ammianus' *ad perniciatē leves*.⁵⁴ Jerome's *insperati ubique aderant* corresponds to *repentini*⁵⁵ in Ammianus. Ascribing to the Huns a trait which Livy had given to the Africans,⁵⁶ Ammianus called the Huns *auri cupidine immensa flagrantēs*;⁵⁷ Jerome repeated it: the Huns were supposed to make for Jerusalem *ob nimiam auri cupiditatem*. Nothing in Jerome's descriptions and characterizations of the Huns in the letters of 396 and 400 and in the Commentary on Isaiah of 408 goes beyond Ammianus. His very words echo those of Ammianus.

Jerome wrote the letter to Herodian in the summer of 396. A few months earlier Claudian had read his *In Rufinum* to an assemblage of senators at Milan; in the first book (vv. 323-31) he dealt with the Huns whom Stilicho fought in the Balkans in 391. Since Levy has made it practically certain that *In Rufinum* influenced Jerome in the composition of the epistle to Herodian,⁵⁸ one could ask whether it was not to Claudian rather than to Ammianus that Jerome owed what he knew about the Huns. Birt in his time raised another question. Noticing what seemed to him a close resemblance between a number of verses in Claudian, particularly in the invective against Rufinus, and Ammianus, he asked himself what, if any, their relationship was. Unimpressed by the then current opinion that Ammianus was

⁵¹ *rotundum pileolum, quasi sphaera media sit divisa, et pars altera ponatur in capite. Hoc Graeci et nostri τιάραν, nonnulli galeam vocant. Ep., LXVI, 13.*

⁵² Cf. Cavallera, *op. cit.*, II, p. 46.

⁵³ *Ep.*, LXXVII, 8.

⁵⁴ Pointed out by Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

⁵⁵ XXXI, 2, 8.

⁵⁶ XXXI, 2, 11.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ See n. 21.

still working on his last books when Claudian composed his poem, Birt postulated that the description of the Huns in Claudian was patterned on Ammianus, XXXI, 2, 1-11.⁵⁹ His thesis found no favor with his confrères. But whatever one may think of the other alleged parallels between Claudian and Ammianus⁶⁰—to me they are not very striking—, there can be little doubt that *In Rufinum*, I, 323-31 was written after Ammianus' last book was made public. I set the two passages side by side:

Ammianus	Claudian
1. Hunorum gens . . . ultra paludes Maeoticas glaciale oceanum accolens, omnem modum feritatis excedit.	1. Est genus extremos Scythiae vergentis in ortus / trans gelidum Tanain, quo non animosium ullum Arcetos alit.
2. Prodigiose deformes at pandi, ut bipedes existimes bestias.	2. Turpes habitus obscaenaeque visu / corpora.
3. pruinās sitimque perpetuam incunabulis adsuescunt.	3. Mens duro numquam celsura labori.
4. Semieruda cuiusvis pecoris carne vescantur.	4. Praeda cibus.
5. Nemo apud eos arat nec stivam aliquando contingit.	5. Vitanda ceres.
6. Infantum ferro sulcantur genae.	6. Frontemque secari / ludus.
7.	7. Et occisos pulchrum iurare parentes.
8. Verum equis prope adfixi.	8. Nec plus nubigenas duplex natura bifformes / cognatis aptavit equis.
9. Subito de industria dispersi vigescunt, et incompressa acie cum caede vasta discurrunt.	9. Acerrima nullo / ordine mobilitas insperatque recursus.

Eight of the nine characteristics of the Huns in Claudian coincide with those in Ammianus. Claudian could have spoken about the religion of the Huns, their language, their marriage customs, their jewelry, and a dozen more items. He did not.

⁵⁹ In his edition of Claudian, *Mon. Germ. Hist.*, A. A., IX, p. ix, n. 1.

⁶⁰ See Birt's notes to *In Ruf.*, II, 338-9; 510; *In Eutrop.*, I, 339; *Cons. Stilich.*, I, 288.

He said in his own words, and so much better, what Ammianus said in his peculiar Latin.

Even the curious *occisos pulchrum iurare parentes* is a literary borrowing. Like Themistius⁶¹ before and Procopius⁶² after him, Claudian identified the Huns with the Massagetae of the ancient authors. Since the Massagetae, according to Herodotus,⁶³ used to slaughter their old people, the Huns obviously did the same. The particular feature he added, the oath taken on the killed parents, Claudian borrowed from Valerius Flaccus where Gesiander, prince of the Iazyges swears by his father whom he had killed, obeying the custom of his people.⁶⁴

Whatever one may think about the interrelation between Claudian and Ammianus, it is evident that Jerome's references to the Huns in the letter of 396 are not based on what he read in the *In Rufinum*. Not Claudian but Ammianus, and only Ammianus, described the Huns as unable to walk. Jerome must have had in his library in Bethlehem a copy of the last books of Ammianus' *Res gestae*.

His *Adversus Iovinianum* permits us to fix the *terminus post quem*. In his defense of asceticism against the attacks of the ex-monk, Jerome hurled at Jovinian hundreds of quotations both from the Scriptures and profane authors. As usual, he sprayed Dicaearchus, Theophrastus, Chaeremon, and other names of Greek authors of whose works he had not read a line "like a smoke or clouds before his readers' eyes, that he may appear learned and of wide reading."⁶⁵ The sayings of these "philosophers" Jerome culled mainly from the *De abstinencia* of Porphyry. Needless to point out that he quoted from the great adversary of Christianity without benefit of citation. *Adversus Iovinianum*, II, 7 is largely a paraphrase of *De abstinencia*, IV, 21.⁶⁶ Jerome made a few slight changes and added here and there a little of his own. It is those additions which interest us here.

⁶¹ *Oratio*, XVI, p. 207, c (Harduinus).

⁶² *Bell. Vand.*, I, 1, 19; 4, 24.

⁶³ I, 216.

⁶⁴ *Argonautica*, VI, 123-8, 288-91.

⁶⁵ Cf. Rufinus, *Apol.*, II, 7 (*P. L.*, XXI, col. 353).

⁶⁶ Ed. A. Nauck, pp. 266-7. That Jerome plagiarized Porphyry has long been recognized; see the notes in J. van Rhoer's edition of Porphyry (Utrecht, 1767).

In I, 5 Porphyry mentions the Nomads and Troglodytes who eat nothing but meat.⁶⁷ In I, 13 he speaks of the Fish-eaters; they bear, so say the antivegetarians, testimony that not even the most primitive races eat raw food; some of them bake, *ὀπτῶσιν*, the fish on sun-heated stones, others in sand.⁶⁸ Tele-scoping these statements in IV, 21, Porphyry produces the following nonsense: The country of the Nomads, or Troglodytes,⁶⁹ or Ichthyophagi, is so sterile, nothing but rocks and sand, that no plants grow there; these people are forced to live on fish which they, having no wood to make fire, bake, *ἀφαναίνειν*, on stones or sand.⁷⁰ By equating the two peoples, Porphyry makes the Nomads-Troglodytes eat fish. Jerome recognized the blunder. He kept the Fish-eaters apart, added their location from Pliny,⁷¹ and wrote: "The *Ἰχθυοφάγοι* on the shores of the Red Sea bake (*assant*) fish on stones glowing from the heat of the sun, and this is their only food."⁷² This left him with the Nomads and Troglodytes. What was *their* food? Jerome pretended to know it: "The Nomads, Troglodytes, Scyths, *et Hunorum nova feritas* eat half-raw flesh." A most peculiar statement. Jerome had read a good deal of Herodotus and must have known from him that the Scyths boiled their meat in big cauldrons.⁷³ Artemidorus, Strabo's source, described how the Troglodytes chopped flesh and bones together, wrapped them in skins, and baked them;⁷⁴ Diodorus Siculus⁷⁵ followed Strabo, and was in turn copied by Porphyry. There Jerome, thoroughly familiar with Porphyry's writings though he did not "introduce into the temple of God the uncircumcised,"⁷⁶ read *τροφὴν σάρκας* without any qualifications.⁷⁷ Only the Huns were accused of

⁶⁷ Ed. Nauck, p. 88.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

⁶⁹ Diodorus Siculus, III, 32, 1, misunderstanding Strabo, equated the *Νομάδες* with the Troglodytes.

⁷⁰ Ed. Nauck, p. 266, 14-23.

⁷¹ *H. N.*, VII, 30.

⁷² P. 402, 5-7 in the critical edition of *Adv. Jovin.*, II, 5-14 in E. Bickel, *Diatribae in Senecae philosophi fragmenta*, I (Lipsiae, 1915), pp. 395-420.

⁷³ IV, 60.

⁷⁴ Strabo, XVI, 4, 17.

⁷⁵ III, 32, 1 ff.

⁷⁶ *Comm. in Gal.*, II, prol. (Migne, *P. L.*, XXVI, col. 353).

⁷⁷ Ed. Nauck, p. 88, 9.

eating half-raw flesh, and only by Ammianus Marcellinus, who wrote:

They (i.e., the Huns) are so hardy in their form of life that they have no need for fire nor of savory food, but eat the roots of wild plants and the half-raw flesh of any kind of animal whatever, which they put between their thighs and the backs of their horses, and thus warm it a little.⁷⁸

Ammianus was, of course, wrong, *teste Prisco*,⁷⁹ who is borne out by the cooking vessels in Hun graves. He, or his informants, misinterpreted a well-known custom of the equestrian nomads who put raw flesh on the backs of their horses for preventing and healing wounds caused by the pressure of the saddle.⁸⁰ It would be the most extraordinary coincidence if the hermit in Bethlehem had been given exactly the same misinformation as the historian in Rome. *Semicruda carne vescuntur*, said Ammianus, and explained what he meant by "half-raw." *Semicrudis vescuntur carnibus*, wrote Jerome, and did not care to tell the reader what the Huns did with the meat. He knew nothing about the eating-habits of the "Nomads" but he knew that the Huns were nomads. Porphyry's Nomads led him to Ammianus' Huns. And for the following sentences he stayed with Ammianus.

The Sarmatae, Quadi, Wandali, and innumerable other peoples enjoy eating horse and fox meat. What should I say of other nations when I, as a very young man, saw in Gaul the Aticotti, a Britannic people, eat human flesh; when they find in the woods herds of swine and cattle they use to cut off the buttocks, thighs, and nipples of the shepherd, which they regard as delicacies.⁸¹

When Jerome was about twenty, he traveled to the "semi-barbarian banks of the Rhine";⁸² he spent some time in Trier where he copied two works of Hilary.⁸³ There is nothing to

⁷⁸ XXXI, 2, 3, Ammianus' *ita uictu sunt asperi, ut . . . semicruda . . . carne vescantur* is patterned on Mela, III, 3, 2 (*uictu ita asperi incultique ut cruda etiam carne vescantur*, on the Germans).

⁷⁹ In the famous description of the banquet at Attila's court in 449.

⁸⁰ Cf. A. Solymossy, "La légende de la 'viande amortie sous le selle,'" *Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie*, August, 1937, pp. 134-40.

⁸¹ Hieron., *Opera*, ed. Vallarsi, VI, 335 has *pastorum nates et feminarum* (for *femina et*) *papillas*.

⁸² *Ep.*, III, 5.

⁸³ *Ep.*, V, 2.

indicate that he knew more of Gaul than the city of Trier. It has been suggested that the Aticotti he claimed to have met were soldiers in the Roman army.⁸⁴ In the *Notitia Dignitatum* there are indeed four auxilia of Atecotti listed,⁸⁵ two of them, the Honoriani Atecotti seniores and iuniores, formed, as their names show, considerably later than the time Jerome was in Gaul. But Jerome does not speak of soldiers; he maintains that his own eyes witnessed the cannibalistic meals of the Aticotti, which they could not very well have had in a camp in Trier. The truth is, of course, that the people of the Aticotti did not migrate from Britain to Gaul, that Jerome never witnessed one of their orgies, and no swineherd on the Rhine had to worry about his buttocks.

Why, then, did Jerome bring in the Aticotti at all? For an answer we must again, and for the last time, turn to Ammianus. In XXVI, 4, 5 he enumerates "the most savage peoples which (about 365) roused themselves and poured across the nearest frontiers. At the same time the Alamanni were devastating Gaul and Raetia, the Sarmatae and Quadi Pannonia, while the Picts, Saxons, Scots, and Attacotti were harassing the Britons with constant disaster."

Here we have, in one passage, with the exception of the Vandals, the peoples about whom Jerome tells his wild stories: Sarmatae, Quadi, Aticotti. Save Ammianus no ancient author names the Attacotti except Jerome.⁸⁶ And Jerome names them in a list of savage peoples immediately after the Sarmatae and Quadi exactly as Ammianus. The final proof that Jerome was guided by the sequence of names in Ammianus is the sentence following the one about the cannibalistic gourmets in Gaul. He suddenly switches from the revolting eating habits of the barbarians to their strange marriage customs. The Scots, he says, have their wives in common, wanton like beasts.⁸⁷ But this is not his theme. The reader expects to learn something about the

⁸⁴ Cf. G. Grützmacher, *Hieronymus*, I (Berlin, 1901), p. 137.

⁸⁵ Or., IX, 29; Oc., V, 197, 200; Oc., VII, 24, 74, 78.

⁸⁶ The difference in spelling is immaterial. Jerome most certainly wrote Scythae and Vandali, not Scytæ and Wandali as the manuscripts have it. The vv. ll. are *aticottos*, *attitiscotos*, *atticottos*, cf. Huebner, *R.-E.*, II, col. 1902.

⁸⁷ Repeated *Ep.*, LXIX, 3, 6, see Bickel, *op. cit.*, p. 402, n. 13.

food of the Scots. Why this abrupt change of the subject? The explanation is simple. Ammianus couples the Scotti and the Attacotti. Therefore Jerome too, sticking to the list, has to say something about them. Since he knew nothing about their cooking, he had to bring up something else. Fortunately he remembered his Caesar.⁸⁸ So, without many scruples, he transferred to the Scots what he had read about the Britons.

Adversus Iovinianum was written in 393.⁸⁹ Valentinian II committed suicide on May 15, 392. On August 22, 392 Arbogast proclaimed Eugenius as emperor. In the later part of the year no man in Rome could have said who the legitimate ruler of Italy was. Theodosius was still *princeps noster perfectissimus* but Flavianus, whom he had removed as *praef. praet. Italiae* in the summer, disregarded the orders from Constantinople⁹⁰ without declaring himself for Eugenius. Gildo, *comes rei militaris* in Africa, remained neutral.⁹¹ Theodosius himself was undecided what to do, whether to attempt to come to an agreement with the usurper or to go to war against him.⁹² It was in this twilight period that Ammianus wrote his last books. Their ambiguity, which has puzzled so many historians, is not Ammianus' fault. The "greatest literary genius that the world has seen between Tacitus and Dante"⁹³ was also a brave man. If he did not take a stand, for or against Theodosius, it was because there was no stand to be taken yet. Everything was in flux. The closest parallel to the last books of Ammianus is Ambrose's *De obitu Valentiniani* of September 392.⁹⁴ The bishop of Milan carefully refrained from taking sides in an issue about which the main protagonists had not made up their minds. We may, I think, assume, with a high degree of probability, that Ammianus Marcellinus finished his work in the winter of 392-393.

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⁸⁸ *Bell. Gall.*, V, 14, 4.

⁸⁹ Cf. Cavallera, *op. cit.*, II, p. 157.

⁹⁰ Cf. Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 328.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² Cf. J.-R. Palanque, *S. Ambroise et l'Empire Romain* (Paris, 1933), pp. 269 ff.

⁹³ Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 331.

⁹⁴ Cf. Palanque, *op. cit.*, p. 544.

THE *INERMES PROVINCIAE* OF ASIA MINOR.*

From the reign of Augustus to that of Diocletian the military strategy of Rome was based on a system of frontier defence. After the initial grouping of armies was completed, Roman arms were spread out along a fortified border almost 3000 miles long from Britain to Egypt. The main duty of the Roman Imperial Army was always to guard and maintain this tremendous frontier, a task that any modern army might well view with hesitation and doubt. This strategy by and large was designed by Augustus and perfected by his successors. The Army followed the expanding frontiers in an almost unavoidable pattern. No large corps was kept in Italy or some other centrally located position for movement to a front in emergencies, for strategic reserve was unknown and unneeded during the principate.¹ The barbarian never really united and never really massed all his available strength at one spot for a single, gigantic attack. He was incapable of such tactics at so early a date; that came later. When the barbarian did attack, the provincial armies of the frontier were able either to defeat him almost immediately, stop him in a reasonably short space of time, or contain him until assistance arrived from neighboring armies.

Thus, when one studies the military history of Rome during the principate, attention is usually—and quite rightly—focused on the armies of the Rhine, the Danube, the East, then Britain and Africa. But what about the provinces within this shell of empire? Were they left undefended? Tacitus gives them the general designation of *inermes provinciae*² and indicates that a province is “unarmed” if it does not contain legions within its borders.³ But some imperial soldiers must have been present in

* I should like to express my thanks to Prof. Henry T. Rowell for several suggestions and references pertinent to this paper.

¹ We mean here an over-all reserve, not mere local tactical grouping of forces. Strategic reserve of the northern frontier, for example, would have demanded legions in North Italy.

² *Hist.*, I, 11; 16. II, 81; 83. III, 5.

³ *Hist.*, I, 11: *Inermes provinciae atque ipsa in primis Italia, cuiusque servitio exposita, in pretium belli cessurae erant.* Since there was

all such provinces, not always in full garrison strength of course, but sufficient in number to provide at least an escort for the governor and, when needed, to give aid in problems of a minor police nature.⁴ It should prove instructive to examine these peaceful provinces from the military standpoint, to outline the methods used for their security, and to enumerate the various troops—regular and irregular—stationed within their borders.

A few preliminary remarks are necessary. We must always be extremely careful in estimating the composition of a provincial army, for near-by wars and military operations frequently brought about changes that lasted but a short time. It would be folly to imagine that war-time strength reflects a normal state of affairs. Military inscriptions can also be very deceiving. For example, nearly all the troops entering Asia Minor for eastern duty must have marched through Asia or Bithynia. Some may have fallen sick or even died on the way, and any memorial left behind on their account is all the more confusing or misleading. We must differentiate between soldiers on leave, transients, retired veterans, detached personnel, and the permanent troops of occupation. This is not always easy.

Let us now examine the evidence in a systematic manner, confining our investigation for the present to Asia Minor.⁵

Lycia-Pamphylia. It was not until 43 A. D. that this province was formed and given an independent status. Except for some brief interruptions in the first century the joint province was in

always a large and permanent force of praetorian and urban cohorts as well as the *vigiles* in Italy, we must not take the phrase *inermes provinciae* too literally. It is a general phrase meaning not the total absence of all troops but merely the absence of legions.

⁴ Even Achaia had Roman soldiers on duty within its borders, and perhaps even an auxiliary cohort at one time: see *I. G.*, V, 1, 1268. The whole problem of Achaia will be treated in a future paper.

⁵ Hopelessly out of date but containing some useful information is the article "Die Militär-Verhältnisse der sog. *provinciae inermes* des römischen Reiches," by Julius Jung in the *Zeitschrift für die österreichischen Gymnasien*, XXV (1874), pp. 668-96. To the point, though brief, are the remarks of Marquardt, *Staatsverwaltung*, II² (Leipzig, 1884), pp. 535 ff. Cf. also Liebenam in *R.-E.*, s. v. "Exercitus," cols. 1608 ff. The single most important passage in ancient literature is the one in Josephus (*B. J.*, II, 365 ff.) in which Agrippa enumerates in detail the various armed forces in the provinces needed to keep the peace.

the hands of an imperial legate of praetorian rank until the last years of the reign of Marcus Aurelius.⁶ And although the mountains on its northern Isaurian frontier teemed with brigands, no complete military unit seems to have been stationed there in the first century (Josephus, *B.J.*, II, 368). The brigand problem was met from the Galatian side. Real protection for Lycia-Pamphylia in the form of imperial troops may not be assumed until the second century, when it is definite that the *cohors I Flavia Numidarum equitata* was there on permanent duty. Nothing, however, is known of its date of arrival or departure beyond the fact that it was there in the year 178 A.D. (*C.I.L.*, XVI, 128). Problems of a local security nature were handled, as usual in Asia Minor, by the civic police with considerable success. Near Moskar on the Hissar Dag there must have been some sort of bandit headquarters which was captured by these police, who left us testimonies of their presence.⁷ The municipal police-chief was the eirenarch, and his importance may be judged from the fact that the provincial governor himself made the appointment.⁸ To aid this local police organization and to secure the safety of the highway system Roman soldiers—*stationarii*—were detached from their regular legionary units elsewhere and distributed along the roads at strategic points in the "unarmed" provinces. One of these was stationed at Olympus in Lycia on the main road which ran through the city and northwards along the coast to Phasis and Attaleia.⁹

⁶ For all details of provincial administration here and elsewhere in this paper the reader is referred to David Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor* (2 vols., Princeton, 1950). His index will easily guide the reader to each of the provinces.

⁷ *S.E.G.*, VI, 686 ff. Bibliography on eirenarchs in Magie, *op. cit.*, pp. 1514 ff., n. 46. Perhaps even the soldiers mentioned at Lyrboton Comae (*S.E.G.*, VI, 675) may have been members of the civic police. At Attaleia: *S.E.G.*, VI, 651.

⁸ Sources cited by Magie, *op. cit.*, p. 1507, n. 33.

⁹ *T.A.M.*, II, 953 and 1165. They were detached legionnaires to act as security police at important cities and road-junctions. See Lammert s. v. "Stationarius" in R.-E. and E. Birley, *Roman Britain and the Roman Army* (Kendal, 1953), pp. 83 ff. The officers in charge of such posts were *beneficiarii*, of whom a very detailed account together with their geographical distribution is given by Domaszewski in *Westdeutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kunst*, XXI, Heft 1 (Trier, 1902), pp. 158 ff.

Strabo (XIV, 5, 7) gives a good picture of the position of Olympos, which shows that such posts were selected with great care.

No provincial militia under Roman officers seem to have been employed in the province. A trace of the governor's military guard may be seen in the person of one Iulius Valerius, an *equus singularis* (*I. G. R. R.*, III, 394); and the *cornicularius* of *S. E. G.*, VI, 679 perhaps belonged to the staff of the governor.

Pontus-Bithynia. Augustus allowed the senate to administer Pontus-Bithynia, and his successors adopted the same policy; but about 110 A.D. Trajan made it imperial in order to untangle the economic snarls into which it had fallen. It probably remained imperial until Antoninus Pius returned it to the senate; but Marcus Aurelius in turn made it imperial once more. Josephus (*B. J.*, II, 368), describing the situation late in the reign of Nero, says there were no Roman troops in the province on permanent duty, but Pliny (*Epist. ad Trajan.*, 21 and 106) makes it quite clear that by 110-111 A.D. there were at least two auxiliary cohorts on active duty. If we credit Josephus with accuracy in his account at this point—and I think we must unless we find evidence to the contrary—then these cohorts were sent into the province by the Flavians. Inscriptions tell us that the name of one of these cohorts was the *cohors VI equestris*, but offer us no substantial information about its date of arrival.¹⁰

Doubtlessly the Roman officer called the *praefectus orae Ponticae* was in charge of the provincial militia, which in this case were acting as coastal security troops along the Euxine Sea. His complaint to Pliny (*Epist. ad Trajan.*, 21) that ten *beneficiarii*, two *equites*, and one *centurio* were insufficient for his purpose would indicate that he had no Roman troops of his own to draw upon for such aides. Hence, he was very likely in charge of the provincial militia.¹¹ A naval unit of the Raven-

¹⁰ For this cohort see *I. G. R. R.*, III, 1396; *S. E. G.*, II, 666, which belongs to the third century. See Pliny, *Epist. ad Trajan.*, 106 for same title.

¹¹ This prefect was Gabius Bassus, *Epist. ad Trajan.*, 21. Roman officers were usually placed in command of provincial militia, as can be seen from the mass of information collected by Antoine Stappers in *Mus. Belge*, VII (1903), pp. 198-246 and 301-34. His article, however, must be used with caution, since he followed Mommsen (*Gesammelte*

nate Fleet may have been stationed at Chalcedon, where the epitaph of a naval centurion has survived.¹² Land and sea forces were needed in northwestern Bithynia to assist the transportation of troops across the straits from Europe, for there was certainly a fairly heavy military traffic through the province.¹³

At least one band of brigands lived in the area of Mt. Olympus just south of Prusa, and a high official in the civic police was killed by them.¹⁴ Detached legionary officers on special duty include a *frumentarius* and two centurions.¹⁵ A *cornicularius* of the governor's *officium* may have been at Prusias.¹⁶ An important document linking auxiliary cohorts with personnel of the *cursus publicus* has been found at Gebise.¹⁷ As for military escorts, Pliny (*Epist. ad Trajan.*, 27) gives us concrete evidence that financial procurators as well as the governors were given some military protection. All important provincial officials had such escorts.¹⁸

Asia. Josephus (*B. J.*, II, 366) tells us that late in the reign of Nero the five hundred cities of Asia submitted to the Roman governor without a garrison, and, since no evidence to the contrary for this period has been found, we must assume his statement to be true. A change, however, was not long in coming, for in the opening years of the reign of Vespasian we hear of auxilia in an inscription from Ephesus (*A. E.*, 1920, 55): *C. Rutilio C. f. | Stel. Gallico | trib. mil. leg. XIII | Geminae q. aedili curuli | legato divi Claudii leg. XV | Apollinaris pr. legato | provinciae Galaticae | sodali Augustali | consuli designato | M. Aemilius M. f. Pal. | Pius praef. coh. I*

Schriften, VI, pp. 145 ff.) who confused the provincial militia with the national *numeri*. Cf. Rowell in *R.-E.*, s. v. "Numerus," col. 1327.

¹² *C. I. L.*, III, 322.

¹³ Evidence of this traffic may be seen in *Wiener Denkschr.*, LXXV, 1 (1952): *Bericht über eine Reise in Bithynien*, nos. 4 and 10; also *I. L. S.*, 8879, and *I. G. R. R.*, III, 60, 62, 68, and 1421.

¹⁴ L. Robert, *Études Anatoliennes* (Paris, 1937), p. 97.

¹⁵ The *frumentarius* is in *I. G. R. R.*, III, 80 from Heraclea; one centurion in *I. G. R. R.*, III, 1390 from Bey-Keui; the other in *I. G. R. R.*, III, 1426 from Istifan.

¹⁶ *I. G. R. R.*, III, 59.

¹⁷ *S. E. G.*, II, 666.

¹⁸ It is also known from Dio, LVII, 23 that as early as 23 A. D. the financial procurator of Asia had some soldiers under his orders.

Bosp. | et coh. I Hisp. legato. It is clear that M. Aemilius Pius was the commanding officer of the two cohorts when he had the stone engraved. And since Rutilius was the legate under whom he was serving at the time, it has been assumed that the *cohors I Bosp.* and *I Hisp.* were stationed in Asia about 69-71 A.D. (when Rutilius is known to have held his office).¹⁹ This seems very probable, but conjectures about the location and duration of the two cohorts lead us nowhere.

Evidence of a more solid nature for the presence of auxilia in Asia appears in a highly important inscription from the town of Eumeneia (*A.E.*, 1927, 95): [*I. O. M. | Pro salute Imp. Caes. | Div. Traiani Parth. fil. | Div. Nervae [n]epoti[s] | Traiani Hadriani Aug. | domuique eei[us] | senatui populiq. R. | et Coh. I Cl. Sugambrum | veteranae equitatae | M. Iulius M. f. Fabia | Pisonianus qui et Dion | praef. fabrum et praef. | coh. s. s. domo Tyro | metropolis Phoenices | et Coeles Syriae qui a | Moesia(e) inf. Montan. | praesidio numerum | in Asia perduxit | v. s. l. m.*]. The *cohors I Claudia Sugambrorum veterana equitata* must have marched from Lower Moesia about 134/35 A.D. and taken up permanent garrison duty at Eumeneia.²⁰ And although it stayed only about twenty years—it was in Syria in 157 (*C.I.L.*, XVI, 106)—Eumeneia remained the garrison town for other later auxiliary units.²¹ In fact, records of its soldiers extend in an almost unbroken sequence from the second to the fourth century.²² One of these later units was the *cohors I Raetorum*, arriving about the middle of the second century and remaining at least until the third.²³ Another garri-

¹⁹ E. Ritterling in *J.R.S.*, XVII (1927), pp. 29 ff. The *cohors I Bosporiana* certainly seems to have been active in the east for many years from the early second century onwards: see *I.G.R.R.*, IV, 1323 and the commentary on this inscription by W. M. Ramsay in *The Social Basis of Roman Power in Asia Minor* (Aberdeen, 1941), pp. 13 ff.

²⁰ E. Ritterling, *loc. cit.* The cohort is attested in Lower Moesia in 99 and 134 A.D. according to *C.I.L.*, XVI, 44 and 78.

²¹ The existence of a military *castra* is expressly stated in *M.A.M.A.*, IV, 328 of the year 196 A.D.

²² A convenient collection is in W. M. Ramsay, *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, I, Part II (Oxford, 1897), pp. 379 ff. For additions and commentary see *J.R.S.*, XVIII (1928), pp. 188 ff., and XIX (1929), pp. 157 ff.

²³ Ramsay, *loc. cit.* The main inscriptions mentioning the cohort at

son town, perhaps under Vespasian, may have been Ilium, but more evidence is needed.²⁴ Nevertheless, Asia certainly had at least one cohort on active duty at all times from Vespasian to Diocletian.

Besides the auxiliary forces Asia also had a *vexillatio* of the *legio XII Fulminata* stationed at Amorium, and perhaps another of the *legio I Italica* at Flaviopolis.²⁵ Detached centurions of the *legio VII Claudia* appear at the important road-junction at Apamea.²⁶ At Ephesus and Aphrodisias we hear of *frumentarii*.²⁷ The ever-present civic police is very frequently attested in the inscriptions from Asia, and so numerous and so widespread are they that we may assume their presence in every major city or large town.²⁸ The military police of the regular army, the *stationarii*, appear at Ephesus and Apollonis, and the presence of customs-houses at Miletus, Iasus, Halicarnassus, and Lysias may suggest Roman *stationes* at those places.²⁹ Adequate patrol of the road-system in Asia was very important, for the province, like Bithynia to the north, witnessed the passage of many troops to and from the East.³⁰ In addition, Asia was

Eumeneia are *I. G. R. R.*, 728-9, and 736. Late in Hadrian's reign it was in Cappadocia: Arrian, *Exp. contra Alanos*, 1.

²⁴ Evidence in *I. G. R. R.*, IV, 216-17. Bandits were active in this whole region: *I. G. R. R.*, IV, 219; Lucianus, *Alex.*, 2.

²⁵ At Amorium: *C. I. L.*, III, 353. It cannot be decided for certain whether the *signifer legionis I Italicae* of *I. G. R. R.*, IV, 616 from Flaviopolis was on official duty or merely passing through the city on his way to the east. Cf. Ritterling in *R.-E.*, s. v. "Legio," col. 1415. The interpretation of *I. G. R. R.*, IV, 1695 from Flaviopolis is also difficult. The stationing of legionary troops at Flaviopolis, therefore, is only a possibility and not a fact.

²⁶ *C. I. L.*, III, 7055, 7056. *I. G. R. R.*, IV, 786.

²⁷ *C. I. L.*, III, 433 (= *I. L. S.*, 2368). *I. L. S.*, 9474. For others see Magie, *Roman Rule*, p. 1547, n. 34.

²⁸ For lists and discussion see the works named by Magie, *Roman Rule*, pp. 1514 ff., n. 46.

²⁹ At Ephesus: *C. I. L.*, III, 7136 = *I. L. S.*, 2052. At Apollonis: *I. G. R. R.*, IV, 1185. Vittinghoff in *R.-E.*, s. v. "Portorium," col. 356 says: "Die Eigenart eines echten Grenzzolls zeigt sich darin, dass die Stationen wohl überall einen bewaffneten Schutz hatten, ohne dass damit wahrscheinlich die Zollerhebung in den Händen des römischen Heeres gelegen hätte." For the customs-houses in Asia see Vittinghoff, col. 373.

³⁰ See the petition to the Emperor Philip in the third century from

viewed as a storehouse from which to draw military provisions for the legions.³¹

A member of the governor's military escort may be seen in the *eques singularis* from Hadrianotherae.³² And the financial procurator under Tiberius certainly had military protection in carrying out his duties.³³

Galatia. Governed first by a praetorian legate from Augustus to Vespasian, then by a consular from Vespasian to Trajan, and by a praetorian again from Trajan to Diocletian, Galatia was a province of the most varied nature in respect to administration, size, and ethnic divisions. But since the strategy of the Euphrates down to the reign of Vespasian rested mainly upon a system of client kingdoms and Syrian legions, Galatia never saw a single legion on permanent duty within her borders. And when Vespasian changed this strategy, it was Cappadocia that received the legions. The highways of Galatia, however, became the natural means of military communication between East and West.³⁴

When Amyntas, last king of Galatia, was killed during a campaign against the Homanades, who had been preying upon the people of southern Phrygia from their mountain retreats on the northern ridge of the Taurus, he left behind him a native army trained on the Roman model. Most of these soldiers eventually formed the raw material of the *legio XXII Deiotariana* and were sent to Egypt,³⁵ but there is, I believe, reason to suppose that other parts of his army may have been organized into auxilia and retained in Galatia. The Homanades still remained a menace, and something had to be done for their containment or extermination. Since an *ala VII Phrygum* is

the people of Arague: *I. G. R. R.*, IV, 598 = *O. G. I. S.*, 519. Cf. the new inscription from Euhippe in Caria: *A. E.*, 1953, 90.

³¹ *A. E.*, 1939, 132: date and commentary by F. A. Lepper, *Trajan's Parthian War* (Oxford, 1948), pp. 180 ff.

³² *C. I. L.*, III, 7085 = *I. G. R. R.*, IV, 234.

³³ Dio, LVII, 23.

³⁴ *I. G. R. R.*, III, 173. On the importance of the Galatian roads see the work of Magie, *Roman Rule*, pp. 1308 ff., n. 9.

³⁵ Ritterling in *R.-E.*, s. v. "Legio," cols. 1791 ff., and J. Lesquier, *L'Armée romaine d'Égypte d'Auguste à Dioclétien*, in *Mém. pub. par les membres de l'Institut français d'archéologie orientale du Caire*, XLI (Cairo, 1918), pp. 40 ff.

known to have existed under Domitian and later, there is a possibility that it owes its origin to Augustus and the remains of the army of Amyntas.³⁶ Proof, however, is lacking. In the early Empire auxilia were permitted to remain quartered in the province from which their original manpower had been recruited,³⁷ and hence the *ala VII Phrygum* may have been organized to protect Phrygia from the mountain bandits. And we have both literary and epigraphic evidence to prove the existence of auxilia in Galatia during the first century and even before the Flavian period. A passage in Tacitus (*Ann.*, XV, 6) clearly informs us that (in 62 A.D.): *simul Pontica et Galatarum Cappadocumque auxilia Paeto oboedirent*. Epigraphic sources are much more exact and revealing, for they indicate that Pisidian Antioch as early as the reign of Tiberius was a garrison town quartering at least one auxiliary unit: *J.R.S.*, XIV (1924), pp. 201 ff., no. 40: [option?]i alae An[t]i[och.], pr[ae]f. veteran[or. leg.] XII, praef. | [alae C]ommacen., T[i]beri[is] Caesaris Aug. | [col.] Caes. The mere title at this early date of *Antiochensis* would seem to indicate that Antioch had been the location of the troop, and it has been pointed out by W. M. Ramsay that Commacon was a town of Phrygia.³⁸ From the reign of Nero comes the following inscription of Pisidian Antioch (*A.E.*, 1914, 128): [- - - - -] | *Ser. Proculo* | *II vir. Aug. trib.* | *mil. leg. III Cyre* | *naic. iuridico Ale|xandreae et Ae|gypti proc.* | *Nero[nis Cl]audi* | *Ca[esaris] Aug. Ger[ma]n[i]ci pr[ov]in[ciae] [Capp]adoci|ae et Ciliciae* | *ala Aug. Germa[nica h. c.* Several other inscriptions from this city mention the *ala Augusta Germanica*, and it may be that the *ala Antiochensis*

³⁶ It seems very probable from the discussion of A. Aymard in *R. E. A.*, XLIII (1941), pp. 217 ff., that there was only one *ala Phrygum*. Much more information, however, is needed on the whole problem of the method or methods used in numbering auxiliary units.

³⁷ On the recruiting of auxilia personnel see now Konrad Kraft, *Zur Rekrutierung der Alen und Kohorten an Rhein und Donau* (Dissertationes Bernenses, Ser. I, Fasc. 3 [Bern, 1951]), especially pp. 21 ff. for the early Empire. Cf. Cheesman, *The Auxilia of the Roman Imperial Army* (Oxford, 1914), pp. 68 ff.

³⁸ The [C]ommacen. of the inscription, of course, cannot refer to the *ala Commagenorum*, since that unit was not organized until after the incorporation of Commagene into Syria in 72 A.D.

of the reign of Tiberius is identical with this one.³⁹ Although such an identification is purely hypothetical, it is a certainty that Pisidian Antioch was a garrison town throughout the pre-Flavian period.

The capital city of Ancyra seems to have had an auxiliary unit stationed in or near it during the first century. The name of this unit was the *cohors I Aug. Cyrenaica equitata*, but it may have been sent later under Trajan or Hadrian to Cappadocia.⁴⁰

The *ala Aug. Gemina Colonorum* was a unit whose history is interwoven with that of Asia Minor from the first to the fourth century.⁴¹ About 135 A. D. it was in Cappadocia, but references to it come also from Perge in Pamphylia (*I. G. R. R.*, III, 797), Saura in Syria (*I. G. R. R.*, III, 1144), Acmonia (*I. G. R. R.*, IV, 642), and Iconium (*Studies in the History and Art of the Eastern Provinces of the Roman Empire* [Aberdeen, 1906], p. 171). It may well have seen service in the vicinity of Iconium. The possibility that other auxilia had been stationed in Galatia appears from the following inscriptions: *Studia Pontica*, III, no. 92 (north of Vezir Keupru in Pontus); *A. E.*, 1951, 254 (Orta G rney in Paphlagonia); *I. G. R. R.*, III, 227 (Pessinus); *I. G. R. R.*, III, 272 (Bosola—an *eques alae II Gallorum*). Of these the most promising text seems to be the one from Pessinus which mentions a *vexillarius*. From all the evidence, I think, we may safely assume that Galatia during the first century had at least one *cohors* and two *alae*. But when Nero's Armenian War shifted the Army's attention to the Euphrates Frontier, and when Vespasian made Cappadocia the key military province of Asia Minor, Galatia's auxiliary forces were perhaps diminished in size.

Another method used by Augustus to secure peace in the new province was the establishment about 6 B. C., at the conclusion of the Homanadensian War, of military colonies in the south: Cremna, Olbasa, Comama, Lystra, and Parlais.⁴² The veterans

³⁹ *C. I. L.*, III, 6831, 6821 (= *I. L. S.*, 2708), 6822. For the identification of "Germanicus" see Ramsay, *Social Basis*, pp. 173 ff.

⁴⁰ W. M. Ramsay and A. M. Ramsay in *J. R. S.*, XVIII (1928), pp. 181 ff. (= *S. E. G.*, VI, 32). Perhaps a detachment of this unit was stationed at Iconium, for its name appears there in *S. E. G.*, VI, 411.

⁴¹ Commentary by Ramsay in *J. R. S.*, XVIII (1928), pp. 184 ff.

⁴² Ritterling in *R.-E.*, s. v. "Legio," col. 1242, and for each of the colonies see the index to Magie, *Roman Rule*.

settled in these colonies are frequently mentioned on the monuments, and coins show an eagle between two standards.⁴³ Since colonial *duoviri* had military competence, and since the early colonies of the Empire fulfilled real military purposes, we are justified in reckoning these colonies among the armed forces stationed in Galatia.⁴⁴ The purpose of their founding is obvious: permanent supervision of the Homanades. The colonial headquarters was probably Pisidian Antioch, founded about 19 B. C. by legionary veterans.

Legionary officers on detached service at Ancyra include perhaps eleven *centuriones*,⁴⁵ most of them probably serving in the governor's *officium*. At Pisidian Antioch was a *ἐκατόνταρχος ῥεγεωνάριος*.⁴⁶ A legionary centurion was at Neoclaudiopolis in Paphlagonia.⁴⁷ Members of the governor's *officium* of junior grade also appear at Ancyra.⁴⁸ We even hear of the procurators' staff personnel.⁴⁹

Civic police are not lacking, for eirenarchs appear at Pessinus, Hadrianopolis, Ancyra, and Tyriaeon.⁵⁰ And at Kirili Kassaba is a sarcophagus of one Iulius Marcellus *stationarius*.⁵¹

Cappadocia. Although Cappadocia eventually became the

⁴³ Numismatic references in Magie, *op. cit.*, index under the colonies.

⁴⁴ Military authority of *duoviri*: *Lex Col. Genet.*, 103, cf. 98. See also Tacitus, *Ann.*, XIV, 27. Other references in Ramsay, *Anatolian Studies Presented to William Hepburn Buckler* (Manchester Univ. Press, 1939), p. 205.

⁴⁵ *C. I. L.*, III, 242, 261 (Retired?), 263, 264, 265 (Retired?), 266, 268, 6761, 6766, 6767; *I. G. R. R.*, III, 214.

⁴⁶ Sterret, *Epigraphical Journey*, pp. 121-2, no. 92. The stone was later seen and the reading improved by Calder, *J. R. S.*, II (1912), p. 81. Cf. the remarks of Broughton in *Quantulacumque: Studies Presented to Kirsopp Lake* (London, 1937), pp. 133 ff.

⁴⁷ *I. G. R. R.*, III, 141. Perhaps another at Iconium, where the dead slave of a centurion is mentioned: *A. E.*, 1912, 271.

⁴⁸ A *cornicularius* honors the governor in *I. G. R. R.*, III, 189. Cf. *I. G. R. R.*, III, 207.

⁴⁹ *Cornicularii* and *beneficarii*: *A. E.*, 1937, 87; 1930, 144.

⁵⁰ In that order: *I. G. R. R.*, III, 226, 1458, 203 and 208, 240. At Laodicea in Lycaonia we may have another reference to civic police: *I. G. R. R.*, III, 253, which mentions a *οὐέπας ἱππεύς*. For the different meanings of *ἱππεύς* in Asia Minor see *C. R.*, XXIV (1910), pp. 11 ff. and XXVII (1913), p. 12. Cf. *I. G. R. R.*, III, 240 for a *οὐέπας εἰρηνάρχης*.

⁵¹ *S. E. G.*, VI, 450 = *I. G. R. R.*, III, 242.

foremost military province of all Asia Minor under Vespasian, it is a singular fact that from the beginning of the province in 17 A. D. until well into the reign of Claudius there do not seem to have been any regular imperial units of any category stationed within its borders. This has been very ably demonstrated by W. E. Gwatkin, and no fresh evidence has come to light to change the picture he has drawn.⁵² When the procurator of Cappadocia, Iulius Paelignus, set out for Armenia on a military mission in 51 A. D., the only troops he could muster were the *auxilia provincialium* (Tacitus, *Ann.*, XII, 49). Gwatkin, following Mommsen and others, deduced from this phrase and from the disgraceful conduct of the troops in the field that they were provincial militia, and I am inclined to agree. However, the explanation cannot be considered final, for Tacitus has quite different terms to describe provincial militia: *tumultuariae caervae Germanorum* (*Ann.*, I, 56), *Noricorum iuventus* (*Hist.*, III, 5), *Rhaetorum iuventus* (*Hist.*, I, 68), and *Maurorum numerus* (*Hist.*, II, 58). He is aware of the technical difference between mere militia and the imperial auxilia.⁵³ However that may be, the Cappadocian army up to about 51 A. D. must have been very inferior in quality and size. Perhaps as a result of this very mission to Armenia troops of a better quality were raised for service in the province, for Tacitus (*Ann.*, XIII, 8) says that *alae* and *cohortes* had been wintering in Cappadocia in 54 A. D. And in 69 A. D. we hear of a *cohors, regium auxilium olim* at Trapezus (*Hist.*, III, 47). Then, a few years later, legionary forces were moved into the province on permanent duty, and Cappadocia may no longer be reckoned as an "unarmed" province.

Cilicia. Since Cilicia virtually ceased to exist from Augustus to Vespasian as a separate province, we are not surprised that no Roman troops were quartered there in that period. When Marcus Trebellius, the governor of Syria, marched to the region to put down the revolt of the Cietae in 36 A. D., he had to bring 4000 troops of his own from Syria. Cilicia Tracheia was there-

⁵² *Cappadocia as a Roman Procuratorial Province* (*The University of Missouri Studies*, V, No. 4 [1930]), pp. 36 ff.

⁵³ For a useful discussion of Tacitus' terminology for irregular units see Kraft, *op. cit.*, pp. 38 ff.

fore under Syrian protection at that time.⁵⁴ And again in 52 A. D. Syrian military forces had to enter the region because of another revolt of the same people.⁵⁵ Cilicia itself could have had no troops at all in this period.

Although I can discover no trace of imperial auxilia in Cilicia even after the provincial organization about 72 A. D., some legionary troops may have been sent there. Simple legionary soldiers appear at Mopsuestia (*I. L. S.*, 8876) and Artanada (*I. G. R. R.*, III, 814-15). Centurions are known at Hieropolis Castabala (*I. L. S.*, 8872 and 1036) and at Tarsus (*I. G. R. R.*, III, 884). All these cases are, however, of doubtful interpretation and prove nothing without further substantiating evidence. There is no question whatever, on the other hand, about the presence of civic police at Syedra and an imperial *stationarius* at Artanada.⁵⁶

From this sketch of the armed forces in six provinces we may draw some conclusions of a general nature. No legions seem to have been quartered permanently in Asia Minor until the reign of Vespasian, but legionary detachments were certainly employed. The largest imperial units in unarmed provinces were the auxilia, Galatia having the largest and strongest of all, and Cilicia perhaps never having any. The three next largest military groups did not, strictly speaking, belong to the regular Imperial Army. These were the provincial militia, i. e. native levies using their own weapons but under the orders of Roman officers; military colonies; and civic police. The most widespread of these was certainly the civic police, which assured the cities protection against brigandage and other criminal activity. The provincial militia existed in Bithynia and perhaps Cappadocia. Colonial units of veterans with some military duties were planted in Galatia, and there is no reason to suppose that they were limited to that one province. As for imperial troops again, the national numeri of the post-Trajanic era do not seem to have

⁵⁴ Sources for the expedition of Trebellius in Magie, *Roman Rule*, pp. 1364 ff., n. 40.

⁵⁵ Tacitus, *Ann.*, XII, 55. See Magie, *loc. cit.*

⁵⁶ Eirenarch at Syedra: *I. G. R. R.*, III, 830. *Stationarius*: *I. G. R. R.*, III, 812. It is also very likely that the colony of Ninica resembled the Pisidian colonies in its military competence: see Magie, *Roman Rule*, p. 1328, n. 46.

existed at all in Asia Minor, although further epigraphical finds in eastern Cappadocia might well reveal them. We may next note the various detached legionary soldiers: centurions to assist the local magistrates in keeping peace, to supervise road construction, to serve on the staffs of governors, and to be available for other projects involving military personnel; *beneficiarii* to serve as *stationarii* at important junctions; and *frumentarii* to carry official dispatches and act as secret police. And last of all we may mention the escorts—*equites* and *pedites singulares*—attached to the governors and the higher provincial officials.⁵⁷ Such were the troops stationed in the *inermes provinciae* of Asia Minor.

Much to the point are the remarks of Aelius Aristides in the second century of our era: "Thus the cities can be clear of garrisons. Mere detachments of horse and foot suffice for the protection of whole countries, and even these are not concentrated in the cities with billets <in> every household, but are dispersed throughout the rural area within bounds and orbits of <their own>. Hence many nations do not know where at any time their guardians are. But if anywhere a city through excess of growth had passed beyond the ability to maintain order by itself, you did not begrudge to these in their turn the men to stand by and guard them carefully."⁵⁸

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⁵⁷ Even when our sources for some provinces give us no information about occupation troops of garrison size, we may always assume the presence of a small unit to serve as the governor's escort. These, of course, and other soldiers on detached duty—*stationarii*, etc.—are not real troops of occupation. It is tempting likewise to assume the presence of small units at the various stations of the *cursus publicus* throughout the empire. *S. E. G.*, II, 666 certainly proves that cavalry soldiers were stationed at the post station in Gebise in Bithynia, and such a practice may well have been common elsewhere. A certain amount of protection at all these post stations would seem to be necessary. Cf. *I. G. R. R.*, I, 766 (= *S. I. G.*³, 880) from Pizus.

⁵⁸ *Roman Oration*, 67a, translation by James H. Oliver, *The Ruling Power* (Trans. Amer. Philos. Soc., XLIII [1953], Part 4), p. 902, note on pp. 931 ff.

REVIEWS.

FRTZ WEHRLI. *Die Schule des Aristoteles, Texte und Kommentar.* Heft IV: Demetrios von Phaleron. Pp. 89; Heft V: Straton von Lampsakos. Pp. 83; Heft VI: Lykon und Ariston von Keos. Pp. 67; Heft VII: Herakleides Pontikos. Pp. 124. Basel, Benno Schwabe, 1949-1953.

Wehrli's new edition of the remains of the Peripatetic writings down to the first century B. C. has been proceeding with admirable speed. Three fascicles appeared between 1944 and 1948.¹ By 1953, four more had come out. To be sure, in regard to the authors covered by the latter series, excellent preparatory work had been done during recent years. Yet it is no mean achievement that within less than a decade Wehrli was able to finish seven out of the ten volumes projected to make up the great work he has undertaken single-handed.

Starting with fascicle IV, the principles followed in editing the texts have been slightly changed. Fragments doubtfully attributed are now indented; the critical apparatus lists the manuscripts from which the various readings are cited (*Nachwort*, H. IV).² These are welcome improvements. It remains regrettable that Wehrli has not seen fit to add an *index locorum* to each fascicle. (All indices are to appear in the final volume which will contain an analysis of the development of the Peripatetic doctrine.) Moreover, in the case of authors like Demetrius and Heraclides, where the editions of Jacoby and Voss respectively are commonly referred to in the pertinent literature, a concordance of the old and the new numeration of the fragments would have been most desirable.

That Wehrli's collection integrates all the evidence hitherto known, one will take for granted. Does it also bring new material? For an answer to this question no criterion is provided by the mere number of fragments as compared with that in earlier editions, e. g. 181 fragments of Heraclides in Wehrli as against 107 in Voss. Unlike the latter, Wehrli does not distinguish *testimonia* and fragments; passages are broken up into small pieces and are sometimes repeated; if no other statement can be traced to titles mentioned in book lists, they reappear as separate fragments, a fact which accounts for 27 "fragments" of Heraclides (and incidentally for 34 out of the 150 fragments of Straton). On the other hand, certain testimonies overlooked by Voss are now included (e. g. Heraclides, 145; 162); parallels not indicated by him have been added (e. g. 51b; c); more recent editions of papyri have yielded additional information (e. g. 9; 13c; 14b). On the whole however one gains the impression that the additions concern only minutiae and that it

¹ Cf. the reviews of H. Cherniss, *A. J. P.*, LXIX (1948), pp. 455-7; LXX (1949), pp. 414-18.

² P. von der Mühl put his collations of the manuscripts of Diogenes Laertius at Wehrli's disposal, cf. VII, p. 9, line 9.

has proved impossible to discover important new testimony. And a comparison of Wehrli's material on Lycon, Ariston, Demetrius, and Straton with that to be found in Mueller, Jacoby, and the studies by Gereke, Capelle, and others, leads to the same conclusion.³

Wherever the attribution of individual fragments is debatable, Wehrli takes a commendably conservative and cautious attitude (e.g. Demetrius, Fr. 114; Heraclides, Fr. 164). Yet one cannot help feeling that his reasons for accepting or rejecting a certain piece of evidence in many instances are stated rather briefly or dogmatically (e.g. Demetrius, Frs. 25; 38 f.; 134; Straton, Fr. 113). Straton, Fr. 128, where the name Straton is a conjecture by Diels, is taken as genuine without an adequate refutation of Capelle's contention that the ascription is "absolutely uncertain" (*R.-E.*, IV A, s. v., col. 305). If Heraclides of Ainos rather than Heraclides of Pontos is referred to in Fr. 11, as Wehrli seems to admit in his commentary (cf. also Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, II, 1⁴, p. 989, n. 3), the story contained in Fr. 16, which in Diogenes Laertius follows immediately and is told on the same authority, must be suspected too; it is in fact excluded from Voss' collection (cf. also Daebritz, *R.-E.*, VIII, s. v., cols. 473 f.). In the case of Straton, Wehrli refuses, rightly I think, to follow Diels in considering the introduction to Hero's *Pneumatics* merely a "shortened summary" of Straton's views, and consequently restricts himself to printing only a very few excerpts. To determine how much Hero derived from Straton, he says (p. 57), would demand a special investigation. It is too bad that Wehrli himself did not provide such an analysis for which he was better prepared than anyone else. Without this, the selection made by him must remain unconvincing, and it might have been better to exclude the indirect evidence altogether—as Wehrli usually does—despite the fact that parallels are adduced to establish at least the authenticity of the passages included.

The testimony on Ariston raises a particularly difficult problem. Even the ancients themselves found it hard to separate the work of the Peripatetic Ariston from that of his Stoic namesake (Fr. 9). That the Philodemus quotations (Frs. 13-15) must go back to Ariston, the Aristotelian, Wehrli reaffirms with new arguments. I am less sure that I can follow him when he claims for Ariston of Keos four of the fragments ascribed to Ariston of Chios by v. Arnim (Frs. 16; 21; 25; 26; cf. I, 401; 390; 402; 400 Arnim), with whose position Wehrli otherwise agrees (cf. *ad* Fr. 9), thus indirectly rejecting the attempt of Gereke to foster upon the Peripatetic philosopher even the fragments quoted from a book entitled 'Ομοιώματα (cf. *Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos.*, V [1892], p. 205; also *R.-E.*, s. v. "Ariston," no. 52). Now, Fr. 26 Wehrli derives from Stobaeus, who in Arnim's opinion is borrowing consistently from the Stoic work just mentioned. Nor is an interest in the Spartan laws on marriage, though in line with Platonic and Aristotelian teaching (Commentary, *ad loc.*), necessarily alien to a Stoic. Zeno's *Politeia* was modelled after that of Lycurgus (I, 261 Arnim). The other three references

³ Since the lack of indices makes it difficult to render a precise estimate, I should mention that at least in regard to Demetrius my judgment is confirmed by P. De Lacy, *C.P.*, XLVI (1951), p. 132.

are taken from Plutarch who knows both the Stoic and the Peripatetic Ariston. Physiognomic observations like those contained in Fr. 21, even if Platonic in flavor, square well with remarks attributed to Zeno (I, 204; cf. also 248 Arnim), and to Cleanthes (I, 618 Arnim), and with other statements traceable to the Stoic Ariston (I, 388 Arnim). And I should think that it is quite compatible with the "cynic coarseness" of Ariston's style to compare the beauty of the body which betrays the beauty of the soul with a well-fitting shoe pointing up the shapeliness of the foot. Again, the fact that Fr. 25 reflects a "realistic" point of view can hardly be considered sufficient reason for proving Peripatetic authorship. Ariston, the Stoic, was not a rigorous adherent of the dogma, as Wehrli dubs him (p. 64). His heterodoxies were many and were vehemently censured by the school (cf. e.g. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, I [1948], pp. 27 f.). In moral actions he ascribed a positive value to the prevailing circumstances, a point upon which Wehrli himself comments in connection with Demetrius, Fr. 84, where he also points out Ariston's influence on the unorthodox Panaetius. Would such an heretical view not imply a realistic outlook on human affairs? Finally, that Fr. 16 fits in with the other remains of the book entitled *Ῥοιούματα* even Wehrli does not deny (p. 62). There seems no firm ground then for the redistribution of the fragments which he proposes.⁴

As for the commentary on the various authors, it provides a good starting point for the study of the fragments. The literary and rhetorical evidence, which forms the greater bulk of the material in the fascicles under review, is treated very fully. The remarks on Ariston's description of the various types of character (Frs. 13-16) and on Demetrius' theory of rhetoric are models of annotation that greatly helps to clarify the subject. On the other hand, issues of detail raised in the earlier debate often do not find an answer. Thus nothing is said about Jacoby's suggestion (*F. Gr. Hist.*, II D, *Kommentar*, p. 649, 35 ff.) that the last sentence of Demetrius, Fr. 166, may not belong to the quotation from Demetrius, or that, on the contrary, it may be necessary to print even more, namely the passage which links Fr. 166 to Fr. 161. Again, in commenting on Demetrius, Fr. 154, Wehrli maintains that Demetrius in his report on Isocrates must have connected the latter's voluntary death with the battle of Chaeroneia; his only reference is to Wilamowitz, *Hermes*, XXXIII (1898), p. 495. But Jacoby takes a different view (*Kommentar*, p. 651, 41 ff.), in confirmation of which he quotes *Philol. Unters.*, XVI (1902), p. 342, notes 1-2. Furthermore, it seems to me that the strictly philosophical testimony has received not quite the same consideration as the rest of the evidence. To be sure, Straton's doctrine of perception (Frs. 107 ff.) is fully discussed, and so is Heraclides' astronomical theory (Frs. 104-17). But Wehrli's commentary on Straton hardly absolves the reader from constantly checking back to Capelle's penetrating criticism of the fragments.

In the four commentaries there are of course a great number of individual problems that would deserve notice. Instead of scrutinizing these, however, I shall endeavor to discuss at least some aspects of the general evaluation of the different personalities as it emerges from Wehrli's statements.

⁴ For the material on Ariston, cf. also below, pp. 418-19.

While earlier interpreters were inclined to deny to Demetrius any interest in metaphysical or logical investigations (e.g. E. Bayer, *Tüb. Beitr. z. Altertumswissenschaft*, XXXVI [1942], p. 150; cf. p. 154), Wehrli is willing to allow for the possibility that Demetrius may have written on epistemological and dialectical problems (Frs. 187; 155). To me, this suggestion is very plausible. A writer whose aim it was to mediate between philosophy and rhetoric by making both serve the truth (Fr. 157; pp. 79 f.) can easily be credited with studies on the question of knowledge, and the title *Περὶ τοῦ δόκου* (Fr. 187) is best explained as pointing to a work of this kind. To doubt with Jacoby (*Kommentar*, p. 644, 14 ff.) the genuineness of the ascription of such a book to Demetrius is warranted only if one sees in him a mere *littérateur*. I wonder whether the treatise *Περὶ πίστεως* (Fr. 87) was not another essay in epistemology, a possibility which Wehrli considers, but finally rejects in favor of the assumption that the subject dealt with was ethical. Philodemus (Fr. 157) criticizing Demetrius for his attempt "to deprive the philosopher of the search for truth and giving it to the rhetorician instead," charges that Demetrius tried to transfer the authority he once held in political affairs to the realm of inquiries that require proof (*καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς σκέψεις μετάγει τὰς πίστεως δεομένας*). Had Demetrius really written on proof, the rebuttal would be especially poignant and deadly. It is true, the essay in question is mentioned among the ethical writings of Demetrius, but the order followed in the book list shows other inconsistencies (cf. *ad* Frs. 74-6).

The fact that Straton selected Lycon as his successor (Frs. 4-6), Wehrli characterizes as "*Notlösung*" (p. 2), but he admits that Lycon's general orientation may have seemed a desirable change from the tendencies represented by Straton. This interpretation, I think, is the most convincing yet proposed of Straton's will. Wehrli rightly disagrees with Wilamowitz' total condemnation of Lycon and rather sides with Brinck's more positive characterization of his policy (*R.-E.*, Suppl. VII, s. v. "Peripatos," cols. 932 f.). Wehrli himself has put Lycon's achievement in proper perspective by pointing out that his definition of the end of life came to be included in the doxographical tradition (*ad* Fr. 15, p. 24). He probably is also right in claiming (*ad* Fr. 20) that Lycon by the true joy of the soul meant the joy derived from a good education rather than that resulting from contemplation. This no doubt would involve a certain deviation from the teaching of Aristotle. That nevertheless the definition retains at least the Aristotelian spirit may perhaps become clearer through a comparison with the one proposed by Ariston's fellow-student, Hieronymus, who under the influence of the Cyrenaic and Epicurean schools taught that the aim of life consists in freedom from pain (Cicero, *Acad. prior.*, II, 42, 131). In the issue that split the Peripatos—Hieronymus founded a school of his own—Lycon remained in opposition to the then ascending moral ideal of imperturbability and freedom from emotions. If his approval of natural goods made him liable to the charge of "luxurious living," one will do well to remember that the same charge was brought by followers of Crates against Theophrastus and Xenocrates (Metrocles, *apud* Teletem, p. 40, 4 ff. Hense), even before it was raised against Demetrius or Lycon (*ad* Fr. 7).

Lycon and his pupil Ariston both were assiduous students of the Aristotelian works (Lycon, Fr. 9). Both were engaged primarily in ethical or rhetorical investigations, but in addition were probably also concerned with inquiries into nature (Lycon, Frs. 28-30; Ariston, Frs. 34-35). On the basis of Stobaeus' report (*Eclog.*, I, p. 347, 21 W.) about the various faculties of the soul according to "Ariston," Zeller (*op. cit.*, II, 2³, p. 926, n. 3) assumed that Ariston was interested also in epistemology and psychology. Arnim has attributed the fragment from Stobaeus to the Stoic Ariston (I, 377), and Wehrli seems to agree with him; at any rate, he does not include the Stobaeus passage in his collection. But within the context of Stoic philosophy, and of the philosophy of the Stoic Ariston in particular, the statement is extremely hard to understand. Two parts of the soul are distinguished, the one capable of sensory perception, the other "by itself and separate from [any] organs"; the latter is either non-existent in animals, or inadequately developed, and has therefore no name; in men, however, in whom alone it appears, it is called reason (*νοῦς*). Now, the Stoics of Ariston's time were sensualists; none of them taught that reason could function independently of the senses or any bodily organs; they made a sharp distinction between animals and men and attributed reason to man alone.⁵ Ariston himself rejected all physical and logical inquiries and restricted philosophy to ethical questions. The theory outlined then is hardly reconcilable with his point of view, and would surely be unique within the context of the other fragments. But it fits in well with the Peripatetic investigations on the psychology of animals known to have extended to Lycon's time (cf. Regenbogen, *R.-E.*, Suppl. VII, s. v. "Theophrastos von Eresos," col. 1432). Straton had gone so far as to attribute reason (*νοῦς*) even to animals (Fr. 48). The author quoted by Stobaeus seems to have been a Peripatetic who made an attempt to return to the Aristotelian notion according to which reason is not bound up with the body or any organ (cf. *De Anima*, 429 a 26; b5), and also to oppose Straton's revolutionary doctrine without completely rejecting all its implications. And is it not most likely, as Zeller maintains, that the Ariston mentioned by Stobaeus is Ariston of Keos? The other Peripatetic by this name who lived in the first century B. C. is a rather unimportant figure and is known only for his natural and logical studies (cf. Zeller, *op. cit.*, III, 1³, p. 614, n. 1; pp. 627 f.). Ariston, the friend or pupil of Critolaus (Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.*, II, 61; Quintilian, II, 15, 19), as I believe with Zeller (*op. cit.*, II, 2³, p. 925, n. 2), is identical with Ariston of Keos; for since the name Ariston is absent from some of the lists of the Peripatetic scholarchs (cf. Wehrli, *ad Fr. 7*), he may easily have been described as a friend

⁵ Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.*, VII, 359, ascribes to some dogmatists a theory in certain respects similar to that of Ariston, namely that the soul is said to be endowed with *δύναμις ἀντιληπτική*, and Arnim, II, 849, takes him to refer to the Stoics. Even if this were correct, it would still be true that Ariston assumes two different parts of the soul, the perceptive and the rational, while the "Stoics" try to show that the faculties of the soul are not separable, but rather coexistent with each other. Nor is there any implication that mind is here conceived of as independent of organs.

of Critolaus in that branch of the tradition which made Critolaus the successor of Lycon. Finally, a psychological dogma as it is intimated in the account of Stobaeus squares well with Plutarch's assertion that in the essay called after his teacher Lycon, Ariston dealt with doctrines concerning the soul (Fr. 33, where I consider Wehrli's restoration of the text preferable to that of the other editors). If this interpretation is correct, the picture of Ariston is much enriched. In his psychological teaching he Aristotelianizes. In his rhetorical views (according to Sextus and Quintilian, he considered persuasion the aim of rhetoric), he also follows Aristotle. Thus his work in its manysidedness forms a transition to the activity of Critolaus, who took up even the metaphysical speculations of Aristotle. It becomes increasingly clear, I think, that even under the leadership of Lycon and Ariston Peripatetic teaching was not as exclusively ethical and historical as one used to assume.

To turn to Heraclides, Wehrli counts him among the Peripatetics, at least in the wider sense of the term (p. 61); following the tradition to be traced to Sotion, he rightly points out that it cannot be by mistake that Heraclides' *vita* appears in Diogenes Laertius' account of the Peripatetic school. But of course, Wehrli does not discount altogether the Platonic influence on Heraclides which was important enough to have instigated many ancient and modern historians to consider Heraclides a Platonist. Neither one of these labels seems quite appropriate, for Heraclides though stimulated by diverse philosophical movements followed his own bent of mind. His originality and the philosophical and scientific character of his work, in my opinion, are underrated in Wehrli's commentary. Little is made of Heraclides' peculiar atomic theory (Frs. 118-20). His dialectical and geometrical writings mentioned by Diogenes Laertius (Fr. 22 *finis*) are not set off as separate fragments. He is denied even the epithet "*wissenschaftlicher Astronom*" (p. 95). Granted that Heraclides was not the original astronomer he was once held to be, and that in his writings he popularized the views of others, he surely had a perfect grasp of the subject matter, and the dialogue form of most of his works did not necessarily preclude strictly scientific exposés. Nor do his studies on music show only that an "amalgamation of mythological fable and scientific data is characteristic of Heraclides" (p. 115). I shall not argue that a history of music which traces the origin of the great musical heroes to the Muses (Frs. 159 f.) is not necessarily mythology, although Apollodorus' use of Heraclides (*F. Gr. Hist.*, 244 F 146) would strongly suggest this. Nor shall I contend that the derivation of all musical genera from Apollo's trimetre (Fr. 158), or the statement that Amphion was the son of Zeus (Fr. 157) are by themselves no sufficient evidence for stamping Heraclides as a mythologist. Any mythologizing tendency on his part is amply counterbalanced by his scientific musical theories concerning the relation of sound and air movement. Wehrli's reasons (p. 113) for athetizing the passage in which they are mentioned (Porphry, *Comment. in Ptolemaei Harmonica*, p. 30 Düring) and for excluding it from his collection seem quite unconvincing to me.⁶ And I find it equally unjustifiable to

⁶ The genuineness of the fragment has been advocated again by B. L. van der Waerden, *Hermes*, LXXVIII (1943); cf. *idem*, *Verh. d. Konin-*

maintain that Heraclides was the first to have had a yearning for the miraculous (p. 75, *ad* Fr. 49), that he fought against the proponents of enlightenment (p. 74, *ad* Fr. 46), or that he belonged among the faithful (p. 74, *ad* Fr. 47; cf. also p. 104). It is true, he sometimes gives a religious interpretation of historical events (Fr. 49). On the other hand, he also traces the misfortunes of men to moral and political causes; miraculous happenings he recounts only in accordance with current reports (Fr. 50: *φασί*); sometimes it remains unclear which side he himself endorses (Frs. 46 f.). After all, the testimonies are taken from dialogues where different opinions were represented. How would one judge Heraclides' view on pleasure if by chance only its praise (Fr. 55) had been preserved? Heraclides doubtless shared the Platonic belief in the immortality of the soul, and the Academic belief in prophecies (cf. *ad* Frs. 76-89; also p. 104). But while it must be admitted that nineteenth-century scholars, like Brandis and Zeller, tended to minimize the "antiscientific" evidence, it seems that now the interpretation tends toward the opposite extreme and comes dangerously close to the biased verdict of Timaeus who was himself so much given to superstition and belief in miracles: *διὰ παντός ἐστὶν Ἡρακλείδης τοιούτους παραδόξολόγος* (Fr. 84).

Finally, the comments on Straton. The ancients considered him preëminently a natural philosopher—Polybius was perhaps the first to have held this view (Fr. 16; cf. Capelle, *R.-E.*, s. v., col. 284). Wehrli rightly stresses the fact that such an opinion is onesided and that Straton dealt also with moral theories and with philosophy in general (Fr. 15), even though the extant fragments, due to the interest of the ancients in the naturalist Straton, happen to concern mostly his "physics." In evaluating his physical doctrine Wehrli, in agreement with the more recent investigations, speaks of Straton's "positivistic science" (p. 46, *ad* Fr. 8) or "positivistic attitude" (p. 81, Fr. 143). The dialectical method, he says almost apologetically, was not absent from Straton's work, in spite of his reliance on experiments (*ad* Fr. 19). Such statements, I am afraid, must give rise to misunderstandings. Straton's experiments are "perceptual demonstrations" of logically proved theories. The role of the experiment in ancient physics is not to be equated with that which it plays in modern research. Moreover physics itself in antiquity was part of philosophy; it was never cut loose from metaphysical principles.⁷ One can therefore hardly argue against Straton's having written a book *On the kingship of philosophy* because such an emphatic profession in favor of the predominance of philosophy would be unlikely for a "physicist" (p. 78, *ad* Fr. 133).

As regards the details of Straton's physical doctrine, Wehrli, like all modern interpreters since Rodier, holds that according to Simplicius, Straton abandoned Aristotle's concept of the changelessness of forms (p. 61, *ad* Fr. 72). However, if this were so, could Sim-

klijke Nederl. Akad. van Wetenschappen, Afd. Natuurkunde, Ser. 1, XX, 1 (1951), p. 63. Zeller, *Philos. d. Gr.*, II, 1^a, p. 1036, n. 1 already noted the connection of Heraclides' musical theory with his atomic speculations.

⁷ Cf. H. Leisegang, s. v. "Physik," *R.-E.*, XX, 1, col. 1041; in general L. Edelstein, *Journ. of the Hist. of Ideas*, XIII (1952), pp. 577 f.

plinius cite Straton's views with approval (καὶ καλῶς γε οἶμαι ὁ Στράτων)? In the words immediately preceding the quotation he identifies himself with Aristotle's position according to which it is the subject, not the form that changes in the process of alteration (*In Phys.*, p. 806, 28 ff. Diels); as he puts it briefly here (p. 807, 2-3; 6-10) and explains at length later (p. 809, 3 ff.), the subject changes essentially, while the forms change but incidentally. Now Straton, as Simplicius relates, assumed that movement takes place not only in the subject that is moved (τὸ κινούμενον), but also in the "whence" (ἐξ οὗ) and in the "whither" (εἰς ὃ), though in each of these it takes place in a different manner. In the subject, movement is change (μεταβάλλει); in the "whence" and "whither," it is passing away and coming into being. If Simplicius calls this an adequate statement of the matter, he must have recognized in Straton's distinction of two kinds of movement the Aristotelian distinction of essential and accidental change just mentioned. His endorsement of Straton is the more noteworthy since he is not remiss elsewhere in pointing out Straton's deviations from Aristotle (e.g. Fr. 75), and he takes issue with Theophrastus for the very reason that the latter fails to differentiate between essential and accidental movement (p. 861, 24 ff.).⁸ How Straton worked out the details of his theory of movement, the fragments do not tell. That he was more of an Aristotelian than is generally granted on the basis of Simplicius' testimony, to me seems certain.

The supposition that Straton rejected Aristotle's concept of form is usually coupled with the contention that he discarded teleological considerations altogether (p. 61; cf. *ad* Frs. 36-9). I see little reason for this assumption. To be sure, Straton considered natural weight and motion sufficient to explain everything (Fr. 32); in his opinion, qualities and forces were the last principles (Frs. 42-9). But he also held that nature, though not possessed of feeling or body, contained within itself divine power, the causes of growth and decay (Frs. 33; 37). One could refer to him as one of those who involuntarily testify to the existence of the divine, even though he put nature in its place (Fr. 36). It is more probable therefore that Straton in his concept of necessity (Fr. 35, and commentary) included the teleological aspect, just as his pupil, the physician Erasistratus, combined mechanistic and teleological principles. After all, even Epicurus, with whom Straton had so much in common, redefined necessity in such a way that it became a substitute for the rational and purposive element in Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy.⁹

In my discussion of the problems arising in connection with the general evaluation of the various personalities I could do no more than ask some questions and make certain suggestions. The final clarification of these matters will have to wait for Wehrli's fully

⁸ H. Cherniss, whom I consulted about the meaning of the Simplicius passage, drew my attention to the fact that G. Rodier, *La physique de Straton de Lampsaque* (1890), p. 62, n. 2, who has been followed by later interpreters, omits the phrase ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἐν ἐκάστω. These words, however, are essential in the argument, at least for Simplicius' identification of Straton's views with those of Aristotle.

⁹ Cf. H. Armstrong, "The Gods in Plato, Plotinus and Epicurus," *C. Q.*, XXXII (1938), p. 192.

documented history of the Peripatetic doctrine which he promises to give in his last volume. That he may reach his goal before long must be the wish and hope of everybody interested in Hellenistic thought.

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ERWIN R. GOODENOUGH. *Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period*. Vol. I: The Archaeological Evidence from Palestine. Pp. xvii + 300; Vol. II: The Archaeological Evidence from the Diaspora. Pp. xi + 323; Vol. III: Illustrations. Pp. xxxv + 10 (indexes); 1209 figs.; Vol. IV: The Problem of Method. Symbols from Jewish Cult. Pp. xiii + 235; 117 figs. New York, Pantheon Books, 1953-54. (*Bollingen Series*, XXXVII.)

It was a Christian theologian, Karl Watzinger who, together with the architect Heinrich Kohl, published, in the year 1916, the first description and reconstruction of the synagogues in Palestine. And again it is a Christian theologian who presents us with a work scheduled to have seven quarto volumes, four of which have already appeared, dealing with the complete range of Jewish art objects: Erwin R. Goodenough, Professor of History of Religion at Yale University.

Both men were guided in their research by similar trains of thought. Watzinger found in the synagogues of Galilee the forerunners of Christian churches, at least as far as the eastern part of the Roman Empire was concerned. And Goodenough, already as a young man, while regarding the mosaics of Sta. Maria Maggiore in Rome, had discovered motifs: the white garment of Jesus and his rod, similar to that of Moses, or the prominence of groups of three figures, indicating Jewish prototypes, or the writings of Philo.

At that time, the number of well-known Jewish monuments was not yet as great as it is today. One need only remember that the mosaic floors in Palestine and the Biblical mural paintings of the synagogue in Dura Europos were found during the last decades. Goodenough began to collect burial places and their contents, synagogues and their plastic and painted decorations, lamps, vessels of earthenware and glass, amulets, coins and even inscriptions; he collected them, described and interpreted them, and had their pictures made. And he was not satisfied to select, for instance, a few characteristic pieces from an abundant number of small lamps, often similar to one another; but he described and reproduced each piece he could lay hands on, with the patience and punctiliousness that mark the true scholar.

His collector's activities range in time from the first to the seventh century of the Christian era, in space over the vast territory that had Jewish settlements. The Jews had penetrated beyond Palestine already before the Roman domination, but now, after the destruction of Herod's temple in 70 A. D., we find them all over the Mediter-

anean region. And Goodenough did not fight shy of seeking out all these places to gather his knowledge at first hand.

The author endeavoured to exhaust the depth of his field as well as its breadth. In the first volume, to begin with, he outlines the problem he posed himself, devoting a chapter to "Literary Evidence for the Religion of Jews in the Roman World." Then, in this and the following volume, he undertakes a description and interpretation of the monuments first in Palestine, then in the Diaspora. The third volume supplements all this with illustrations, no fewer than 1209. In the fourth volume he gathers everything that rabbinic sources have to say on the subject of graphic art as such. Then he sets out on a thorough examination of the method in evaluating symbols,—in the course of which he consults even the most recent findings of depth psychology. This examination is followed by another look at the monuments, this time not according to countries, genres, or materials, but symbols. He subjects each one of them to a special examination: the seven-armed candelabrum, the Torah shrine, Lulav, Ethrog, Shofar, and incense shovel. One hundred and seventeen further illustrations are added. The still forthcoming volumes will treat of more symbols and, finally, the Jewish representations of the Bible and their influence on Christianity. A truly gigantic undertaking such as has never been attempted before.

The explorer's interest was, at that, not even primarily oriented toward history of art. Not the aesthetic form is described, or its development—which progresses from a rather naturalistic to an increasingly abstract representation (the floor mosaic of Beth Alpha). Rather did the author try to comprehend the meaning of the individual motifs and, to use his own words, in this way to explore "the religious attitude of the Jews in the Greco-Roman world." In this process he attributes symbolic content to every detail, even to parts of architecture, like the number of doorways, or the use of arches and gables. That some of these are purely decorative the author will not admit.

The present reviewer cannot suppress a certain skepticism vis-à-vis this exclusive approach. Let us take, for example, the floor mosaic of the African synagogue in Hammam Lif (Naro). The center panel probably has symbolic significance: the fountain with its two peacocks, the large fish, the wheel-like object. But may the panels on the right and left, with their tendrils, animals, and baskets, not be merely decorative? One might adduce the explanation that the center space was possibly left free of worshippers, whereas the side portions were trod upon, the larger field by men, the smaller by women. In the Beth Alpha synagogue the main area has been covered with symbolic figures; but that does not prove that, in other parts of the country, one hesitated to tread upon religious representations. Such scruples did, indeed, exist in Christian art. For example the purely decorative mosaics of the Church of the Multiplying Loaves in Tabgha, Palestine, come to mind.

While on the subject of the floor mosaic in Beth Alpha, the reviewer would voice some doubts concerning Goodenough's interpretation of the third panel, the one furthest from the entrance. Goodenough looks upon the gathered curtains as being the hindmost part of a synagogue, behind which the Torah shrine was supposed to be

hidden at times. But why a representation of a Torah shrine in a synagog that had a real one? The present reviewer would prefer to look upon that scene as representing the tabernacle—equal in importance to the Temple—: hence the curtains and the Ark of the Covenant. This interpretation also explains the birds crouching on the shrine—which Goodenough cannot explain. They are the Cherubim on the lid of the Ark of the Covenant, that superior class of angels whose representation, according to later Jewish law, was prohibited. One here followed Philo who, in his *Life of Moses*, describes the Cherubim as πτηνά, which, to the artist, meant "birds." Such birds, in place of Cherubim, are to be found in Jewish art for many centuries. It was, then, the belief in the restoration of the supreme sanctuaries that occasioned this representation.

Incidentally, the reviewer believes he can interpret yet another component in this mosaic floor, left unexplained by the author, namely the figures of a bull and a lion at the entrance. They refer to the End of Days prophesied by Isaiah (XI, 6), when previously hostile animals, among them the bull and the lion, shall live together in amity. That the artist should have picked on just these two animals goes back to heathen prototypes, as has already been pointed out by Doro Levi. In a villa in Antioch the same pair of animals has been found flanking the word φιλία, here certainly after Virgil's *Fourth Eclogue*. Such occasional departures from, or additions to, his interpretations in no wise detract from the author's supreme ability to interpret objects of Jewish art, wherein his comprehensive knowledge of the literature of the times, Jewish and non-Jewish, stands him in good stead.

Already at the beginning of the observations which Goodenough made while looking at the mosaics in Sta. Maria Maggiore, he noted traces of Philo's world of thought. But was not Philo, with his allegorical interpretations of the Bible, influenced as they were by Hellenistic thought, an exception in Judaism? Goodenough replies: not at all. There must have been, he thinks, a Hellenistic Judaism of mystico-eschatological character, that was suppressed by rabbinic Judaism and thus was made to disappear. But it did not disappear completely. For it is just these pictures which make this tendency appear very clearly, thus enhancing their importance considerably.

Now it is true that the murals of Dura Europos go far beyond the restrictions of rabbinic Judaism concerning representational art. Similarly, the representation of the Greek god Helios on his sun chariot—in the Beth Alpha mosaic—can hardly be reconciled with rabbinic thought. But is it necessary to deduce from this two separate, even inimical tendencies in Judaism? An argument against this is that all the pieces listed by the author manifest the same symbolic character. Should rabbinic Judaism have dispensed with every representation holding out to man the hope of immortality? We know from the most recent discoveries that this was certainly not the case. A further consideration is that during the Middle Ages—and the Jewish Middle Ages continue far into modern times—the rabbis felt strongly opposed to illustrated manuscripts and prints, and yet both were lavishly illustrated with Biblical scenes and even with angels in human shape. Life, then, proved stronger than all ordinances. And this was the case too, in late

antiquity. Not only surrounded physically by a heathen world but intellectually influenced by it, the cause of plastic art was espoused, and once it was there, the rabbis let it be. Instead of speaking of two sharply opposed trends in Judaism, it would be better to speak of only one Judaism of which Rabbinism, however, was not the complete expression, but for a knowledge of which one must also rely on pictorial art.

If here, as in his denial of the purely decorative in art, one might describe the author as prone to be too dogmatic, yet there is ample left to make this work most praiseworthy. It is an invaluable and indispensable contribution to the knowledge of Jewish art, which everyone can read with the utmost benefit.

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MAURICE VANHOUTTE. *La philosophie politique de Platon dans les Lois*. Louvain, Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1954. Pp. ix + 466.

The author of this book declares it his intention to attempt a new interpretation of Plato's *Laws* from a point of view as comprehensive as possible, in contrast with numerous recent studies of details which, he feels, run the risk of losing the deeper significance of the dialogue. He claims also a certain novelty for the method he employs. In order to form a definitive judgment on Plato's conception of legislation, we must discover the "climate" in which his reflections on politics took place (pp. vi-vii); and to do this in a "spirit genuinely Platonic" (p. 65), he thinks we cannot rely merely on the direct and objective method of investigation, such as is ordinarily used in the interpretation of Plato's text. We must search for its "latent content" (p. 66), for the "sense which the attentive reader has a right to ascribe to him, given a knowledge of the factors that Plato could have or must have been ignorant of, or simply did not have constantly before his eyes" (p. 67). Thanks to this "method of reflective analysis" he believes that he has arrived at an interpretation more fundamental and more philosophical than could have been attained by "immediate interpretation"; he claims to have found something which he describes, in the words of Merleau-Ponty, as "interests disguised as ideas, ideas fallen to the level of cares and vague anxieties in the confused ebb and flow of existence" (p. 67).

The point of departure for this existentialist interpretation is the evidently unfinished condition of the *Laws*. M. Vanhoutte insists on the lack of order in the exposition, the manifest omissions of matters that the author intended or should have intended to include, the several references backward for which there are no discernible referents, the occurrence of parallel treatments of identical themes, and contradictions in the spirit and substance of the legislation. Are these deficiencies such as could have been corrected by a re-editing that Plato would probably have undertaken if death had not intervened? The author believes not; the contradictions are not only literary but philosophical, and of such gravity as to be insoluble.

Hence we must not take too seriously Plato's own excuses for the incompleteness of his legislation, such as his advanced age, the complexity of social and political life that makes any law inadequate to the reality it would control, and the need for supplementation and correction in the light of experience. Plato could not admit that his work was "desperately incomplete," yet a latent consciousness of this fact was the cause of "perpetual malaise" to him (p. 58).

Vanhoutte traces these insoluble difficulties in Plato's work to the opposition between the rational and the irrational in his thought, an opposition that shows itself in three specific contradictions. Plato's work aims at scientific form, but such an aim is incompatible with his desire to deal concretely with the details of social life. Plato's aim is to create a new civic spirit, but he also finds it necessary to draw upon Greek tradition. Finally, reason is to rule in Plato's city, but the legislator has to recognize the imperious facts of nature and body. In particular, the author says, the economic organization of society is essentially a matter of violence. These contradictions are what Vanhoutte means by the "climate" in which the *Laws* was worked out (pp. 70-4).

The next question is whether Plato was "faithful" to this climate (p. 69). Three terms are necessary for the existence of the tension that underlies the *Laws*. The first is the legislator's desire to introduce clarity and system into human affairs; the second is his recognition of the irrationality of his materials, the chaos and anarchy in nature and society; the third is the confrontation of his aims with his materials and the recognition of the incompatibility between them. This confrontation gives rise to what Vanhoutte calls the *conscience législative*, which necessarily becomes a *conscience révolutionnaire* (p. 77). Since all three of the elements just distinguished are necessary in this situation, the legislative consciousness commits suicide if it suppresses one of them—for example, by assuming that legislation has been carried to such a point of perfection as to need no further change. For this is to suppress or to ignore the permanent irrationality of the materials and thus to destroy the reforming consciousness which arises from the insight into this irrationality. Now Plato, in assuming that his legislation was nearing perfection and would reach it in some not too distant future, was guilty of a flagrant breach of logic (pp. 70, 218), in the sense that he acted contrary to the climate in which his thought occurred. In suppressing one of the terms on which his legislative consciousness depended, he destroyed the basis of his problem. He failed to recognize that permanent revolution is the only attitude worthy of the true statesman (p. 78) and became instead a *révolutionnaire assez prudent* (pp. 80-1).

Such is the analysis which, as I understand Vanhoutte, underlies his interpretation of Plato. When we consider this existentialist analysis in the abstract, the result it leads us to appears to be trivial or fantastic, according to the interpretation one places upon it: trivial, if it means that when one has solved a problem the problem disappears; fantastic, if it means that any attempt to solve a practical problem is foredoomed to failure. Since existentialists probably do not like to think their results trivial, it is the latter interpretation that seems to prevail—and so here, in Vanhoutte's analysis of Plato's work. Plato was desirous of establishing his legislation on a scien-

tific basis, according to the method of dialectic; but a thoroughly scientific scheme would presuppose an exploration of all imaginable social institutions, which is impossible (pp. 219-20). Hence he draws freely from the positive traditions of his people, but—if I understand Vanhoutte—these borrowings are usually arbitrary or forced, and in any case they are fatal to the consistency of his system. Thus Plato is condemned to failure whatever he does: if he adheres to his demand for scientific system, his thought is subjective, formalistic, idealistic (terms which the author seems to treat as synonymous), without any contact with the concrete world of chance and change (pp. 255 f., 261 f.). If he relaxes his demand for the ideal and adopts features of known social structures, he descends to the level of the mentality of his time and in so doing falls into contradiction with himself (pp. 234 ff., 447).

This is the fundamental and insuperable difficulty in Plato's thought, as Vanhoutte appears to see it, and it is exhibited in various guises in the course of his lengthy analysis, together with a number of other contradictions more or less closely related to it. To the question whether Plato's legislation is intelligible, or whether Plato has succeeded in his political theory, the answer, given again and again, is that he failed to accomplish his purpose, failed to present an intelligible system of legislation.

To an interpreter not under the existentialist spell many of the judgments passed on Plato seem arbitrary—for example, that he had no concrete idea of the state (p. 261), that his moral code is purely formal (pp. 247 ff., 259), that his emphasis on law is misplaced (pp. 257 ff., 432). Vanhoutte seems to exaggerate the extent and nature of the deficiencies found in the *Laws*. The disorder in the exposition is not great, certainly no more than could be explained by the nature of a dialogue and the natural tendency of an author to modify an initial plan in the course of its execution (and we must assume that Plato was working on the *Laws* for many years). The omissions, though considerable, are such as might readily occur either by accident or by explicit design (as Plato sometimes asserts) in the composition of such a comprehensive work in the limited time Plato felt he had left to him. As to the contradictions (where they are real contradictions, not simply differences, a distinction that Vanhoutte seems to overlook), some of those alleged are the result of Vanhoutte's own abstractions. There is a difference between the disapproval expressed in Book I of the Spartan and Cretan education for war, and the inclusion of warlike exercises in the educational proposals of Book VII. But it is making an issue to characterise this as a conflict between pacifism and *bellicisme* (p. 35). Similar comments could be made regarding the alleged conflict between feminism and *masculinisme*, and the conflict between the spirit of community and individualism (*ibid.*). When we translate these abstract antitheses into terms of concrete legislation, the evidence for contradiction becomes rather limited, and some of it would vanish, I believe, upon a careful analysis of the conditions presupposed.

One contradiction that particularly strikes Vanhoutte (he refers to it on several occasions) is that implied in the admission of credit in contracts for services in Book XI, when previously all use of credit and interest has been expressly forbidden. This indicates to

Vanhoutte that Plato sometimes prescribes, in the name of morality, measures which he considers "perfectly immoral" (p. 237). Likewise Plato contradicts himself in prescribing fines for certain offences and stating these fines in Attic currency, when all use of gold and silver money has been eliminated in transactions within the state (p. 238). Plato's failure to condemn exposure and abortion shows that "the legislator become statesman can only follow afar off the moralist which he once was" (p. 236). Where, one might ask, had Plato previously denounced these practices? The use of a property qualification for certain offices is taken as evidence, not merely that Plato adopts familiar oligarchic devices, but also that he introduces the spirit of caste in contradiction to his explicit declaration that equality should be based on merit (p. 235). No recognition is given here to the fact that for most—and particularly the highest—offices in Plato's state no property qualification is prescribed, nor is there any mention of the reasons Plato gives for employing this criterion when he does do so. For the full understanding of these and other difficulties we need a more searching examination of Plato's law and of the institutions of his countrymen than Vanhoutte has made. He relies heavily at times upon Gernet's admirable juristic introduction to the Budé edition of the *Laws*, but he uses Gernet's results somewhat eclectically, as suits his particular purpose at the time. The historian of philosophy has a task different, he says, from that of the historian of law (pp. 245-6); but even so the historian of philosophy can hardly be justified in taking over the jurist's results without digesting them. Plato's formulation of a law to punish parricide and other forms of deliberate murder is said to be a departure from his principles; for how could a state such as Plato envisages contain citizens of this order of depravity (pp. 242-3)? There is said to be a latent contradiction between religion and politics in Plato's state; yet Vanhoutte really does not show that the increase in the initiative given magistrates in the administration of the law is opposed to "the most venerable traditions of Greek religion," nor that the assumption by the magistrates of secular responsibilities is incompatible with their religious preoccupations (pp. 448 ff., 431, 463). The reader, who should be entitled to interpret Vanhoutte as he interprets Plato, is likely to feel that the significance of this work lies less in what the author says than in the emotional tensions that form the climate of his thought.

Yet the dualism between the ideal and the real is undoubtedly an essential feature of Plato's thought. The whole of his life's work was devoted, one might say, to emphasizing this contrast, and the work of his later years was particularly concerned with bridging the gap between its two terms. We scarcely needed the existentialist analysis to reveal this to us. But unless this dualism, sharpened to an antithesis, is to be made an insuperable barrier to any intellectual effort in the guidance of action—whether by Plato or anyone else—it must be taken less rigidly than Vanhoutte usually takes it when he passes judgment on Plato. In fact Vanhoutte is not always consistent with himself. He considers that Plato was a truly great legislator (p. 235), that often his proposals were in advance of his time (p. 453), and that he has much to teach us today. Yet elsewhere he remarks that the study of Plato's influence leads to results that are either trivial or arbitrary (p. 218). I cannot reduce

these statements to a consistent pattern. Still less can I understand how on his principles he thinks that Plato could possibly have solved the problem that faced his legislative consciousness. Yet in one passage he attempts to show in outline how Plato might have proceeded better than he did in bringing together the ideal and the real. "He could have started from the law which regulates, or claims to regulate, the relations between citizens. This law—the sediment of political experience, but containing also certain moral conceptions imperfectly developed—could then have been rationalized by means of formal morality, which in its turn is a dead letter until it has been integrated into a tradition by which men live. The opportunity would then have been opened to go beyond this tradition to a living morality whose distinctive character would be to take seriously whatever there was in the heritage of the past that deserved to be retained. Finally, a political philosophy worthy of the name should normally expand into a theory of the state . . . conceived as the reality which includes ethics . . . as well as law. It is thus that one rises to a higher level which is, in the proper sense of the words, true political science" (pp. 262-3). Some readers of Plato would say that this is precisely the way in which he proceeds in the *Laws* and that Vanhoutte has finely expressed it.

There are many other fine passages in which the author, forgetting his method of reflective analysis, patiently explores the sense of Plato's text by the more orthodox methods of "immediate interpretation." One could mention as illustrations his analyses of the meaning of the *logos*, or *nous*, which guides the legislator; of the steps by which Plato progressively clarifies and determines the philosophical conception of God; of the Cronos myth in the *Politicus* and the revised version of that myth presented in the *Laws*; of Plato's reasons for finding circular revolution an apt image of the activity of reason. For these and many other excellent analyses the reader will be grateful; in them Vanhoutte has made a significant contribution to the understanding of the texts involved. One can only hope that some day he will escape from the spell of Albert Camus and practice with greater confidence and consistency this method of immediate interpretation; for with his scholarly equipment and sensitivity one could then expect an interpretation of Plato's political philosophy consonant with the high opinion he professes to hold of him.

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H. A. K. HUNT. *The Humanism of Cicero*. Melbourne University Press, 1954. Pp. viii + 221. 30 s.

It is customary, though perhaps not absolutely necessary, to seek Cicero's humanism primarily in his philosophical treatises. The reasons which secure them a place in the humanistic tradition need hardly be summarized. More important than the sense of form and the beauty of expression in which Cicero is likely to have surpassed his Greek models is the impression that he does not lose sight of fundamental human concerns and that such esoteric and highly technical matters as were debated in the philosophical schools are for him a means rather than an end. Nor of course should it be forgotten that Cicero wrote these works from an express desire to educate his countrymen; he wished to raise their intellectual standard and to refine their feeling for human and cultural values.

In his new book Hunt discounts the formal element completely. The dialogue form, the use of the Roman *exempla*, the Introductions which others admire—and perhaps even appraise as humanistic elements—are for him literary devices of slight merit, if not downright clumsy. To the educational purpose he pays little attention. What really matters is the intellectual content of these works. Hunt firmly believes that Cicero set out on a genuine philosophic quest, prompted by a desire to clear up his own doubts and vexing problems. From this point of view Hunt gives us an account of the series of works from the *Academica* to the *De Officiis*. This account which includes much careful analysis of the arguments is sure to be received with gratitude. If I am not mistaken, nothing of the kind has been attempted, either in English or in another language, for well over fifty years.

Probing beneath the surface layer of philosophical doctrines and arguments, Hunt finds a set of problems concerning man's relation to the outer world and his capacity of moral perfection. These he believes are the problems for whose solution—or at least clarification—Cicero makes one attempt after the other. If the *Academica* cannot completely assure us of the validity of our perceptions yet shows our inclination to "assent," the question remains (and would worry Cicero) whether an ethical system may be erected on the basis of such "assent"—a system, that is, which while accepting our impulses with their ready assent would work up from them all the way to a perfect morality. Again if this system as set forth in the *De Finibus* does not provide a complete answer for the relation between perfect morality and man's lower faculties, the *Tusculan Disputations* are meant to stop the holes and tidy over the fissures. Thus from work to work there is continuity, not so much of subject matter as of the deeper underlying issues.

The new approach is in some ways attractive—so attractive indeed that the reader may at times have difficulties in restraining his own impulse towards assent. Still, there is one and the same difficulty everywhere. The approach makes it necessary that in every treatise certain thoughts and certain passages be singled out to bear a maximum of weight. Here the life which has so long been hidden under the surface suddenly comes into the open; here we may feel the philosopher's pulse. Yet I doubt whether anyone studying these

works with an unprejudiced mind would attribute to these thoughts and passages anything like the significance which they acquire in Hunt's book. The thread which he finds running from work to work is not only very thin but actually disappears in the large and complex fabric.

It surely is risky to construct sequences which Cicero himself does not indicate. However, the basic question remains: how much of a philosopher is Cicero and is it likely that he was troubled by questions of a rather technical nature? He himself says that he was anxious *prodesse quam plurimis* (*De Div.*, II, 1) by familiarizing them with the larger topics of Greek philosophy. He tries to be fair and to give a hearing to the conflicting schools; yet he is also mindful of native Roman traditions and wonders to what extent they are in harmony with Greek philosophical teachings. If these are not philosophical orientations, then we are once more left with the realization that there is a difference between a philosophical and a humanistic attitude to philosophy. It is precisely this difference which Hunt cannot get himself to recognize. His sequences are reasonable, yet in a timeless and philosophical sense rather than in a historical and Ciceronian.

Being *tenax propositi*, Hunt discovers even in the *De Natura Deorum* something that may be related to the issues which he has traced through the preceding works. This time it is the question whether (or in what degree) man's freedom of choice remains unimpaired by the divine control of things. True, the question cannot be said to dominate the discussion; at best it is in the background. Yet Hunt suggests that if we think of *De Natura Deorum*, *De Divinatione*, and *De Fato* as forming a unit we can regard the question as the bond which, however unobtrusively, holds them together. Finally Panaetius' system of man's duties and social obligations may have attracted Cicero's interest because it seemed to close some gaps that were left in Antiochus of Ascalon's theory concerning man's moral τέλος and its relation to our "natural advantages." Yet it does the *De Officiis* little good to acquire new interest in the light of this possibility. For when Hunt analyzes the work he finds Panaetius' answers lamentably inadequate and superficial. Panaetius can hardly have given much thought to the task which Hunt has mapped out for him.

Such critical strictures as Hunt—here and elsewhere—applies to Cicero and his sources may not always hit the mark. Often he misconceives their intentions. And yet the criticism includes some rather good thoughts. In particular it brings home to us the fact that recent philosophers when dealing with similar problems—how similar I should not wish to decide—have gone beyond the point which Cicero or his authorities could reach. It does make sense to compare Antiochus' system with modern attempts to use man's natural instincts as starting point for ethical doctrine, and once this is granted it must also be admitted that a good deal is now known about these instincts that the Stoics and Antiochus did not know and perhaps would not even have cared to know.

Thoughtful too are some of Hunt's suggestions regarding Cicero's relation to his sources. He is quite prepared to allow Cicero some independent writing; for Cicero knew the philosophical systems well

and where the argument is not too difficult he may easily have drawn on what was stored in his own mind. Hunt also offers (p. 134) what to me at least seems the best and simplest explanation for the lack of real contact between *De Natura Deorum* II and III (the latter Book professes to refute the arguments of II but in fact hardly ever meets them). I am ready to believe with Hunt that the authors on whom Cicero relied in Book III did not know or at any rate did not criticize those whom he follows in Book II. As for the identity of Cicero's Greek sources, this is a subject on which Hunt has no intention of presenting new discoveries. He contents himself with accepting the opinions of Holden, Dougan and Henry, van Straaten, and others. On the whole this may pass; yet in some instances Hunt too readily acquiesces in views that are no longer tenable. After Karl Reinhardt's penetrating analysis it is hardly possible to regard *De Natura Deorum* II as a homogeneous account derived *καθ' ὅλον καὶ μέρος* from Posidonius. Nor are the resemblances between this Book and the *Timaeus* as close as Hunt keeps asserting.

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C. M. BOWRA. *Problems in Greek Poetry*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1953. Pp. 171. \$4.25.

The contents can best be indicated by simply naming the ten separate studies, as follows: Xenophanes on Songs at Feasts; Xenophanes and the Olympian Games; The Proem of Parmenides; The Daughters of Asopus; Pindar, *Pythian* 2; The Epigram on the Fallen of Coronea; Sophocles on his Own Development; Plato's Epigram on Dion's Death; Aristotle's Hymn to Virtue; Erinna's Lament for Baucis. All have been published before in various learned journals and are here assembled.

It is not generally easy to characterize as a whole, with any degree of accuracy, a volume which has such varied contents. Here we can say that the method is consistent throughout: a careful analysis of the meanings and implications of words in selected crucial passages or, for the shorter pieces like Sophocles' account of his own development, the whole text. For the entire volume, we can also say that the scholarship of Mr. Bowra (now Sir Maurice Bowra) is sound, that he regularly shows a high level of common sense, and that his literary and scholarly manners are exemplary. With ten different pieces on ten different subjects, I find it impossible to go further (within reasonable compass) in over-all criticism, and shall confine myself to a few cases which may illustrate the character of Bowra's methods and results.

Most convincing, to me, is Bowra's identification of the nine divinely married Asopids as Aegina, Thebe, Plataea, Coreyra, Salamis, Chaleis, Sinope, Thespia, and Tanagra, with his suggestion that the whole literary tradition goes back to Eumelus of Corinth.

This essay is a model of method, and its persuasiveness will not be affected by any doubts which Professor Page may have raised concerning the antiquity of Corinna, for that is a separate question. Bowra has interesting things to say about the two poems by Xenophanes, but is it not, for instance, over-interpretation to say that in the line

εὐφήμοις μῦθοις καὶ καθαροῖσι λόγοις

"the distinction between *μῦθοι* and *λόγοι* must be intentional"? What of the demands of metre, line-filling, and (the Fowlers' phrase) "elegant variation"? I find a similar too drastic extraction of meanings in the treatise on Parmenides' proem. If Parmenides was able to say in hexameters precisely what he wanted to say, and nothing less *and nothing more*, with every word carrying full weight and without "poesy," he was a far better poet than I think he was. On the other hand, to say, as Bowra does, that Tyrtaeus' preference for martial over athletic ἀρετή proves that aristocrats were not so universally interested in athletic renown, is to oversimplify. Surely, Tyrtaeus' careful belittling of athletic talents proves that these talents meant much to others than Tyrtaeus. Again, in arguing that Pindar's *Second Pythian* was written on the occasion of Hieron's victory at Olympia in 468 B. C., Bowra ignores the fact that the ode simply does not have the properties, so to speak, which are to be found in every other Olympian ode; that is, no Olympia, Elis, Pisa, Alpheus or Alpheus Crossing, Hill of Cronus, or any indication that the victory was Olympian. The foregoing examples might perhaps illustrate an occasional thinness of texture. I do not find these faults, if faults they really are, in the essays on the Coronea Epigram, on Aristotle's Hymn, or Erinna's Lament. It is good, too, to have Sophocles' οἶον δὲ ποιεῖν firmly interpreted as characters as they ought to be *in a play*, not as they ought to be in real life. The Atreidae in *Ajax*, Aegisthus in *Electra*, Creon in *Oed. Col.* are Bowra's examples of characters whose conduct can not be help up as a model for imitation. Best, though, to go further than these minor characters or villains; are Ajax himself, Electra, even Antigone and Oedipus, men as they ought to be? (Yet this is what Aristotle seems to have understood by the phrase, *Poet.*, 1448a with 1460b).

There is much to be learned from this collection. Bowra is always sensible, always stimulating, never dull.

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Corpus Hermeticum, Tome III: Fragments extraits de Stobée (I-XXII). Texte établi et traduit par A.-J. FESTUGIÈRE. Pp. ccxxviii + 89. Tome IV: Fragments extraits de Stobée (XXIII-XXIX). Texte établi et traduit par A.-J. FESTUGIÈRE. Fragments Divers. Texte établi par A. D. NOCK et traduit par A.-J. FESTUGIÈRE. Pp. 150. Paris, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1954.

The final volumes of the *Corpus Hermeticum* exhibit the same outstanding qualities as the previous two volumes published ten years ago (see *A. J. P.*, LXIX [1948], p. 457). In his French version Festugière has kept in mind the primary function of a translator, to make clear the meaning of the text. But why should the mark of the vocative be rendered by the emphatic exclamation (*ô Tat*), particularly as the spelling of the Greek letter is *τ* and not *ω*. The notes are again as superabundant as learned, and an introduction explains the structure, meaning, and literary connections of Stobean excerpts. What a shame that there is no index to Festugière's commentary. A mass of precious observations, touching the whole field of Greek religion and philosophy, is literally buried here. For instance, who can suspect that an important note on Tertullian is to be found in vol. IV, p. 65? There is no index to *C. H.* either.

The text is based on the Teubner edition of Stobaeus. Of course, Festugière makes his own choice among manuscript variants, and does not hesitate to avail himself of emendations proposed by various scholars. His own conjectures are rare, but convincing. For instance in Exc. XXIII, 56 (p. 18): *ἐγκατερήσει* (MSS: *ἐκαρτήσει*).

Festugière's text was ready before the last war, and he meditated upon it during the fifteen subsequent years. Now, he abandons many conjectures proposed in *Rev. des études grecques*, 1940, pp. 59 ff. A casual reader of *C. H.* must be wary of offering his suggestions. Yet, it seems to me again that the editor has not been, perhaps, sufficiently discriminating in regard to Christian interpolations. I would have bracketed *ἡ δίκαιον* in Exc. II A, I (p. 4), likewise in § 7 (p. 5): *ἀληθῆ νοῶ καὶ λέγω* (omitted in some MSS). In Exc. XXIII, 1 (p. 1) the word *θεῶν*, which is outside of the grammatical construction, is again a gloss probably referring to the ambrosia mentioned in the same sentence. In Exc. XXIV, 7 (p. 54), I am unable to understand the conjecture *πλατεῖαι* received into the text, and translated *rues*. The Greek word does not mean 'street' but 'avenue,' 'broad way.' Cf. L. Robert, *Études Anatoliennes* (1937), p. 532. To say that as there are broad ways on the earth which differ one from another, so is also the case of souls, makes no sense. The MSS reading *πολιτεῖαι* is perfect. The term here means 'offices,' 'ranks,' as often in late Greek. See A. Wilhelm, *Glotta*, XIV (1925), pp. 78 ff. The author says that corresponding to the variety of callings on the earth, there are different places for souls.

The candid reader of *C. H.* must wonder how Hermes Trismegistus, *ille vanus paganus*, as Philastrius rightly calls him, could impose upon countless generations of Christian readers and, at the last, in the days of Columbus, appear as mystagogue on the pavement of the cathedral of Siena. Granted that the Christians needed witnesses of

truth. If Rahab, the harlot, had to become the type of the Church for Augustine, the Egyptian god, "contemporary of Moses," might be pressed into service to announce in advance the majesty of the Second Person of the Trinity (*C.H.*, fr. 12 b). But he could be requisitioned for this service because of his mediocrity. *C.H.* abounds in well meant truisms. I think, for instance, of the series of aphorisms in Exc. XI or of the beginning of Exc. I, often quoted by Christian writers. Here, Hermes explains the impossibility of knowing the deity. Again, his complacent approval of the existing social order (Exc. XXIV) did not hurt him. To be just, let us add that sometimes a spark of Hellenic beauty illuminates his tedious writing. Many years ago, reading the apocryphal Apocalypse of S. Paul, I was struck by the image of the creation complaining to God about the impiety of men. Now, I see that the Christian author rewrote a page of *C.H.* (Exc. XXIII, 53 ff.)—and I also see that A. D. Nock, whom nothing escapes, has already made the same observation (III, p. cexix, n. 2). But above all, I think, *C.H.* pleased by the union of piety and science. Hermes could explain scientifically why children resemble their parents (Exc. XXXII) and why ants store up provisions for winter (Exc. IV), but also discourse on the immortal soul (Exc. III). There is something "medieval" in *C.H.* Reading *C.H.*, I chanced to open *De fide et symbolo* of Augustine. As something self-evident he states incidentally: *quod enim vere est incommutabiliter manet*. The sentence could have stood in *C.H.* It is there, almost in the same terms (Exc. II A, 10). This vulgarization of Plato, which eliminates that which would not please the ecclesiastic censor, made the fortune of *C.H.* among the Christians who felt the need of a contemplative and so to say philosophical mysticism. Cf. A.-J. Festugière, *L'enfant d'Agri-gente* (1950), p. 142. In 1591, amidst the wars of the Counter-Reformation, an editor of *C.H.* (Patrizzi) recommended it as an antidote for godless philosophy and the Protestant errancy (cf. W. Scott, *Hermetica*, I, p. 38). I wonder whether Casaubon, who was the first to recognize the unauthenticity of *C.H.*, was not moved by the anti-Catholic bias. (Cf. also "Testi umanistici su l'ermetismo" in *Archivio di filosofia*, 1955.)

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ANDRÉ-JEAN FESTUGIÈRE, O. P. *Personal Religion among the Greeks.*

Berkeley and Los Angeles, Univ. of California Press, 1954.

Pp. viii + 186. (*Sather Classical Lectures*, 26.)

M. Festugière thinks of personal religion, which he regards as the only "true religion" (p. 1), as a "desire to enter into direct, intimate, and personal contact with the divinity" (p. 139). Thus for him personal religion excludes any private religiosity regulated by the *do ut des* formula (p. vii), as well as all forms of group religiosity, whether Apollonian-civic or Dionysiac-mystical in character (pp. 43-5). Taking Catholic Christianity as his norm, he distinguishes two types of personal religion, which he calls, not very happily, popular piety and reflective piety. Reflective piety, ex-

emplified by St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and Meister Eckhardt, seeks union with God directly. Popular piety, exemplified by St. Francis, seeks God as embodied in intermediary figures such as Jesus, the Virgin, or the Saints (pp. 2-3). Festugière then gives illustrations showing the existence of both these types of personal religion in classical as well as Hellenistic Greece. The main examples of popular piety are Hippolytus' devotion to Artemis in Euripides' play (chap. I), Lucius' devotion to Isis in Apuleius' *Golden Ass* (chap. V), and Aelius Aristides' devotion to Asclepius as recorded in his *Hieroi Logoi* (chap. VI). The archetype of reflective piety is of course Plato (chap. III), though Festugière finds the reflective quest for God already in Greek Tragedy, Aeschylus in particular, and in Heraclitus (chap. II). The other main examples of reflective piety considered are the Stoicism of Seneca (chap. IV) and of Marcus Aurelius (chap. VII), and the mysticism of Plotinus and the Hermetic texts (chap. VIII).

This summary of the contents of the book is enough to show that the material analyzed by Festugière has been analyzed many times before. That, of course, is no reason why the material should not be analyzed again. For the larger questions lurking in the background of Festugière's book are perennial questions for the humanistic consciousness, that is to say, still important and still unsolved. These larger questions are (1) the forms and varieties of religious experience, and (2) the relation of classical paganism to Christianity. But an attempt to reopen these perennial questions can be called a significant success only if new theoretical equipment is brought to bear on the old material: Professor Dodds' recent *Sather Lectures* (*The Greeks and the Irrational*) are an example of a significant success in this sense. Judged by this standard, Festugière's book can only be called a failure. With disarming but fatal innocence he apparently assumes that no special theoretical equipment is needed to understand the varieties of religious experience. In a book which, if it is anything, is a study of the psychology of religion, he writes as if Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Freud, James (to mention only a few) had never existed. How much is thus lost, no matter what the religious point of view of the author may be, can be measured by comparing Festugière with Father M. C. D'Arcy's penetrating study *The Mind and Heart of Love*. Festugière's concepts—personal religion, popular piety, reflective piety—are too thin and too naïve to yield any new insights, irrespective of the sensitivity or erudition of the author. A conceptual framework which puts Meister Eckhardt in the same category as St. Thomas cannot clarify the psychology of religion.

But if Festugière does not advance our understanding of certain problems, he reminds us of their existence. As a florilegium of passages of interest to the student of the psychology of religion, explicated in a style that is always unpretentious, clear, and graceful, the book has real merit. And Festugière has both the sensitivity and the erudition which enables him to put individual authors and passages in a new light. Most scholars will hardly be satisfied with the analysis of Heraclitus, leading to the following summary of his obscure doctrine: "In a word, then, the wise man finds peace and rest in God" (p. 35). But the general reader will be grateful for the taste of Hermetic mysticism conveyed by a selection of texts

explicated by an acknowledged expert in the field (pp. 126-39). Festugière's analysis of the eleventh book of Apuleius' *Golden Ass* establishes the need for a comprehensive reconsideration of this still underestimated work. For this reviewer the most original and stimulating chapter was the one on Aelius Aristides, in which Festugière brilliantly succeeds in recreating the psychology of a circle of hypochondriacs whose hypochondria took the form of a cult of Asclepius instead of the form of a straight neurosis as it would today. But after stigmatizing the group with the quaint but significant label of "neuropaths" (p. 103), Festugière has characteristically nothing to say on the interesting psychological problems implicitly suggested.

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FRANCO CARRATA THOMES. *Il regno di Marco Aurelio*. Torino, Società Editrice Internazionale, 1953. Pp. 170. 1200 Lire.

Although not free from a few minor slips, this is a thorough and in general reliable monograph on Marcus Aurelius and his age. The author is ready to take issue with other investigators in the field, and the result is a stimulating and very readable account. The notes constitute an excellent bibliography of almost all the important works on the period. It is primarily a political and military history, but social and economic problems are by no means neglected. There are two maps of inferior quality and two indexes, one of sources and another of names.

The first of the major divisions into which the book is divided (pp. 7-54) is devoted to a general review of imperial policy from the death of Trajan to the accession of Marcus. Worthy of mention here is the useful discussion of succession to the throne by adoption, where Thomes concludes (p. 22) that "... agli occhi di Adriano il principio dell'adozione potesse essere perfezionato in qualità, se non nel sistema, con la scelta tempestiva ed oculata di un certo numero di individui opportunamente preparati al gravoso compito del governo," and that the new imperial nobility assumes the right of providing the candidates. Great attention is given to explaining the unrest among the northern and eastern peoples with its consequent military upheaval under Marcus. These pages are well written and are intended to define the nature of the problems facing the new emperor.

The second division (pp. 55-87) outlines the situation on the Eastern Frontier at the beginning of the reign of Marcus, followed by a close examination of that emperor's Armenian and Parthian War. We note that Thomes views the policy of co-regency as one born of strict necessity and involving no philosophical motives. Large-scale warfare on all frontiers is imminent, and two rulers of equal power are needed to resolve the crisis. Lucius Verus appears as a trustworthy and very competent co-regent, clearly a different sort of person from the dissolute and sensuous figure portrayed in the *Scriptores Historiae Augustae*. Let us bear in mind, neverthe-

less, that a hostile witness does not prove the defendant to be a man of honor and ability. Thomes, of course, is here following the paper of P. Lambrechts, "L'empereur Lucius Verus. Essai de réhabilitation," in *L'Antiquité classique*, III (1934), pp. 173 ff. In military matters, the strategy and campaigns are clearly outlined, but for the details we must still refer to Ritterling in *R.-E.*, s. v. "Legio," cols. 1296 ff. and under the individual legions. The entire section on the military forces could have been much more comprehensive. (Thomes does not even mention Ritterling!) Some minor comments: on p. 78, note 4, we are told that *legio III Gallica* was encamped at Damascus, which was not the case until about 231 A. D.; and again on p. 78 we miss a reference to Lepper, *Trajan's Parthian War* (Oxford, 1948), pp. 180 ff., which contains a valuable commentary on *A. E.*, 1939, 132.

The third division (pp. 91-120) deals with the German wars from 166 to 176 A. D. The author here gives us a condensed and excellent account of the Gothic emigration from their Scandinavian habitats to the region of the Vistula, and the subsequent pressure on the tribes north of the Danube. The invasion of the Quadi and Marcomanni, the Roman campaigns against them, the death of Verus, and the provincial repercussions are all told in a clear and concise manner.

The fourth division (pp. 125-42) explains the social and economic crisis of the age and outlines the decay of municipal aristocracy, the financial unrest, the heterogeneous composition of the army, and the growth of bureaucracy.

In the last division (pp. 145-61) are lumped together a series of smaller sections dealing with the centralization of imperial power in the person of the emperor, the revolt of Avidius Cassius, the imperial family as a political factor of unity, the second German war, the death of Marcus, and the problems facing Commodus. Much of this material might better have been integrated into the previous divisions. In regard to Avidius Cassius, Thomes believes his revolt is symptomatic of the times, when the power of the army is such that it believes itself alone capable of selecting the proper candidates for the throne.

There are many typographical errors, but generally of a minor nature: p. 74, note 2, read "Magie" for "Magle"; p. 77, note 1, *PIR*² 1042 should read *PIR*² 1402 (Avidius Cassius). A sentence apt to cause misunderstanding is found on p. 97, where we read: "Esse (legioni), designate in un primo tempo come *II Pia* e *III Concors*, assumeranno una volta formate (verso il 166-167 d. C.) il nome definitivo di *II Italica* e *III Italica*, e prenderanno rispettivamente stanza a *Castra Regina* nella Rezia-Vindelicia e a *Lauriacum* nel Norico." Actually, the *II Italica* had its camp at *Lauriacum* and the *III Italica* at *Castra Regina*.

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M. P. J. VAN DEN HOUT. *M. Cornelii Frontonis Epistulae. Volumen prius, prolegomena, textum, indicem nominum propriorum continens.* Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954. Pp. xciv+262; 4 pls.

The famous MS of Fronto, discovered by Angelo Mai, in part in the Ambrosian Library (in 1815), in part in the Vatican (in 1823 and 1846), shows three levels of writing. The lowest, as deciphered by E. Hauler, consists of only three words *HADR FAUSTIS OMNIBUS* (or *OMINIBUS?*); the second, containing the correspondence of M. Cornelius Fronto with Marcus Aurelius, Verus, Antoninus Pius, and others, and a few miscellaneous items, was written in North Italy in the second half of the fifth century; the uppermost dates from about 700 A.D., and preserves a Latin translation of the *Acta Concilii Chalcedonensis* of 651.

Proper arrangement of the badly dislocated quaternions and decipherment of the often nearly illegible text have occupied various scholars, including B. G. Niebuhr, W. Studemund, S. A. Naber, and, especially, E. Hauler, about seventy-five articles by whom are listed in van den Hout's bibliography. The edition by Naber (1867) has been the standard to date, and on it that of C. R. Haines in the Loeb Library (1919, 1920) is based. The need, however, for a new and carefully prepared text has been generally recognized, and this is now furnished by Professor van den Hout of the Gymnasium Augustinianum.

In an 82-page Latin introduction the editor describes the MS, its compendia and orthography, and in detail (pp. xlii-lxvi) the confused arrangement of the quaternions, for which he despairs of having attained a final solution. He then lists and appraises the previous published editions, according high praise to Hauler, who did not live, however, to complete his edition. At the end of the introduction comes an eleven-page bibliography, but the editor promises an even more complete one in the second volume. A few authors here appear without their initials, and Henry Allen is misinterpreted as Alan.

In his text van den Hout frequently prefers the archaistic forms of the first hand to the standardizing corrections of *m*²; consequently we often find, not only MS readings but also emendations producing such forms as *poetare<i>*, *protelarei*, *nataleis*, *hospitei*, *quom*, and *salvos esto*. The Latinization of Greek terms varies; e.g., p. 6: *utar epichiremate*, but p. 42: *in hac εικόνη* (a Greek ablative?!). The text is well arranged and clearly printed; the apparatus shows few and slight emendations by the editor but many by other scholars. In view of the currency of Naber's text and the dependence of other editions upon it, it would have been helpful if to each item there had been prefixed a corresponding number or page in Naber, instead of its being necessary to ferret these out from the conspectus on pp. 259-62. Some misprints may be noted: xxvi, 29, for *saeculo* read *saecula*; xxix, 19, for *precedens* read *praecedens*; xxxvii, 23, for *antiquioren* read *antiquiorem*; lxvii, 5, for *Antonium* read *Antonium*; lxxxvii, 20, for *Utreil* read *Urteil*; 21, 12, an accent missing on *εἰκὼν*; 59, 18, for *arbitetur* read *arbitretur*; 92, 25, for *quas ic* read *qua sic*; 132, 21, for *ini/ussu* read *in/iussu*. At 95, 4, the difficult MS reading *semul* is retained in the text, without explanation whether it means *semel* or *simul*.

On p. lxxx the editor promises a second volume containing commentary, testimonia, and an index verborum, and these it is to be hoped he may complete. But as it stands this first volume marks a great improvement over earlier editions, though it leaves still unsolved the problem how well educated men, even though gouty valetudinarians, could, in their correspondence, have achieved so high a degree of dullness.

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H. L. LORIMER.¹ *Homer and the Monuments*. London, Macmillan, 1950. Pp. xxiii + 552; 61 figs.; 32 pls. \$9.00.

This book, dedicated to Gilbert and Mary Murray, is a most important work on Homer. It will serve as a dictionary of Homer's words and their meanings, and may give future Homeric scholars a new point of departure. It will also tend to offset some of the recent publications on Homer such as Rhys Carpenter's *Folk tale, Fiction, and Saga in the Homeric Epics*. The book which, despite the date on the title page, did not appear till 1951, is the result of a study begun fifty years ago when Miss Lorimer, Miss Marion Edwards Park (later president of Bryn Mawr), Miss Caroline Ransom (the later Mrs. Williams, famous Egyptologist), Marcus N. Tod, the epigraphist, and I, with some others, listened for five days to delightful lectures by Dörpfeld at Hissarlik. Miss Lorimer (p. x) speaks of her debt to that great figure, "forgotten today in some quarters and in others the object of an ill-informed contempt. To Wilhelm Dörpfeld scholars owe not only that basic elucidation of the sites of Tiryns and Troy which ensured their further fruitful exploration but the establishment of rigidly scientific standards in the business of excavation, an innovation which has preserved for us untold treasures all over the Aegaeon area . . . In his own realm his work, as those testify who have had access to the daily records of his digs, was as nearly impeccable as anything human can be."

Miss Lorimer's excellent book includes chapters on Prehistoric Greece, the foreign relations of Greece in the Late Bronze and the Early Iron Age, Cremation and Iron, Writing in the Aegaeon Area, Arms and Armour, Dress (no mention here of Heuzey or Bieber), the Homeric House, seventy-seven pages of conclusions on the Composition of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, and a list of passages cited from Homer and the ancient authors. It is unfortunate that it should have appeared before Blegen's *Troy* (vol. I published in 1950, vol. III in 1953). Miss Lorimer does, however, refer to many parallels from Asia Minor and the East, and especially to Thraco-Phrygian and Hittite relations—which are neglected by Blegen; cf. for example the knowledge of Syria shown in the tale of Eumaeus. Professor W. F. Albright has shown that Oriental material must be made use of in

¹ Miss Lorimer died March 1, 1954, at the age of 81. See *The Times*, London, March 3, 1954, p. 10.

trying to date Homer (see his very important articles, "Some Oriental Glosses on the Homeric Question" in *A. J. A.*, LIV [1950], pp. 163-6; "The Eastern Mediterranean about 1060 B. C." in *Studies presented to David M. Robinson*, I, hereafter referred to as *Studies*, pp. 223-31, where he dates the *Odyssey* to about 1050 B. C.).

Homer, I believe, can only be interpreted in the light of the Late Helladic Civilization, as many passages in the Homeric texts indicate: the technique of bronze inlay seen in Achilles' shield; the practice of inhumation; the use of the brooch (cf. chapter VIII in Ridgeway, *The Early Age of Greece*, pp. 552-93, not cited by Miss Lorimer); the Boar Tusk Helmet, which disappears after L. H. III (cf. Holland in *A. J. A.*, XXXIII [1929], pp. 173-205, and Mylonas, *A. J. A.*, LV [1951], p. 144); the picture of Cyprus as we know it from the fourteenth to the eleventh century B. C.; the battle of the Sangarius against the Amazons; the allusion to Egyptian Thebes and other sites important in Late Helladic times; the references to the Hittite Empire and its downfall; and the similarity between Homeric and Mycenaean burial customs (cf. Mylonas in *A. J. A.*, LII [1948], pp. 56-81; *Studies*, pp. 64-105).

Miss Lorimer points out many Helladic customs and objects in Homer, but still thinks he was writing of an age long past; his career began not later than the last third of the eighth century (p. 493), and the *Odyssey* was composed before 680 B. C., she says. I have always felt, with Ridgeway, that Greek was spoken as early as 2000 B. C.,² and that the hexameter was a legacy from the Bronze Age; hence, Homer could certainly have written in developed Greek hexameters in the eleventh century, at the end of a brilliant Helladic civilization, with its love of nature, of rhythm, and its decorative circles. He did not write in a late dark Geometric Age, with its "vile concatenation of straight lines," as most scholars now believe (cf. Whatmough in *A. J. A.*, LII [1948], pp. 45-50). In support of this earlier date is the fact that not a single colony in Asia Minor

² Since this review was written, nearly three years before Miss Lorimer's death, Ventris and Chadwick have deciphered as Old Achaeans the Linear Script B of the Minoan-Mycenaean texts (*J. H. S.*, LXXIII [1953], pp. 84-103; Dow, *A. J. A.*, LVIII [1954], pp. 77-129). The so-called Aeolic stratum which underlies the text of Homer is really much older. Homer has a poetic ancestry, and I can see no reason why, even with the technique of oral poetry in vogue, he could not have written in this difficult syllabic script (*σήμετα λυγρά*) as early as 1200-1000 B. C. I have noted the similarity to Homer of many words, phrases, paratactic constructions, formulae, lists with numbers, much syntax and meter, ideas of astronomy, dress, armor (*epikitonija* = bronze plates placed over chitons—"bronze-skirted Achaeans"), and names of vases. *-Sis* names are concrete, and things may be human beings or goddesses. Homer's meanings, forms of words, and meter are as primitive as those in the Minoan tablets, and are not like those of Hesiodic and early Greek literature. Thus *apodosis* means "repayment," and *physis* "growing" or Nature as a goddess. See my remarks in *C. J.*, L (1954), p. 110; Webster, "Homer and the Mycenaean Tablets," *Antiquity*, XXIX (1955), pp. 10-14; also *La Parola del Passato*, XXXV (1954), pp. 81-117. At the recent Classical Conference at Oxford (Aug. 9) Chadwick answered all criticisms, especially those of Plato, director of the New Museum at Candia. He showed lists of inlaid furniture, armor, plants, and condiments such as occur in Homer.

or Sicily is mentioned—which would indicate that Homer wrote before the period of colonization, and during or soon after the Dorian invasion (cf. *A. J. A.*, LII [1948], pp. 107-18). There are no allusions to the presence of Dorians in the Peloponnesus (on "The Early History of Greece and the Dorians," cf. Hopkins in *Yale Class. Stud.*, II [1931], pp. 115-83, and now Bérard in *Studies*, pp. 135-59, where the date 1200-1190 B. C. is given). The late Professor Bates in *A. J. P.*, XLVI (1925), p. 266 dated Homer at the end of the twelfth century B. C., and Ridgeway did likewise in his *Early Age of Greece*, where there is an excellent survey of the Mycenaean material of Homer's day.

There are other points on which I would disagree with Miss Lorimer. On page 1 she describes the Neolithic population as extending from Thessaly to Arcadia. She does not know Hazel Hansen's *Prehistoric Thessaly* nor the work of Mylonas and myself in Macedonia, which showed that the Neolithic did, in fact, extend from Macedonia to Malthi. She also accepts Dörpfeld's theory that Leucas was originally called Ithaca, a theory which has been much criticized by more recent scholars. I feel too that she has been too much influenced by Rodney Young's articles, although on p. 44 she does disagree with him about the date of the Isis grave at Eleusis, which he puts as late as 700 B. C. She is wrong in saying, I think, that "in the eighth century the Black Sea was virtually unknown to the Greeks" (p. 52). Sinope was founded before 756, as is shown by Eumelus' reference to it and by other ancient sources, a date which the excavations now going on may confirm (cf. Robinson, *A. J. P.*, XXVII [1906], p. 148). Ortygia (p. 81) is said to be Sicily, but Tréheux (*B. C. H.*, LXX [1946], pp. 560-76) has argued that it is Delos, where an important Mycenaean deposit of ivories was unearthed (*B. C. H.*, LXXI [1947], pp. 148-254, pls. XXV-XXXVII) in the Artemisium. Miss Lorimer dates the Dorian invasion in the last half, probably the last third, of the twelfth century. Bérard has more recently put it at 1200-1190 B. C. in *Studies*, p. 158. On p. 123, in discussing the Minoan language, Miss Lorimer does not refer to the work of Sundwall, Ktistopoulos, Mylonas, Myres, or the late Miss Alice Kober (*A. J. A.*, XLIX [1945], pp. 143-51; LII [1948], pp. 82-103; *Studies*, pp. 16-22). Ullman is followed on the origin of the Greek alphabet, and reproductions of his tables given on pp. 130-1; there is no mention of Carpenter's articles (*A. J. A.*, XXXVII [1933], pp. 8-29; XLII [1938], pp. 58-69) or of Albright (for references see *A. J. A.*, LIV [1950], pp. 164-5).³

For the mitra (p. 245), I am sorry that Miss Lorimer was not able to consult the article by Picard in *Studies*, pp. 655-63, and that she did not include the sling in her list of armor (Childe, *ibid.*, pp. 1-5). On pp. 329-35 of her book Nestor's cup (*Il.*, XI, 632) is rightly interpreted in the light of the cup with two doves found at Mycenae (but now compare Blegen, *Eph. Arch.*, 1953, p. 59). Furu-

³ Note also, since the publication of Miss Lorimer's book, the articles of Bennett, Plato, Webster, Browning, Ventris and Chadwick. Cf. note 2, above, and *Bull. of the Institute of Class. Stud., Univ. of London*, no. 2 (1955), with articles by Chadwick and Palmer and a good bibliography by E. G. Turner.

mark in *Eranos*, XLIV [1946], pp. 41-53, must be wrong, although the article was not available to Miss Lorimer. Archaeology has also shown that *πυθμῖν* means support, not bottom, or base. On p. 335, for shooting through the twelve axes of Odysseus, I wish Miss Lorimer had seen *C. W.*, XXVI (1932), pp. 25-9 (such "spectacle-axes" date 1610-1200 B. C.); and on p. 367, fig. 53, for such Mycenaean figures, cf. Robinson, *A. J. A.*, LIV (1950), pp. 1-9. For the temple-models (p. 418; Pl. XXXII) which are really house-models, cf. Markman's better account: "Building Models," *Studies*, pp. 259-71. For the stelae at Mycenae (Pl. XXIV), cf. now Mylonas, *A. J. A.*, LV (1951), pp. 134-47; he believes that the stelae represent athletic scenes and chariot races, not battle scenes.

In the chapter on Dress, Pins and Fibulae, pp. 336-94, the elaborate discussion of fibulae would have benefited by a reading of *Olynthus*, X, pp. 95-115, but Miss Lorimer does know that there are no fibulae before 1200 B. C. and that Calypso and Circe used them in their toilet; this makes it quite possible for the *Odyssey* to have been written in the eleventh century. *Olynthus*, "the Greek Pompeii," seems in general to be unknown to Miss Lorimer. A perusal of *Olynthus*, vols. VIII and XII, for example, would have prevented such mistakes as p. 411, n. 4, "we are virtually ignorant of the domestic architecture of Greece not only in the Dark Age and the Archaic Period, but throughout the fifth century, and we know little about that of the fourth until near its close." Over 100 houses excavated at *Olynthus* date before 348 B. C.; cf. my article on the House in *R.-E.*, Suppl. VII, cols. 224-78, published in 1938. Bassett's article (*A. J. A.*, XXIII [1919], pp. 288-311) is cited but I should like to add some further bibliography here: for example, Boethius (*B. S. A.*, XXIV [1919-1921], pp. 161-84); Holland (*A. J. A.*, XXIV [1920], pp. 303-41); Baldwin Smith (*A. J. A.*, XLVI [1942], pp. 99-118); Mueller (*A. J. A.*, XLVIII [1944], pp. 342-8); Blegen (*A. J. A.*, XLIX [1945], pp. 35-44); Buechner on "Orsothyre" (discussed by Miss Lorimer on pp. 422 ff.) in *Rh. Mus.*, LXXXIII (1934), pp. 97-112; Fraser in *Rev. des Études Homériques*, V (1935), pp. 25-43.

Study of the megaron is important in showing that the steep thatched roof, lacking in the Classical Period but mentioned in Homer, indicates that his work is Pre-Classical. The megaron at Thermon is of the tenth century, those at Perachora and Sparta of the ninth, and the earliest Heraeum at Samos goes back at least to the ninth century. According to Dörpfeld there could have been temples with wooden columns as early as the eleventh century. The buildings in Homer are such as we expect in L. H. III, and the action in the house of Odysseus (p. 407) is that of L. H. III. In Homer there are no stone columns, no house cult or house statues, no cult of the dead, but open air altars of Late Helladic III type (cf. Yavis, *Greek Altars*, pp. 1-52). The cults and practices in Homer conform to what we know of the period ca. 1100 B. C.

There is much evidence, too, that the Greeks were not illiterate in the so-called Dark Age. Miss Lorimer's statement that the "Iliad could never have been developed out of popular poetry" will not please the Harvard School of Milman Parry and Albert Lord, who have clearly demonstrated that there is much oral popular

poetry in Homer. See the recent monograph of S. Gandz, "The Dawn of Literature, Prolegomena to a History of Oral Literature," *Osiris*, 1938, no. 7.

Nevertheless, Miss Lorimer's book is indispensable to every student of Greece and Greek history and to every scholarly library, and is a masterpiece of analysis. Let us hope that the first edition, written some years ago, will soon be exhausted, and that a second can be printed after revision in the light of the important American contributions to the study of Troy, and making use also of Nilsson's new edition of *The Minoan-Mycenaean Age*, and such monographs as Helene Kantor's *The Aegean and the Orient in the Second Millennium B.C.* (reprinted from *A.J.A.*, LI [1947], pp. 1-103). Perhaps by that time scholars will have found an inscription in Asia Minor mentioning Homer and giving his date, thus settling the Homeric Question, which has been debated at least since the third century B.C. Perhaps the solution will come from Caria, where inscriptions as early as 1000 B.C. have recently been found. It is a calamity that Axel Persson, who had discovered these clay tablets, and even a bilingual inscription, died just as he was going to excavate thoroughly at Labraunda (cf. Bossert, *Altanatolien* [1942], figs. 217-18, pp. 219-21; *Arch. Orient.*, XVIII, p. 495, n. 11; *Jahrbuch für Kleinasiatische Forschung*, I [1951], p. 328).

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MARGARET THOMPSON. *The Athenian Agora, Vol. II: Coins from the Roman through the Venetian Period.* Princeton, The American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1954. Pp. viii + 122; 4 pls. \$5.00.

The systematic publication of coins from excavations has become standard procedure for Americans, though our colleagues abroad have not joined the laborious practice, with the exception of Regling's work on Priene. It is expensive in time and money and the results are not exciting to the normal classicist. Nevertheless, it is worth the cost. The coins supply an economic and historical picture of an ancient site independent of all other evidence, though supplemented by many other kinds. Their testimony must be used with discretion. Increase in the number of coins found from a given period does not prove a proportionate increase in the population—I should suppose that common ware pottery was a much more reliable index in that regard—but it does mean that for one reason or another more coins were used and frequently, in combination with other evidence, it suggests why. The coins found may clearly show to what economic orbit the site belongs, and the comparison of several sites will reveal relations to which we have no other clue.

To our growing resources in this field we can now add a partial publication of the coins from the Athenian Agora, the 37,000 odd pieces found from 1931 to 1949 belonging to the Roman and mediae-

val periods. Mrs. Shear is charged with the publication of the Greek coins whose special problems, particularly in regard to the later Attic series, make their satisfactory cataloguing extremely difficult. It is to be hoped that the Islamic coins may be dealt with by Dr. Miles and the whole body thus made available—unless someone insists on a catalogue of the 11,000 modern pieces. Of course it would be an advantage to have all the material produced simultaneously in one volume but it is a great deal better to have access promptly to what is ready than to pursue that counsel of perfection which has made so many excavation reports recede before the thirsty scholar like mirages in the desert.

The present work has the virtues of clarity and economy. The catalogue itself is reduced to the barest essentials: places, denomination, dates, inscriptions and abbreviated descriptions, and number of specimens. Reference to standard works, at the same time, gives opportunity to consult the fuller treatment of these types and wherever more explanation is needed there are remarks in a section of commentary following the catalogue. Most of these remarks are notes on various details, of importance only in adding to the completeness of earlier lists, but there are weightier observations as well, the longest of which is a passage of half a dozen pages devoted to a re-examination of the anonymous bronze coinage. The reader will find with pleasure that Miss Thompson is a critic who tests all her authorities and understands thoroughly how to use the evidence of proportion and provenance to confirm or to amend earlier doctrine, thus adding greatly to the value of her report.

General considerations are gathered into a judicious introduction and a numerical summary, a table of comparative frequencies, and indices of rules and mints add to the utility of a most useful book.

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ATTILIO DE LORENZI. *Cronologia ed evoluzione plautina*. Naples, Istituto della Stampa, 1952. Pp. 223. 2000 lire. (*Quaderni Filologici*, V.)

With ingenuity backed by scholarship de Lorenzi opens yet again the vexed question of Plautine chronology. His criterion of dating (p. 22) is sequences of more than 20 senarii: the more of these, he argues, the later the play. This criterion passes a number of objective tests: it dates *Epid.* and *Asin.* early and *Bacch.* late, where on other grounds we know they belong; it fits the two plays (*Stich.*, *Pseud.*) which are firmly dated by their *didascaliae*. But it will not work, as de Lorenzi candidly admits, for plays with lacunae (*Amph.*, *Truc.*, *Aul.*). So another criterion, more familiar and less satisfactory, is invoked (p. 47): topical allusions, either to a great event (like the restoration of prisoners after Zama in *Capt.* and *Poen.*) or to a key political idea or an important law (de Lorenzi sees Plautus as pro-Scipionic in *Asin.*, anti-Scipionic in *Bacch.*, and

argues that where the tone of a play is vulgar [*Asin.*, *Stich.*] it was performed at the *Ludi Plebei*; where it is aristocratic, at the *Romani*. Where the two criteria conflict, de Lorenzi suspects *retractatio*. The final order (p. 221) established by these criteria is: *Epid.*, before 211; *Asin.*, 211; *Amph.*, 201 *Romani*; *Capt.*, 200 *Romani*; *Stich.*, 200 *Plebei*; *Poen.*, 199 *Romani*; *Merc.*, 198 *Romani*; *Pers.*, 196 *Plebei*; *Curc.*, 195-4; *Trin.*, 194 *Megalenses*; *Cist.*, 193 *Megalenses*; *Most.*, 193 *Romani*; *Truc.*, 192 *Megalenses*; *Rud.*, 192 *Romani*; *Pseud.*, 191 *Megalenses*; *Aul.*, 190 *Megalenses*; *Mil.*, 190 *Romani* (*retractatio* of original version of 205); *Bacch.* 189; *Men.* (second version), 186; *Cas.*, ca. 185.

Given the state of the MSS (interpolated) and the internal evidence (equivocal), one may be permitted reluctantly to doubt that such precision is possible. One doubts also chains of reasoning like the following (p. 166): Periplectomenus in *Mil.* says he is 54; Plautus may have played the part; the first version of *Mil.* is dated by the reference to Naevius in 205; therefore Plautus was born in 259. Nor can we be quite sure that Plautus played Simo in *Most.*, and that therefore he must have married after 205 a rich widow of Sarsina for her money. Again, how many will see in *Cas.* a sob for vanished greatness uttered by a bedridden old man (p. 201)? Yet these are exceptions to a scholarly method generally sound: the summary of the work on chronology to date (pp. 9-49) is clear and valuable, and the notion of dating by sequences of *senarii* is ingenious and provocative. This is a book that will have to be reckoned with by future students of Plautus.

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H. KOLLER. *Die Mimesis in der Antike. Nachahmung, Darstellung, Ausdruck.* Bern, A. Francke, 1954. Pp. 235. 22.90 Sw. fr. (br.); 27.05 (gb.). (*Dissertationes Bernenses Historiam Orbis Antiqui Nascentisque Medii Aevi Elucubrantibus*, Ser. I, Fasc. 5.)

The text of this volume, by the author of *Die Komposition des Platonischen Symposions* (Zürich, 1948), is divided into two main parts: 1) the sources for the theory of *mimêsis* (pp. 9-121), and 2) a systematic presentation (pp. 125-209). A conclusion (pp. 210-14), notes (pp. 215-31; many references, however, are incorporated into the text), bibliography (pp. 233-4), and an index of one page covering the chief technical terms complete the volume.

Koller presents essentially a detailed study of the use of the Greek word *mimêsis* and its cognates, taking his clue from the introductory paragraph of Aristotle's *Poetics*. Aristotle includes under *mimêsis* instrumental music (which uses harmony and rhythm), dancing (employing rhythm apart from harmony), an unnamed class of literature, including the mimes of Sophron and Socratic discourses (which employ *tois logois psilois ê tois metrois*, the meaning of which phrase is discussed by the commentators of the *Poetics*) as well as

dithyramb, tragedy, and comedy (which make use of rhythm, melody and metre).

According to the author *mimêsis* is not identical with the term imitation, which denotes only a small part of *mimêsis*. The narrower meaning of *mimêsis* has sprung, in Koller's opinion, particularly from Plato's use of the term in the third and tenth books of the *Republic*; the broader meaning, which is the more original and more accurate, should include music and the dance. As the author points out, previous scholars have called passing attention to the broader meaning of *mimêsis*—for example, E. Frank, *Plato und die sogenannten Pythagoreer* (Halle, 1923), note 18; an exhaustive study of the question, however, has not been made previously. Such is the aim of Koller, who has completed the task well and persuasively.

The bibliography reflects the usual Continental attitude—the omission of all studies published in America; in fact only a few British and French works are cited. Frequently there may be justification for the omission of American scholars; in the present volume, however, which devotes detailed discussion to the dance as an essential part of *mimêsis*, it is surprising that not one of the numerous studies of Professor Lillian B. Lawler has been cited.

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BOOKS RECEIVED.

(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all pertaining to the classical field are listed under BOOKS RECEIVED. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

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